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Chapter 1
Introduction
International economic mobility will continue as long as differences between economies
exist, be they in the domain of markets or in the domain of societies. This is in fact one of
the oldest features of human civilization. In 2010 it was estimated that around 214 million
people lived outside of their country of birth (United Nations Population Division, 2010).
This state is far from being steady, though. Thousands of people per day make decisions
concerning their place of residence and place of work. Opposite to what economic models
and empirical verifications would suggest, the choices concerning location and form of
economic activity can be made simultaneously. Labor market literature tends to treat
migration choices as status quo, whereas migration literature is more concerned about
migration per se than about the forms of migrants’ economic activity. The resulting gap
between the two approaches leads to oversimplified conceptual frameworks, which typically
yield biased estimates and, consequently, inadequate conclusions. It is the objective of this
thesis to partially fill in this gap.
The role of migrants in sending and receiving countries is in many cases vital. From
the receiving country’s perspective, immigrants satisfy the demand for labor, enhancing
the productivity not only in the sectors where they work, but also in complementary
industries. Furthermore, immigrants are usually net contributors to the host countries’
tax systems. They can also be considered natural innovators. From the sending country
perspective, emigrants often provide financial support to their family members left behind,
thus facilitating investment in physical and human capital. On top of money, emigrants
also remit cultural norms and knowledge which facilitate the implementation of innovative
codes of conduct concerning both individuals or organizations. Indeed, all these benefits
of migration are particularly strong, when migration meets entrepreneurship. The small
and medium size enterprises often generate a considerable share of gross domestic product.
While they rarely contribute to official R&D statistics, they constantly introduce novel
ideas in terms of products and processes. Given the importance and benefits of migration
and entrepreneurship for an economy, the combination of both can bring even greater
advantages. Recognizing the potential value of these processes, the focus of this thesis
concerns the nexus between migration and self-employment.
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Migrant entrepreneurs are among those who are especially capable of taking advantage
of the opportunities created by diverse market structures across countries. They can take
account of capital (financial, social, cultural, physical) acquired at home and relocate
it to a destination where it can generate higher returns. Such a form of arbitrage has
been exploited since the Neolithic Revolution when populations which settled in various
locations became able to generate surplus food production and get involved in trade. The
new socio-economic order enabled distinguishing those who were immobile from those who
became migrants. The link between migration and entrepreneurship, encompassing but
not limited to trade activities, has existed ever since.
Conceptually, common pull factors suggest a natural link between migration and self-
employment. Entrepreneurs are par excellence recognized as those who undertake risks. In
fact, the very specificity of self-employment as a labor market strategy arises form time-,
effort- and risk-demanding character. Migration is also a strategy associated with high
costs and uncertainty of outcomes. It is also pursued with the aim of obtaining higher
earnings. In this sense migrants are inherently entrepreneurial when compared to non-
migrants, ceteris paribus. These arguments make immigrant self-employment conceptually
a very coherent subject of study.
Notwithstanding, migration typically concerns citizens of poorer countries moving to
richer countries. Under such conditions, migrant entrepreneurs are not likely to have
an advantage: neither in terms of physical capital or technology, nor good knowledge of
the local market conditions, regulations, consumer preferences, etc. In fact, one should
expect that operating a business is harder for an immigrant than for a local citizen, ceteris
paribus. Thus, immigrant entrepreneurs, if successful, typically perform arbitrage on the
diversity of market structures and consumer preferences, exactly where it would be hard
or nearly impossible under autarky and among solely autochthon communities. in light of
these realities, this thesis will seek answers to the question of what are the mechanisms
through which migrants can take advantage of self-employment as a means to
improve labor market outcomes.
Theoretically, there are three primary mechanisms driving the choice of self-employment
among migrants. First, migration and self-employment are in principle induced by differ-
ences in potential earnings. Second, some features of the host markets - e.g. discrimination
- may prevent migrants from fully realizing their potential as employees, thus making self-
employment an attractive alternative. Finally, the presence of co-ethnics may yield pos-
itive spillovers for immigrant business owners. Notably, the prevalence of discrimination
can make immigrant self-employment an income-maximizing choice even if the migrants’
(endowment adjusted) earnings remain below those of the native population. The pos-
itive spill overs and lack of entry barriers, however, could determine the relatively high
profitability of self-employment in the hosting economy.
Each of the mechanisms outlined above generates incentives affecting international mi-
grants in their choice of labor market activity. The incentives considered in this thesis
are both direct and indirect. Based on existing migration theories, the difference in ex-
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pected earnings between the receiving and sending countries will be treated as a direct
incentive. The indirect incentives are related to two institutions which affect immigrants’
business operation - discrimination and ethnic economies. Out of these two labor market
features discrimination effectively “pushes” immigrants into self-employment as a second-
best strategy. In contrast, ethnic economies induce favorable conditions for immigrant
business in certain markets, ultimately “pulling them” into self-employment.
In the light of enormous cross-country differentiation in compensations, international
mobility and mobility across labor market statuses may in fact enable workers to overcome
the problem of human capital underutilization, understood as the under-compensation of
individual productivity. On one hand, assets such as ethnic ties may increase the returns
to self-employment among co-ethnic entrepreneurs, a feature existent only in the context
of international mobility. On the other hand, strong links between the extent of wage
discrimination and the intensity of self-employment seem to suggest that at least some of
the self-employed originally intended to be wage-employed at the destination and it was
only the change in labor market status that helped close the underutilization gap. Hence,
this thesis formulates the following general hypothesis
General hypothesis Self-employment, on top of international labor migration, facilitates
reducing the inefficiency of the international division of labor.
In search for proof of this proposition the thesis contributes to the existing literature by
merging two strands of work. On one hand, it relies on the concepts and methods related
to the economics of migration. On the other hand, the developments in the field of self-
employment economics are taken into account. The migration literature either considers
migrants as moving between two economies regardless of their labor market status, or,
if it does deal with migrants’ labor market choices, than only in the destination country
context. The self-employment literature is concerned about the changes in labor market
status, but of minorities in general, irrespective of whether one is a migrant or not. In
the first case migration is accounted for, but not labor market status. In the second case
labor market status is accounted for, but not the differences in market conditions between
home and abroad. In the third case the specificity of one being a migrant is neglected. By
bringing together the migration and the self-employment literature this thesis provides a
refined understanding of immigrant self-employment, as a process which comprises both
the choice of (labor) market and the choice of employment status on that market. On
one hand, such knowledge will provide insights into whether facilitating migration among
entrepreneurs can lead to more efficient allocations of capital. On the other hand, we will
be able to determine whether it is worthwhile in terms of economic outcomes to support
migrants in becoming entrepreneurs.
In order to derive conclusions on how gainful is the decision to become an immigrant
entrepreneur, on one hand, earnings form self-employment abroad have to be compared to
foregone earnings at home. In this case the extent to which immigrant self-employment
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is an income maximizing choice depends on the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of
mobility. On the other hand, the ability to determine the profitability of immigrant en-
trepreneurship also depends on the alternative costs of self-employment on the foreign
labor market. Therefore, following the general hypothesis several operational hypotheses
have been formulated in order to enable testing the specific mechanisms related to immi-
grant self-employment considered in this thesis. The motivation for formulating all of the
hypotheses was a blind spots in existing literature. The question of whether immigrants
earn more when they become self-employed abroad, then what they earn if they had not
migrated will underlie the first empirical analysis. The operational hypothesis on this
subject states that
The income gain hypothesis Income from self-employment abroad is greater than ex-
pected income earned at home.
Theoretical concepts of migration suggest that differences in earnings are an impor-
tant stimulant for migration. Whether this holds for self-employed immigrants has not
been empirically verified. The main challenge is methodological and lays in the ability to
control for the selectivity of migration. The contribution of this chapter is, first, in taking
advantage of the propensity score matching technique in order to overcome the selection
problem. Second, the conducted analysis provides answers not only to the question of
whether self-employed migrants earn more than what they would earn at home on aver-
age, but it differentiates between various labor market statuses in the country of origin.
One of the reasons why the hypothesized income gain to immigrant self-employment could
be especially advantageous, is that it enables overcoming labor market constraints in the
destination country, such as employer discrimination. Assuming that discrimination is
carried out on the basis of racial or ethnic group membership, such a context would be
insignificant in the migrants’ country of origin. In order to test for this scenario the fol-
lowing hypothesis has been formulated
The discrimination hypothesis Labor market discrimination is related to increased in-
tensity of immigrant self-employment.
This above hypothesis is tested by applying a research strategy which quantifies the
extent of discrimination by means of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and then applies
that measure in explaining the probability of immigrant self-employment. The main con-
tribution of this study is acknowledging that the interrelation between discrimination and
intensity of self-employment on local labor markets may vary in relation to various groups
which comprise more or less “significant others” for immigrants. This conceptual novelty
which considers a number of possible reference groups against which migrants may com-
pare their earnings is especially relevant, as we are not interested in discrimination per se,
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but rather in discrimination as a factor affecting the extent of self-employment activity
among immigrants.
The migration context provides not only labor market limitations, such as discrimina-
tion, but also opportunities which are inexistent at home. An institution which creates
such opportunities is that of an ethnic economy (enclave). The idea behind the function-
ing within ethnic enclaves is that one’s co-ethnics may constitute a pool of consumers and
labor beneficial for business operation. Furthermore, as this thesis will argue, the more
co-ethnics take advantage of such a preferential setting and become entrepreneurs, the
greater the competition, which is expected to be detrimental to profits. The hypothesis
for this analysis is thus the following
The ethnic economy hypothesis. Ethnic competition is related to lower, while ethnic
complementarity is related to higher returns to local entrepreneurial activity.
Considering both the opportunities and the threats related to the functioning of busi-
nesses within ethnic enclaves has not been done in existing research. This chapter con-
tributes to the literature by introducing the Hirshman-Herfindahl Index of industrial con-
centration as a measure of competition computed for all entrepreneurs, and for immigrant
entrepreneurs only. By comparing the estimates of the relationship between these two
measures and the returns to immigrant self-employment we draw conclusions concerning
the extent of exposure of immigrant business to general competition and to ethnic com-
petition. In addition, we also control for the ethnic complementarity, by accounting for
the size and the wealth of the co-ethnic community.
The underlying assertion of the latter two hypotheses is that the “foreignness” of
immigrants may be both a handicap, as in the case of discrimination, and an asset, as in
the case of ethnic economies.
Discrimination is typically hypothesized to push immigrants into entrepreneurship.
Unjustifiably lower compensations from wage employment lower the alternative cost of
self-employment, making it a profitable strategy at the margin. It should be noted, how-
ever, that often what is perceived as discrimination does not necessarily have to be dis-
crimination. Different educational backgrounds and non-transferability of some skills may
in fact imply an inability to discount some characteristics in the context of a foreign labor
market. One such example may be high skills in the mother tongue coupled with rela-
tively lower ability to communicate in the local language. For instance, highly skilled and
talented actors may be unable to obtain (sufficient) recognition abroad due to a strong
accent. In such circumstances, relatively lower compensation may in fact reflect lower
endowments, not necessarily lower valuation of these endowments. Thus, although in
principle discrimination could be an important push factor, it is also possible that even
in “perfect” labor markets immigrant would prefer to be self-employed. Summarizing,
immigrants’ opportunity costs of self-employment may be relatively low or relatively high,
what calls for an empirical analysis.
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Notwithstanding, relatively high returns to self-employment due to positive spillovers
from the co-ethnic population create the possibility for immigrants to entirely overcome
discrimination in the hosting labor market. On one hand, immigrant entrepreneurs can
be in possession of a comparative advantage resulting from home country specificity and
employ it in a place where it is more scarce, thus potentially also generates greater returns.
A good example are Indian immigrants employed in garmenting in Europe. Another type
of comparative advantage may originate from a unique ability to satisfy the needs of
the local (possibly co-ethnic) community, providing goods and services no other group
can secure at comparable conditions. A good example here is the provision of religious
services, dedicated foods, or dedicated food processing. With the growing size and welfare
of the co-ethnic community, the range of such products and services expands, including
familiar merchandise and tailored assistance. On the other hand, a larger number of co-
ethnics also possibly implies better employment opportunities and stronger competition
in such markets, what naturally lowers relative returns to business operation. Thus, both
complementarity and competition between members of immigrant populations might affect
the returns to immigrant self-employment. Furthermore, since immigrants tend to cluster
geographically, it is the local density of co-ethnics that should drive the results. That
being so, in case of sizable presence of immigrants in certain markets both relatively high
and low returns to immigrant self-employment are theoretically possible. Determining
which of these effects is quantitatively dominant requires empirical investigation.
The three aspects of immigrant self-employment mentioned above, i.e. the earnings
disparities based on which immigrants can perform arbitrage, discrimination on the host
labor market as a push factor, and ethnic complementarity as a pull factor into immigrant
self-employment are the focal aspects of this thesis. However, a variety of local condi-
tions in receiving countries make it empirically impossible to determine the quantitatively
dominant pattern. As people from numerous countries go to various destination countries,
their motivations and opportunity costs of mobility and self-employment will vary as well.
Figure 1.1a depicts the differences in immigrant and native self-employment rates
across OECD countries. Though the OECD average shows quite similar proportions of
immigrants and natives in self-employment, there are large regional discrepancies in the
considered ratio. On one end of the spectrum, immigrants seem to be more entrepreneurial
than the local population in Central and East European (CEE) countries. On the other
end, in South European countries, it is the natives who are relatively more entrepreneurial.
These differences may arise from factors differentiating the countries of origin as well as
from factors differentiating the destinations.
The figure fails to depict the selectivity of home countries with respect to the considered
host economies. While immigrants in the US or Australia come from all parts of the world,
for most receiving countries it is possible to recognize a dominant sending state. Depending
on the historical, social, political and economic differences between the home and the host
economies, immigrants will experience varying modes of incorporation resulting in the
observable diversity of labor market outcomes. These modes of incorporation can be
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treated as origin-specific responses to the conditions immigrants are faced with at the
destinations.
Behind the patterns represented in Figure 1.1a there are also dissimilarities in terms
of the destination countries’ market environments, e.g. the ease of doing business or the
extent of market saturation in certain industries. Although these aspects might be consid-
ered universal, i.e. affecting both immigrants and natives alike, as emphasized a number
of times heretofore, immigrants differ from the natives in their interactions with local
economies. For example, in net emigration countries of CEE migrants will be differently
perceived than in net immigration countries of Southern Europe. If they are considered
as a threat (a common misinterpretation) it could be due to their abundance in the lat-
ter, or due to scarce information on their beneficial role in the economies of the former.
The CEE markets will also have different institutional conditions for immigrant incorpo-
ration, both in terms of relatively underdeveloped legislation and organizational support
for newcomers. These two features could affect the extent of labor market imperfections
effectively targeting immigrants, such as labor market discrimination, and consequently
also immigrants’ self-employment rates.
The various receiving countries also differ in the opportunities for immigrant en-
trepreneurship created by immigrant populations themselves. In the context of ethnic
competition and complementarity relatively small immigrant populations may be a lia-
bility, as they limit the demand, or an asset, as they are unable to saturate the market.
Figure 1.1b captures this aspect by plotting the differences in self-employment rates of im-
migrants and natives against the size of the immigrant population at a given destination.
The US stands out in Figure 1.1b as an especially interesting case. First of all, it hosts
a very large number of migrants. This feature makes considerations concerning discrimi-
nation, but especially competition and complementarity effects very meaningful. Second,
US immigrants and natives have very similar self-employment rates. Such conditions make
research on immigrant self-employment more reliable in terms of possible generalizations
of obtained results, as we are dealing with a setting which not extreme, but rather average.
Even when considering only one destination country the diversity of the environments
in the sending countries could easily masque the relationship between the alternative costs
and the migrants’ choice of self-employment. In order to compare choices of people who
face comparable opportunities it would be preferable to consider a single sending country
as well. In order to facilitate the measurement of the alternative costs in the sending
country, it would also desirable to dispose of data concerning “stayers” of comparable
quality to data at the destination. Finally, from an analytical perspective it would be
favorable if the sending country under analysis was relatively less developed than the host
economy. Otherwise, external validity of the findings would be limited.
One case that fulfills these requirements is Puerto Rico. In per capita terms, Puerto
Rico is poorer than the US. In addition, unlike many other nations, Puerto Ricans do not
face formal constraints concerning entry to the US, neither are they de iure limited by
labor market regulations (e.g. they do not require work or residence permits in the US).
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Figure 1.1: Relative immigrant self-employment prevalence across OECD countries.
(a) Difference between immigrant and native self-employment
rates (in percentage points, circa 2008). Source: own elaboration
based on OECD data: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932440698.
(b) Difference between immigrant and native self-employment
rates (in percentage points) vs stock of foreign population, circa
2008. Source: own elaboration based on OECD International Migration
Database and http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932440698.
Furthermore, Puerto Rico uses the US dollar as its currency, what facilitates comparisons
of earnings in the sending and receiving countries. Finally, Puerto Rico conducts a census
survey according to the same standards as the US, what limits the scope of potential
mismatch between the measures used for the sending and for the receiving state.
Given the advantages, this thesis will analyze primarily the situation of the Puerto
Rican “stayers” and emigrants to the US. Such individual case studies, however, often
suffer from interpretational limitations in terms of external validity. Thus, for each of the
analyses, we attempt to provide a generalization against entrepreneurial choices made by
people who face comparable opportunities.
Summarizing, this thesis contributes to the literature in three major ways. First, it
combines the labor market literature and the migration literature from a new perspective.
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All three notions - the expected income gain, the discrimination, and the influences induced
by one’s co-ethnics - are present in existing works, but not in the contexts considered in
this thesis. Income gains, though analyzed for wage-employed migrants, have not been
researched for self-employed migrants. Discrimination, in spite of having been examined
among immigrants in general, has been rarely looked into as a feature affecting immigrant
self-employment rates. Finally, market competition and complementarity are often studied
in relation to the mainstream economy, but are still an under-researched topic, especially
when considered jointly, in the context of ethnic economies.
Second, we provide a number of policy relevant findings. First, this thesis shows that
there is a significant income gain to being a self-employed immigrant - both in refer-
ence to wage-employment abroad and self-employment in the home country. Second, it
proves that, indeed, discrimination (even in relative terms) can be an important push
factor for self-employment. Finally, although competition generally lowers returns to self-
employment, in the case of immigrants, it must not, while the co-ethnics’ larger purchasing
power generates additional stimulus for profitability.
When taken together, these findings shed new light on the international earnings dis-
parities. In fact, it seems that via self-employment individuals are able to considerably
narrow the size of the international compensation gap. On one hand, migration is typically
treated as a means for reducing the under-utilization of the human capital, especially for
migrants from less developed countries. On the other hand, labor market discrimination
against immigrants justifies policy interventions aimed at facilitating immigrant inclusion
in the host countries. This thesis demonstrates that immigrant self-employment not only
fulfills the expectations of migration, i.e. the effective reduction of the under-utilization
of migrants’ human capital, but moreover, that it leads to more effective allocations of
human capital, enhancing immigrants’ labor market outcomes at the destination and gen-
erating multilateral benefits for migrants and the receiving societies alike. While typically
inclusion policies stress the role of adaptation, skills, and open access to wage employment,
this thesis suggests that policies facilitating self-employment among migrants may in fact
be more effective in limiting the under-utilization problem.
Last but not least, we contribute to the methodology of migration and labor studies
by adapting the available empirical techniques to test the formulated hypotheses. While
propensity score matching, parametric decomposition as well as returns and choice models
have been used extensively in research in general, our applications are novel in each of
the relevant strands of literature. The application of propensity score matching does not
aim to provide causal interpretation, but to address the selection bias problem. Since
it is applied to relatively large samples in a relatively homogeneous context, the validity
of such a method choice seems satisfactory. Second, the estimates of discrimination are
used as explanatory variables in our framework, rather than the end point of the analyses.
A number of robustness checks as well as external validity exercises suggest that the
results are fairly general and statistically strong. Finally, we are the first to include
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both complementarity and competition measures, when analyzing the returns to self-
employment.
This thesis comprises an extensive literature review, three independent empirical anal-
yses and a concluding section. Indeed, is immigrant self-employment a beneficial choice?
This thesis will analyze predominantly Puerto Rican immigration to the US. In Chapter
3 we briefly describe the characteristics of Puerto Rico and the US, which justify such
choice of empirical material. The following chapter presents an overview of migration,
self-employment and immigrant self-employment theories and theoretical concepts. In
accordance with the structure of following, empirical chapters, the literature review is
divided into three parts. The first part discusses the determinants of migration. The
second part provides an overview of the determinants of self-employment. The third part
considers the two selected contexts of immigrant self-employment which will be analyzed
in this thesis, i.e. discrimination and ethnic economies. While there are numerous re-
views of both migration and self-employment literature, our objective was to show the
main existing knowledge gaps. In addition, it organizes general theoretical foundations
for subsequent analyses. This thesis is predominantly empirical, putting a lot of stress on
the methodological context of migration-cum-entrepreneurship studies. However, meth-
ods employed in each of the three analyses differ substantially. To facilitate the flow of
analyses, the review of the advantages and disadvantages of various empirical strategies is
discussed in each chapter separately, along with the main insights form earlier empirical
works.
Three empirical chapters follow the literature review. Each of them is dedicated to
testing specific operational hypotheses. The last section of each empirical chapter provides
an extension of the relevant study. The extensions allow to consider the analyzed deter-
minant of immigrant self-employment, be it income differences, discrimination or ethnic
competition and complementarity, in a wider context, i.e. one not limited to Puerto Rican
immigration to the US.
The first chapter tackles the most fundamental issue of income gains to immigrant
entrepreneurship. It provides methodologically robust estimates of the counterfactual
earnings of emigrants, which would have been gained had they not migrated. We employ
propensity score matching to address the problem of migration (and entrepreneurship)
selectivity. We compare income from self-employment in the receiving economy to income
form wage employment in the receiving economy and to income from self-employment
and wage-employment in the sending economy. The core of the analysis concerns self-
employed Puerto Rican “stayers” and immigrants to the US. We find that in fact returns
from self-employment in the US are superior to alternatives. The test of external validity
is provided by an analysis of self-employed “stayers” and migrants in the context of inter-
state mobility in the US. Only relocations between states as distant as Puerto Rico is from
the US are considered in order to enable comparability of the results.
The second empirical chapter deals with labor market discrimination as a reason for
undertaking self-employment by migrants. Based on the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
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of wage differences it estimates the probability of becoming self-employed under the con-
ditions of local labor market discrimination. In fact, the analysis comprises two parts.
First, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is applied to wage equations of Puerto Rican
immigrants in the US and several comparison groups of natives. This stage of the research
allows us to determine the extent of labor market discrimination. Second, the estimates
of discrimination obtained in the first stage are incorporated into probability models of
immigrant self-employment, allowing to recognize the interdependencies between discrimi-
nation and the intensity of immigrant self-employment. The findings prove that the extent
discrimination is positively related to self-employment incidence among Puerto Rican im-
migrants. The external validity of the study is tested on several aggregate ethnic groups
of immigrants residing in the US.
The third empirical chapter analyzes the hypothesis of ethnic enclaves as potential
stimulants for immigrant self-employment. The innovative approach introduced in this
chapter considers not only the potentially positive effect of ethnic congestion, though, but
also the possibly detrimental effect of ethnic competition. The former is expected to in-
crease profits by enlarging the customer and labor pool. The latter is expected to decrease
profits by reducing the market power of a representative firm. Ethnic complementarity
is primarily operationalized as the share of co-ethnics in a local market. The co-ethnic
group’s relative wealth is also controlled for. Ethnic competition is operationalized as the
value of the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index. We compute it not only for co-ethnics, however,
but also for the whole population of entrepreneurs. The results show that although ethnic
competition is detrimental to profits, increased external competition provides a favorable
environment for ethnic businesses. The effect of ethnic complementarity as such was found
unrelated to business profits, but increased purchasing power of co-ethnic communities was
positively related to the returns to ethnic entrepreneurship. The external validity of the
study is provided by an analysis of the competition and complementarity mechanisms
among the same aggregate ethnic groups as considered in the extension to the previous
chapter.
The last chapter develops policy implications, summarizes the findings, and provides
suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Literature review
This chapter aims at demonstrating gaps which exist in the literature on migration and
self-employment. It shows that immigrant self-employment, as an outcome of a migration
decision and a labor market status decision, should be an income maximizing choice. It
further establishes that, on one hand, self-employment is a form of labor market activity
which enables migrants overcome labor market imperfections such as discrimination. On
the other hand, it also determines that there exist contexts such as the ethnic economy,
which enable self-employed immigrants taking advantage of their joint migration and labor
market status.
The presented discussion reveals the drawbacks of existing research and substantiates
the theoretical and methodological approaches applied in this study. The chapter is divided
into three parts, each dedicated to a specific notion. The first two parts consider analyses
related to the determinants of labor migration and the determinants of self-employment
as forms of labor market activity. The final section takes the choice of migrating and be-
coming self-employed as given and reviews the theoretical concepts related to two contexts
of immigrant self-employment - labor market discrimination and ethnic economies.
In this chapter only theoretical issues are tackled. Reviews of methodologies applied
in testing these theoretical predictions are discussed in each of the empirical chapters of
the thesis.
2.1 Determinants of labor migration
There is no holistic, unified theory of labor migration1. The multitude of individual
preferences and objectives regarding (international) migration, together with the numerous
contexts in which they are translated into actual strategies lead to the evolution of various
theoretical concepts explaining why mobility occurs. Each one of them tackles only a
selection of issues and overlooks the influences of the others. This section elaborates on a
catalogue of most widely recognized factors which affect migration choices.
1Due to its labor market orientation this thesis focuses solely on labor migration and excludes forced
mobility or that relying on other motivations, such e.g. as educational.
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All seminal concepts in the economics of migration consider expected income differ-
ences as one of the determinants of migration. Hicks (1932) was the first to make a very
straightforward reflection that “differences in net economic advantages, chiefly differences
in wages are main causes for migration” (Hicks, 1932, p.76). This statement has become
the motto of all neoclassical migration theorists. The idea of differences in net returns
to economic activity on two markets as the main driver of mobility has been most often
exploited in the framework of trade theory. Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1998) have proposed
labor migration to be considered in the same way as the mobility of capital. Flows between
markets were expected to take place until wages equalize. A graphical representation of
their approach has been replicated in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: International trade model of labor mobility.
Source: Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1998).
In T0 employment in countries A and B is AL0 and BL0, respectively. Country B, where
labor is relatively more scarce, offers relatively higher wages (wB0 > wA0). Neoclassical
theory claims that this creates a sufficient incentive for people to want to move from the
lower paying market (A), to the higher paying market (B). The model predicts that as
long as wages are strictly higher in B than they are in A, people will move. As they move
labor becomes more and more abundant in country B and more and more scarce in country
A, decreasing marginal productivity of labor in the former (MPLB) and increasing it in
the latter (MPLA). An equilibrium with equal wages is reached when MA−B workers
migrate from A to B, at which point wA = wB leaving no more incentive for mobility.
Despite its simple and convenient mechanics, the neoclassical model of migration has
been considered an oversimplification for at least three reasons. First, due to institutional,
technological and structural factors equalization of wages does not necessarily occur. The
poorest countries in the world do not become completely depopulated and migration flows
between some very diverse states are inexistent or at least much less intensive than ex-
pected given the extent of wage disparities. The second very much related oversimplifica-
tion lies in that labor is not homogenous. People actually may have different propensities
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to migrate. This associates the choice of being mobile and of choosing a given labor market
status to individual characteristics, rather than just macroeconomic features of markets.
The third reason why there exists a mismatch between neoclassical migration theory and
reality is the existence of alternative stimulants which significantly affect the decision to
migrate, even in case of wage equality between the sending and receiving economies.
In an attempt to refine the neoclassical approach to migration, Sjaastad (1962) pro-
posed that migration be treated not as a process subject to market equilibrating mecha-
nisms on the macroeconomic level, but as an individual resource allocation decision. As
such, migration in Sjaastad’s (1962) view involves both monetary costs, including the op-
portunity cost of earnings forgone during the migration process, and non-monetary costs,
i.e. “psychic costs” (Sjaastad, 1962, p.85). This understanding of the individual migration
decision-making process implies that a potential migrant aims at maximizing the present
value of lifetime net gains to mobility. Such a view of migration can be formally expressed
as an individual’s decision resulting from maximizing the following equation (Bodvarsson
and van der Berg, 2009, p. 33)
π =
T￿
t=0
[WMt −WHt − CLMt + CLHt ]e−rtdt− C(D,X).
The gains are modeled as a function of: the, potentially foregone, earnings at home (WHt );
the “costs” of living at home, which can be treated as non-pecuniary benefits of remaining
in one’s place of origin (CLHt ); the, potentially gained, financial benefits from migration
(WMt ); the costs related to finding oneself in a strange context, i.e. the costs of living
abroad (CLMt ); other fixed costs related to distance (D); and personal characteristics,
preferences etc. (X). The main drawback of Sjaastad’s formulation of a migration decision
was that it assumed that an immigrant would be able to be certain about finding a job at
the destination. It could also be criticized for not being able to capture multiple migration
events in one’s lifetime and for not including the migrant’s household’s role in the decision
process. Given its formula, which considers migration as a one time occurrence, Sjaastad’s
understanding also fails to account for the benefits (to the household, thus partially also
to the migrant) and the costs (to the migrant) of sending remittances.
Harris and Todaro (1970) reformulated Sjaastad’s proposal in a model which included
a probability term in the income maximization problem. Based on an analysis of rural-to-
urban migration they have observed that people migrate despite high unemployment in the
modern sector in the cities. An explanation of this phenomenon was found in the expected
income hypothesis, which stated that people will migrate as long as their expected wage
in the urban sector, net of their migration costs, is higher than what they would earn in
the countryside.
Sjaastad’s (1962) and Harris and Todaro’s (1970) models of migration recognized more
than just the pecuniary gains and costs to migration. In this sense they ask the question
whether migration is a consumption decision or a supply decision (Bodvarsson and van der
Berg, 2009). Treating migration as more than just an optimal allocation of labor neces-
sitates considering other gains to migration than higher expected earnings. Better living
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conditions, wide-ranging civic rights or even a more preferable climate have been con-
sidered possible gains of that sort (Sjaastad, 1962; Lee, 1966). Costs complimentary to
such gains have also been recognized. Among them distance (Ravenstein, 1885; Sjaastad,
1962; Lee, 1966), political barriers (Lee, 1966; Harris and Todaro, 1970), or costs related
to family separation (Lee, 1966) have been identified. In order to be able to explain why
individuals do not respond to these factors in the same way, migration theorists have pro-
posed that they are moderated by individual characteristics (Ravenstein, 1885; Lee, 1966;
Sjaastad, 1962).
Selectivity of migration
The postulate that individual characteristics are a determinant of migration inevitably
lead to formulating the presumption that migration is a selective process. Lee (1966)
observed that age, gender, level of educational attainment, degree and strength of social
ties, one’s social class or cultural awareness may hypothetically differentiate the strength
of responding to factors pushing and pulling migrants to and from certain locations. In
extreme cases, as Lee suggested, certain personal features could either be catalysts for the
migration process, or they could completely prevent one from engaging in mobility.
As labor migration is a labor market choice it goes without saying that it concerns
people in productive age. Within that group those mid-aged (30-40 year olds) are in
practice most likely to become international migrants (United Nations, 2011). Graduates
may prefer to initially search for employment opportunities on the domestic labor mar-
ket. Moreover, the decision to stay in the country of origin may also be dictated by the
need to set up families. Older cohorts may choose to be immobile due to their health
limitations and the harsh work conditions usually awaiting migrants abroad. If people
do not have previous migration experience it may be also difficult or them to adapt to
a new environment at a certain age. Gender is an aspect of migration strongly related
to the demand side of certain migration streams. While flows from some countries tend
to highly feminized, others are masculinized, depending on the type of jobs immigrants
take up at the destination (DeJong, 2000; Pessar and Mahler, 2003; Massey et al., 2006).
Familial arrangements may one hand be push factors as people search for the means to
provide for their kin. On the other hand, they pull one to stay at home as the costs
of family separation may be considered very high (Mincer, 1977; Dumon, 1989; Kofman,
2004). Education and one’s level of human capital may also hypothetically work in both
directions. On one hand, better endowment in human capital increases the probability of
finding a job abroad, which should increase the propensity to migrate. On the other hand,
it also increases one’s probability to find a job at home, increasing the opportunity cost
of working abroad.
Borjas (1988) has relayed on Sjaastad’s neoclassical view of migration and formalized
it in a way that took into account the heterogeneity of potential migrants and their varying
responsiveness to the determinants of migration. In his model Borjas considered workers
with varying distributions of skills between the sending and receiving societies. He also
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assumed incomplete transferability of skills across markets. In Borjas’s framework a person
would migrate if he or she experienced a positive value of the index function, I, which
takes the following form (Borjas, 1988, p. 4)
I = ln( w1w0+C ) ≈ (µ1 − µ0 − π) + (￿1 − ￿0)
where w are wages, C is the cost of migration, π is the so-called ’time-equivalent’ cost of
migration (π = C/w1) and, following Roy (1951), µ are the observable wage determinants,
￿ are the unobservable wage determinants. Indices 1 and 0 represent the destination and
source country, respectively. The probability of migration, i.e. the probability of I > 0
was positively related to mean income at the destination, negatively related to the mean
income in the source country, and negatively related to the cost of migration. These
predictions of the model are in line with what was proposed by Sjaastad (1962).
What Borjas’s model was also able to represent, contrary to Sjaastad’s approach, was
that the type of migrants for whom it is feasible to emigrate to a given destination country
depends on the ratio of the variances of the income distributions of both economies. If
it was only the mean earnings that mattered, as Borjas argued, we would observe all the
people from the “poorer” country migrating to the “richer” country, what clearly is not
the case. Borjas illustrated his argument with a simple example of when σ2, the variance
of the unobservable determinant of wages, is higher is the country of origin than at the
destination. Low-earning workers (implicitly also low-skilled) would then be “insured”
against relatively poor labor market outcomes. For the high-earners (high-skilled workers)
the situation would be disadvantageous due to the compressed distribution of earnings.
The opposite would be the case if σ1 > σ0. In the former case the destination would
create incentives for rather low-skilled workers to immigrate, in the latter case rather
high-skilled workers would be encouraged to come. In his work Borjas neatly merged
earlier hypothesis in the field of labor migration with established labor market theory.
Despite the refinements to former models, Borjas’s representation of migration processes
remained in the neoclassical framework, assuming that migrants are rational agents with
complete information, able to weigh the costs and benefits of mobility accordingly.
The New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) formulated by Stark and Bloom
(1985) was the most influential concept proposing to amend the dominant neoclassical
paradigms. Stark and Bloom (1985) suggested that the rational migrant is not the sole
agent deciding whether or not to migrate and that the migrants’ social environment plays
a critical role in the process. Based on these premises the authors were able to demonstrate
that the differences in wages need not be a necessary condition for migration to occur.
In light of Stark and Bloom’s (1985) theory migrants were embedded in a social en-
vironment composed of their family or household members and a constructed group of
reference, be it their neighbors, peers, co-workers or others. Stark and Bloom thought
of the familial group, rather than the migrant alone, as the main agent in the migration
decision-making process. Building upon this advancement in thinking about migration
Stark and Lucas (1985) have argued that the relationship between a migrant and his or
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her family is a contractual one, what is visible e.g. in remittance patterns and treating
migration as a household, rather than an individual, strategy. Another aspect, which en-
forced viewing migration as a collective, rather than individual decision, was that it could
be treated as a risk diversification strategy for the household (Stark and Bloom, 1985). If
migration of one or more family members took place to a country where the earnings were
negatively- or un-correlated with the earnings in the country of origin (where other family
members worked), then the cost of migration (including family separation) could have
been considered as the cost of family insurance against negative shocks affecting employ-
ment in one of the markets. Relating notions such as risk diversification or within-family
contractual agreements to migration was unthought of in the main streams of previous
literature. Such thinking conceptually allowed for the occurrence of migration despite no
significant differences in wages between the origin and the destination. As far as the con-
structed reference group is concerned Stark and Bloom (1985) suggested that people might
be willing to migrate in order to change their relative social position or to change their
group of reference. From the latter it follows that after migrating people would rather
compare themselves to other migrants than to the members of the receiving society. This
further allows to explain why migrants are willing to fill in niches unwanted by the natives
and undertake dirty, dull and demeaning (3-D) jobs.
Summary
An overview of the most influential contributions to labor migration theory reveals two
major dimensions of their scope. One considers the exogenous mechanisms which are hy-
pothesized to frame people’s choices. Here we find the theories which exploit equilibrating
market mechanisms on one hand, and the numerous structural push and pull factors on the
other hand. The second dimension of how migration processes are understood is related
to the migrants’ endogenous choice making mechanism, i.e. the form and components of
his or her objective function. Whether the migrant maximizes solely income or rather
a bundle of components of utility, including market and non-market consumption goods,
remains a significant difference across various propositions.
Given the number of migration theories and the foundations for migration research they
propose, the following features are recognized as most critical for the presented research:
• the notion of migrant selectivity,
• expected income differences as the main determinant of migration as a labor market
strategy,
• the social context in which the decision to migrate is made with both its familial
and other components.
Out of the catalogue of determinants of labor migration two will be purposefully set
aside in the following research. The first is the notion of possible non-pecuniary costs and
benefits of migration and the second one is the idea of risk-diversification as an alternative
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migration strategy. Primarily both of these issues are very difficult to capture in the
data. Moreover, setting aside benefits from migration which are of other than financial
character is due to the fact that they are subject to individual preferences as to what
should be considered a cost and what should be considered a benefit. Some people might
prefer to live in a warmer climate, while others in a cooler climate; some like to have clear
and strict rules about how to behave, while others would rather make their own decisions
within a wide scope of acceptable practices. In this sense it is impossible to determine what
should be the effect of certain circumstances on one’s cost-benefit analysis of migration.
Nevertheless, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs and benefits of migration will be
considered in the interpretation of obtained results.
2.2 Determinants of self-employment
Similarly to the determinants of migration, the determinants of self-employment may
also be recognized as individual and contextual, i.e. related to the socio-economic cir-
cumstances under which one undertakes entrepreneurial activity2. The former lead to
the selectivity of self-employment. The latter may be considered in two major aspects
- circumstances that create an opportunity for establishing entrepreneurial ventures and
circumstances that push people into entrepreneurship as an option of last resort.
Among those who stress the need to differentiate between entrepreneurship out of ne-
cessity as opposed to entrepreneurship resulting from voluntary realization of a business
plan are Earle and Sakova (2000), Llisterri et al. (2006), or Naude (2008). The rate of
the two types of entrepreneurial choices across countries has been estimated within the
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor project (GEM, www.gemconsortium.org). GEM defines
the relative prevalence of “Improvement-Driven Opportunity Entrepreneurial Activity” as
the percentage of those involved in early stage entrepreneurship who “(i) declare that they
are driven by opportunity as opposed to finding no other option for work; and (ii) who
indicate the main driver for being involved in this opportunity is being independent or
increasing their income, rather than just maintaining their income” (Global Entrepreneur-
ship Monitor, 2013). Relative prevalence of “Necessity-Driven Entrepreneurial Activity”
is defined as the “percentage of those involved in entrepreneurial activity who are involved
in entrepreneurship because they had no other option for work” (Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor, 2013). The rates of opportunity and necessity driven entrepreneurship in major
immigrant receiving countries are presented in Figure 2.2.
The US exhibited an upsurge of necessity driven entrepreneurship accompanied by
slight decrease in the relative number opportunity driven startups in the years of the
global financial crises. This pattern is not as clear in the case of the UK, where op-
portunity driven entrepreneurship falls since 2006 and no significant increase in necessity
entrepreneurship is visible. Data for Australia is incomplete for that period. Unfortunately
2The review of existing literature presented in this subsection has been partially discussed in Tyrowicz
and Nestorowicz (2011)
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Figure 2.2: Scale of opportunity- and necessity-driven entrepreneurship.
Source: own elaboration based on the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor data, www.gemconsortium.org/Data.
GEM data do not allow to differentiate between native and immigrant entrepreneurs. We
could speculate that, because the two groups face the same macroeconomic conditions,
be they preferable for business or not, the motivations behind their labor market choices
are similar. This might not be the case for two reasons. First, as it will be demonstrated
in further sections of this chapter, immigrants and natives do not necessarily operate on
the same markets. Second, immigrants are a rather disadvantaged group on the labor
markets of receiving states. As these two features potentially have opposing effects, the
former creating potential for more opportunity entrepreneurship and the latter for neces-
sity entrepreneurship, it is impossible to determine how do immigrants fare in comparison
to the natives in these aspects.
Whether opportunity- or necessity-driven entrepreneurship is on the rise in aggregate
terms depends partly on the business cycle as such, but the local economic conditions
affect people’s entrepreneurial choices as well. Ferrante and Sabatini (2007) found a neg-
ative effect of regional per capita income on the choice of self-employment. Availability
of less risky careers in wealthier regions bears a lower opportunity cost that becoming
an entrepreneur. Other regional effects which may influence the probability of becom-
ing self-employed are local labour market related factors such as the unemployment rate
(Van Praag and Van Ophem, 1995; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Audretsch et al.,
2001; Baptista and Thurik, 2004), the local industrial organization structures (Malecki,
1993; Storper, 1995), or regional institutions and policies (Amin, 1999; McQuaid, 2002;
Lee et al., 2004).
Irrespective of the global and local economic conditions and the resulting rates of
opportunity and necessity-driven entrepreneurship, ceteris paribus, some people do engage
in self-employment while others do not. This leads to exploring the selectivity of self-
employment, i.e. the individual characteristics which serve as explanatory variables of
entrepreneurial activity on the labour market. Among them gender is one of the most
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widely discussed. Cowling and Mitchell (1997) claim that self-employment rates among
women may be an effect of discrimination by the employers. An argument which will also
be used in the context of immigrant self-employment. In this sense women are treated,
similarly to foreigners, as a labor market minority. Other reasons behind the preference of
women for self-employment are presented by Hughes (2003) who puts forward such issues
as proactive responding to lack of other opportunities, more flexible working hours, the
ability to work at home and remain a care-taker for children or older family members.
Despite the preference for self-employment, fewer women than men might in fact be self-
employed. Dolton and Makepeace (1987) attribute this observation to treating activity
on the labour market as complimentary for house work, in which case involvement in the
latter decreases activity in the former.
When the character of labor market activity is considered at the household level,
marital status has also ben found to play a critical role in the decision to become self-
employed. Taylor (1996), Fairlie (2005), Hyytinen and Ilmakunnas (2007) or Tamvada
(2007) mention positive correlations between being married and the propensity of being
self-employed. In their view marriage is said to reduce entrepreneurial risk through income
diversification, given the spouse is economically active. Marriage may also possibly be a
source of start up capital due to the ability of the couple to pool their resources. Le (1999)
recalls a further number of reasons why there may be a positive correlation between being
married and self-employed, especially when the spouse is also engaged in the business.
In this case, apart from some of the possible reasons mentioned previously, the spouse
increases the levels of human and social capital and provides reliable labour, the latter
aspect being also analyzed by Borjas (1986).
On top of gender-related issues, human capital was also found relevant for explaining
selection into self-employment. Cross sectional studies prove it is one of the most powerful
variables used to explain the selection processes. Its role remains ambiguous, however
(Dickson et al., 2008). Van der Sluis et al. (2004) claims that the differences in results ob-
tained from various studies arise from diverging returns to self-employment from different
levels of education. Analysis based on US and European data draw on a theory of how the
schooling system creates incentives for self-employment. Within this stream of literature
the role-modeling effect of parents’ occupational choices has also been considered. Blanch-
flower and Oswald (2007) concluded from their quantitative analyses that the probability
of becoming an entrepreneur increases if one’s father has been self-employed. There is
also evidence which demonstrates that supporting one’s family members’ entrepreneurial
activity may partially compensate for formal education when one becomes self-employed
(Silva, 2007; Hartog et al., 2008; Caliendo and Kritikos, 2008). In the case of immigrants,
as it will be discussed further, cultural capital, which can be considered a form of human
capital, also plays a critical role in the selection process.
Apart from gender, marital status and human capital also age has been extensively an-
alyzed as a determinant of self-employment. Numerous studies have found positive corre-
lations between age and the probability of becoming self employed in developed economies
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(Brock and Evans, 1986; Rees and Shah, 1986; Borjas and Bronars, 1989). The selection
process with respect to age does not follow a linear path, though. On one hand, repre-
sentatives of the youngest cohorts would not get involved in setting up their own business
due to lack of start-up capital and know-how. Neither the oldest cohorts in productive
age would do so, because of risk aversion related to potential loss of life-time savings
just before retirement. This type of thinking would lead to concluding that the greatest
odds of becoming self-employed are among the mid-aged population. Having gathered
enough financial and human capital and still having a long horizon of possible activity
on the labour market in case of business failure, individuals in their 30s, 40s and 50s are
said to be those who most probably become self-employed. On the other hand, bearing
in mind the notion of necessity-driven entrepreneurship, we could theoretically assume
that the least productive cohorts - recent graduates with no labor market experience and
the eldest workers would be most disadvantaged, implying their increased propensity to
undertake self-employment as a survival strategy (Llisterri et al., 2006).
Two other characteristics which hypothetically affect one’s propensity to become self-
employed are risk aversion and entrepreneurial ability. Risk aversion as a feature charac-
terizing the self-employed has been recognized by Cantillon (1755). In his essay Cantillon
defined the entrepreneur as one who performs arbitrage and bears the risk of uncertainty.
Relatively low risk-aversion is considered immanent to entrepreneurship till now (Levine
and Rubinstein, Levine and Rubinstein). Entrepreneurial ability has been conceptualized
as the capability to coordinate factors of production (Say, 1803), introduce innovations
(Schumpeter, 1947), manage human resources (Leibenstein, 1968), or possess specific psy-
chological traits (Parker, 2006; Caliendo and Kritikos, 2012).
As difficult to measure as they are, entrepreneurial ability and risk aversion have been
considered in theoretical models of entrepreneurial choice. Lucas (1978) considered a closed
economy, with a fixed homogenous capital stock, and with workers who identical as far as
their productivity in wage-employment was concerned, but differed in their productivity
(managerial ability) in self-employment. It is assumed that higher ability translates into
higher output regardless of the amounts of capital and labor employed in the production
process. Individuals with lower ability than that of the “marginal entrepreneur”, i.e. one
for whom the net profits from self-employment are equal to the going wage, remain wage-
employed. All those with better ability choose self-employment. Demand functions derived
from Lucas’s model indicate that the firms’ demand for capital and labor are increasing
in the managerial skills of individuals running them, implying that more able managers
run larger firms.
Lucas’s model explains occupational choice between wage-employment and self-
employment, but the choice is assumed to be made once in a lifetime and risk related
to undertaking an entrepreneurial venture is ignored. Dixit and Rob (1994) suggest a
two-sector model which incorporates uncertainty into the production of output in one of
the sectors, thus enabling conceptually treating it as if it was a (risky) “self-employment
sector”. Output in the other sector is certain, as if it was the case of wage-employment.
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Individuals are able to switch between the sectors, i.e. forms of labor market activity.
Switching is costly. The agents are risk-averse and impatient. Thus the agents maximize
their discounted expected lifetime utility net of the costs of switching
E
￿￿ ∞
0
U [y(t)]e−δtdt−
￿
i
ce−δti
￿
where U is the utility, y is income, c are the costs of switching, while ti indicates the periods
when switching is done. The implication of Dixit and Rob’s (1994) model is that there
is a certain (high) threshold level of output in self-employment which stimulates agents
to switch from wage-employment to self-employment. There is also a (low) level output
which lowers expected utility to the extent that individuals switch from self-employment to
wage-employment (where output is certain). If output in self-employment falls in between
these two thresholds individuals remain in their initial form of labor market activity, as
the costs of switching would make them worse off. The probability of switching increases
as risk aversion falls, as impatience rises, and as switching costs become lower.
Summary
The main findings of the self-employment literature provide quite clear pointers as to the
determinants of entrepreneurial labor market choice. These determinants can be classified
into individual and contextual. Among demographic variables we find age and gender.
Other features than gender, such as race or ethnicity, which would classify one as a minority
are also considered. One’s marital status and level of educational attainment have also
been found to be significant correlates of the propensity to become self-employed. Neither
of these characteristics enables making unambiguous predictions as to the directionality
of their relation to entrepreneurial behavior, though. The reason lies in the contextual
factors which define the role of certain characteristics in a given economic environment.
It makes a difference whether one is forced to become self-employed due to unfavorable
conditions on the local labor market, or is inspired by the existing opportunities to become
an entrepreneur. The following section will discuss in greater detail two contexts, one
potentially “pushing” and the other “pulling” into self-employment. The specific case of
immigrants as labor market actors will be considered.
2.3 Contexts of immigrant self-employment
Literature concerning immigrant self-employment has combined features established in the
field of migration with those established in studies of entrepreneurship3. From the former
it takes the specificity of migrants in cultural terms or the role of networks in the migration
process. From the latter it mainly adopts the ideas of “self-employment out of necessity”
and the basic premise of entrepreneurs being market actors who perform arbitrage.
3This section is based on a wider overview of immigrant self-employment theory published as: Nestorow-
icz, Joanna (2012). Immigrant Self-employment: Definitions, Concepts and Methods, Central and Eastern
European Migration Review 1(1).
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In the context of performing successful arbitrage immigrants are inherently en-
trepreneurial. The fact that they strategically relocate their human capital to a country
where it generates higher returns makes them exemplary entrepreneurs. Self-employed
immigrants have an advantage over their wage-employed counterparts in that they are
not as dependent on the labor demand at the destination country and can take advantage
of their social and cultural capital in order to maximize gains to migration. These spe-
cific features are most visible in two contexts of immigrant self-employment. The first is
labor market discrimination. Becoming self-employed detaches one from the unfavorable
labor market circumstances and possibly allows to obtain relatively fair returns to one’s
productivity. The second context is the presence of other immigrants on a local market.
Whether there are many co-ethnics at a given destination may be a necessary condition for
the success of an immigrant business venture. It enlarges the pool of consumers and the
supply of employable labor. In the light of the approaches to the choice of self-employment
presented in the previous chapter we may say that discrimination is a factor which pushes
immigrants into necessity-driven self-employment. High concentrations of one’s co-ethnic
may be an opportunity which allows to make the choice to become self-employed prof-
itable. In the following two sections theories related to the above-mentioned contexts and
the mechanisms through which they affect immigrant self-employment will be discussed.
2.3.1 Labor market disadvantages
The economic theory of discrimination focuses on unequal labor market opportunities of
“minorities”, e.g. women, disabled persons, or people representing certain racial groups.
The stream of work stems from the economic writings of Becker (1971) and theoretical
models of Arrow (1998), who provide insights into how race may provide signaling effects on
the labor market, serving as a screening device for employers, who extrapolate conceptions
concerning e.g. productivity to the whole ethnic groups. This exclusion from certain (or
all) sectors of the labor market is said to affect the choices of minorities in such a way that
self-employment becomes a feasible alternative. Labor market disadvantages can be thus
treated as resulting from a mismatch between skills (or recognition of skills) of minorities
and their labor market opportunities.
Migration studies complement economic considerations with greater regard for culture-
related nuances, such as issues connected to labor market integration and resulting immi-
grant incorporation strategies. Light (2004) provides a typology of disadvantages immi-
grants may face in the context of labor market activity (see Table 2.1). It follows that
if labor market discrimination is in place, but one does have access to some resources,
self-employment may be the best alternative.
The claim that labor market discrimination affects people’s choice to become self-
employed has been termed the “discrimination (or disadvantage) hypothesis”. Though
in the field of economics this strand of literature considers minority populations in gen-
eral, here the focus will be specifically on immigrants. Over the past three decades the
discrimination hypothesis received a number of formal conceptualizations and empirical
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Table 2.1: Immigrant disadvantages
resource disadvantage
yes no
labor market
disadvantage
yes immigrants have low productiv-
ity and for the productivity they
demonstrate they are not ade-
quately rewarded, possibility of
relying solely on the informal
economy or experiencing long-
term unemployment
immigrants can not obtain a
wage which reflects their produc-
tivity; self-employment may be a
more rewarding or the only possi-
ble source of income, if resources
are sufficient it may be pursued
in the formal ethnic economy or
even in the open market
no due to low resources (human,
social, cultural capital) immi-
grants have low productivity
and therefore receive low wages;
very limited possibilities of oc-
cupational mobility or pursuing
self-employment in the informal
economy where limited resources
are sufficient
no disadvantage
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Light (2004).
verifications. The following three types of discrimination have been recognized: 1) em-
ployer discrimination (e.g. Moore, 1983; Clark and Drinkwater, 2000) 2) capital market
discrimination (e.g. Coate and Tennyson, 1992) and 3) consumer discrimination (e.g. Bor-
jas and Bronars, 1989). The first of these explains under which conditions would im-
migrants choose self-employment over wage-employment. The second concept explores
access to capital as the key ingredient of entrepreneurial activity and examines how bor-
rowing constraints affect the incentives and potential for the development of immigrant
entrepreneurial ventures. The last concept is useful for explaining how consumer prefer-
ences with respect to providers of goods and services may affect the returns and thus also
the numbers of immigrant businessmen.
Employer discrimination may be exerted in two forms (Parker, 2006). Either by block-
ing a group’s access to the labor market in general, or by restricting their opportunities to
low-paid jobs. Such limitations could result in choosing self-employment as a substitute
strategy. Given the theoretical assumptions of formal models of employer discrimination,
e.g. identical distributions of entrepreneurial abilities in the migrant and non-migrant
groups and that business profits are an increasing function of these abilities, the explana-
tory power of this concept is not enough to answer the question of why some immigrant
groups have higher and others have lower rates of self-employment when compared to the
natives, though.
24
The second type of discrimination, discrimination in capital markets may have a di-
rect effect not only on the choice between wage-employment and self-employment, but
also on the survival rate of ethnic businesses. Not having access to bank loans or being
able to borrow relatively small amounts of money and at high interest rates may heav-
ily impede business set-up and development. It has been shown, though, that even here
the discrimination performed by lenders does not necessarily affect all immigrant groups
equally (Parker, 2006). One of the possible explanations arises from the specificity and
clustering of immigrant businesses mostly around only a few industries which have above-
average failure rates (ref.: Bonacich’s (1973) middleman minority theory and Werbner’s
(2001) insights into the enclave economy hypothesis for discussion on immigrants’ sec-
toral specialization). When the relatively low collateral of immigrants, as compared to
the possibilities of the native population, is added to the picture, it may look as if banks
discriminate immigrants as such, while in fact they “discriminate” certain types of (risky)
businesses (which happen to be run mostly by immigrants), a process referred to as sta-
tistical discrimination (Arrow, 1998). Coate and Tennyson (1992) develop a theoretical
model where they postulate that credit market discrimination actually occurs due to initial
labor market discrimination.
The idea of consumer discrimination and its applicability to immigrant self-employment
has been analyzed by Borjas and Bronars (1989), among others. The authors propose
a model in which incomes and rates of self-employment among minorities are explored
based on the hypothesis that consumers dislike buying goods and services from minority
businessmen (see: Becker, 1971). The equilibrium outcomes of both the consumer and
producer choices imply that: 1) the average income of self-employed black entrepreneurs
is lower than the average income of white entrepreneurs and that 2) the gains from self-
employment for able black entrepreneurs are smaller than the gains from self-employment
for able white entrepreneurs. The two conclusions imply that minority entrepreneurs not
only have lower incentives to become self-employed, but that they are also negatively
selected into self-employment with a greater probability than the majority population.
Employer discrimination
Employer discrimination may be visible in restricting a minority’s access to the labor
market to simple or undersupplied occupations or to capping immigrants’ earnings. In
either case the effect observed on the aggregate level would be the same, lower wages of
immigrants in comparison to the natives.
The immigrants’ labor market restraint may apply to the whole market, making the
members of minority groups unemployable, or only to some industries or occupations, e.g.
those which are associated with more prestigious jobs. In either case self-employment may
be an escape strategy. This concept has been also termed “blocked mobility” or “bleak
mobility” (Mata and Pendakur, 1999). The former appeared in the work of Waldinger
et al. (1985), Beaujot et al. (1994), or more recently by Raijman and Tienda (2000), among
others. The notion refers to a situation in which immigrants pursue self-employment
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due to ’glass ceilings’ as far as occupational upward mobility is concerned. Because of
unrecognized qualifications or discrimination based on ethnic prejudice they experience
a mismatch between their skills and labor market opportunities made available to them.
In their study Raijman and Tienda (2000) find that the “blocked mobility hypothesis”
obtains for Koreans, who view self-employment as the “price of immigration to be paid
by the first generation” (Raijman and Tienda, 2000, p. 701). It is hypothesized, though,
that as time passes immigrants (and with greater probability their children) may obtain
recognition for their skills or acquire skills by the standards of the receiving society, become
proficient in the local language and, as a consequence, be able to eventually break out of
the affliction of blocked mobility.
As far as employer discrimination is concerned, its effect on labor market choices of
immigrants has been tackled formally. Decreasing immigrants’ wages relative to those of
non-minority workers with the same productivity potentially leaves the ratio of minority
business profits relative to native business profits higher then their ratio of wages. By
means of employing this comparison with the natives into the decision-making process mi-
nority members may find self-employment a relatively more attractive strategy. Regardless
of what the nominal earnings in either type of activity are. The latter process is hypothe-
sized to continue only to such a point when the crowding of migrants into entrepreneurship
pushes down the average profits low enough, that
wM/wN = πM/πN
where w denotes wages, π denotes profits from entrepreneurship and indices M and N
indicate minority and non-minority members, respectively.
Consequently, assuming identical distributions of entrepreneurial abilities in the minor-
ity and non-minority groups and that business profits are an increasing function of these
abilities, then for the marginal entrepreneur (who is indifferent between wage-employment
and self-employment) with ability x˜
wN = π(x˜N )
wM = π(x˜M )
and since, by definition, due to employer discrimination
wN > wM
then
π(x˜N ) > π(x˜M )
what in the words of Parker (2006) expresses the notion that immigrant (minority) en-
trepreneurs are less able and gain smaller returns to their enterprises than majority busi-
nessmen. Nevertheless, given the assumption of equal distributions of skills in the two
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populations, the lower skills required for the minority group members to switch into en-
trepreneurship imply a proportionally larger number of minority entrepreneurs, relative
to the majority population.
As Parker (2006) observes, though, this is not true for all minority groups. Some
immigrant groups have higher while other groups have lower rates than the native pop-
ulation on the same market. Thus it remains a question why would, according to this
approach, employers discriminate against some groups, but not other ones. A possible
explanation, as proposed in this thesis, lies in the fact that the theoretical model assumes
a very simple mechanism of differentiating between the inner and outer group. One can
either be a native or an immigrant. It is implicitly assumed that employers are natives
and potential workers are either natives or minority members. Had the employers been
minority members, i.e. immigrants entrepreneurs would the hypothesized relationships
hold? This notion will be recalled in the empirical analysis related to immigrant labor
market discrimination and its effect on immigrant self-employment. The possible prefer-
ence of minority (immigrant) employers for minority (immigrant) employees will also be
exploited in the empirical analysis of how ethnic concentration ratios affect ethnic business
profitability.
Consumer discrimination
Similarly to employers, also customers may have preference for providing business to some,
but not to other firms. Borjas and Bronars (1989) describe a model in which incomes and
rates of self-employment among minorities are explored based on the hypothesis that con-
sumers dislike buying goods and services from minority businessmen (see: Becker, 1971).
The set up of the model assumes two types of sellers - black (b) and white (w) who sell
a homogeneous good. Black sellers constitute a minority of the population, the fraction
of them being θ < 0.5. The number of black buyers in the population is the same. It
is further assumed that white buyers discriminate against black sellers, but that black
buyers have no preference with respect to the race of the seller. All consumers are utility
maximizers, do not discount, live infinitely and are risk-neutral.
Buyers contact sellers with cost C and prior to bearing that cost they do not know
what is the race of the seller and what price he or she charges for the good. The maximum
price buyers are willing to pay for a good purchased from a “preferable” seller is R. If white
consumers were to buy from an “not preferable” (black) seller, they would be willing to
pay maximum R(1− d), where d is a discrimination coefficient. Thus the reservation price
P ∗(i, j) offered by seller i to consumer j at which the consumer would be indifferent with
respect to buying from that seller of continuing the search is given by
R−D(i, j)P ∗(i, j) = max[0,−C + EV (P, i, j)]
where
D(i, j) =
￿
1/1− d for i = b and j = w
1 otherwise
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and where EV (P, i, j) is the expected value of the price offer given by seller i to consumer
j with i, j ∈ {b, w}.
Sellers, on the other hand, devote their time either to production or selling. They
choose the hours worked per day (H ) and the fraction of consumers they serve with:
τ = 1 if they sell to all, τ = θ if they sell only to blacks and τ = 1− θ if they sell only to
whites. Furthermore, in the model proposed by Borjas and Bronars (1989), sellers differ
in their ability to produce the market good and can be either high-skilled or low-skilled
and the skills are equally distributed among the w and b sellers. The sellers maximize
utility
U = ατβατ+βP (τ)H − H
δ
δ
where α is the number of transactions any seller (be it high- or low-ability) can complete
per unit of time, τ is the fraction of contacts that result in a sale, β is the ability (pro-
ductivity) of the seller, P (τ) is the price asked by the seller dependent on his segregation
strategy, H is the number of hours worked and δ is a parameter greater then 1, what makes
the relationship between utility from income and disutility from hours worked nonlinear.
From the above set up and by determining the equilibrium outcomes of both the
consumers and sellers choice, Borjas and Bronars (1989) conclude that: 1) the average
income of self-employed black entrepreneurs is lower than the average income of white
entrepreneurs and that 2) the gains from self-employment for able black entrepreneurs are
smaller than the gains from self-employment for able white entrepreneurs. The two con-
clusions imply that minority entrepreneurs not only have lower incentives to become self-
employed, but that they are also negatively selected into self-employment with a greater
probability than the majority population. Here, similarly to the theoretical model of
employer discrimination two assumptions would have to be made in order to extend the
theory to immigrant discrimination. First, it would have to be assumed that a minority
defined by race may just as well be a minority defined by immigration status. On one hand
this is a fair assumption as customers, contrary to .e.g employers, have no possibility of
checking an entrepreneur’s immigration status. On the other hand, this is faulty, though.
Due to e.g. the capability for self-exploitation, immigrants may prefer to work long hours
in order to achieve their financial migration goal sooner and return home. Thus they may
establish their businesses in (sub)sectors where the majority doe snot find it profitable
to work, leaving the local consumers no choice and disabling discrimination all together.
Second, among the consumers we may just as well see minority members, rather than the
majority population. In that case we should consider that they could possibly discriminate
against majority businesses.
Credit market discrimination
The final market in the context of which minority discrimination has been considered in
relation to entrepreneurship is the credit market, more often than not an unavoidable
economic arena for business ventures. Coate and Tennyson (1992) develop a theoretical
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model, which provides the intuition of how credit market discrimination is in fact a deriva-
tive of initial employer discrimination, i.e. how can employer discrimination “spill” into
other segments of the market and affect both the odds and the gains to self-employment.
In their set up Coate and Tennyson (1992) recognize two distinct groups, which could be
different either in terms of race, ethnicity, gender or any other exogenous characteristic.
The labor market offers two jobs for two types of workers - “skilled” and “unskilled”.
The marginal product of either skilled or unskilled workers in the unskilled occupation is
wu. In the skilled occupation the marginal product of skilled workers is ws, while that of
unskilled workers is 0.
Marginal productivity of a skilled worker is strictly larger than the productivity of an
unskilled worker. The model further assumes that the fractions of skilled and unskilled
workers in the two groups (let us continue with minority (M ) and non-minority (N )
workers) is the same. Yet due to employers’ discrimination practices against the minority
group (restricting access to skilled jobs), the probability that a skilled minority member
obtains a skilled job is π < 1. The probability that a majority skilled worker obtains a
skilled position is 1. Unskilled workers, be it minority or majority, are always assigned
to the matching unskilled job. Workers are further assigned an exogenous probability of
success in case of undertaking entrepreneurial activity p ∈ [0, 1]. For unskilled workers this
probability is equal to 0. For skilled workers, minority and non-minority, the allocation
of entrepreneurial ability follows an identical distribution function for both groups G(p)
with the probability density function g(p) continuous and positive on the range of [0,1].
It is finally assumed that each worker has to borrow K > 0 capital at interest rate r in
order to start a business and the returns from a successful venture are R, and 0 in case of
failure.
Given this set up a risk-neutral, skilled worker will choose to become self-employed if,
given a certain probability of success (p), the returns from business (R) net of the costs
of borrowing capital (K+K ∗ r) are larger than the expected wage w. Thus, the marginal
borrower for whom the expected return from wage-employment and self-employment would
be the same can be described as facing the following equality
p∗(r, w) = w/[(R− (1 + r)K)].
A credit market equilibrium requires that expected profits from lending to either minority
or majority entrepreneurs be equal to 0. Thus, given the risk-free interest rate q and the
expected probability of success E[p|p ≥ p∗(ri, wi)], the interest rate pair (r∗M , r∗N ) would
be an equilibrium if
(1 + r∗i )E[p|p ≥ p∗(r∗i , wi)] = 1 + ρ, i ∈ {N,M}
In case of (skilled) minority members, who, due to employer discrimination, have to expect
a lower wage in the labor market the profitability of business, which would create a suffi-
cient incentive for them to switch to self-employment is lower, than for the non-minority
population. Following the logic of the model as it has been set up by Coate and Tennyson
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(1992) the expected probability of success (which depends positively on the expected wage)
for minority entrepreneurs will be lower than for the non-minority entrepreneurs. Thus the
interest rate for immigrant borrowers has to be higher in order to compensate the lenders
for increased risk of the investment. This mechanisms has been termed “credit market
discrimination”. It has been know to be purely “statistical discrimination”, though (see:
Arrow, 1998), i.e. a case of discrimination in which members of a certain group are not
discriminated against because of their membership in the group per se, but because this
group is characterized by a specific set of attributes.
The higher interest rate resulting from the labor market and credit market discrimina-
tion further implies lower returns from self-employment for a minority entrepreneur with
the same probability of entrepreneurial success as a majority entrepreneur. Nevertheless,
the expected return from self-employment relative to wage-employment is higher for the
minority than for the majority businessmen, thus creating a stronger incentive to become
self-employed among the former.
In a further development of the model Coate and Tennyson (1992) allow the workers to
invest (I ) or not invest (NI ) in acquiring additional skills, thus partially endogenizing the
skill variable. Under such a set up it is shown that lenders will differently approach the
groups who invested in their human capital and those who did not. Under the assumption
that minority and majority members invest optimally in their skills with the net utility
gain from investing being∆(r∗i , wi), the interest rates (r∗N , r
∗
M ) will result in an equilibrium
if the following equalities are met
(1 + r∗i )EI [p|p ≥ p∗(r∗i , wi)] = 1 + ρ and ∆(r∗i , wi) ≥ 0, i ∈ {N,M}
or
(1 + r∗i )ENI [p—p≥ p∗(r∗i , wi)] = 1 + ρ and ∆(r∗i , wi) < 0, i ∈ {N,M}.
In such a case the relations of interest rates offered to minority and majority entrepreneurs
who invested in skills and who did not would be as follows
rN (I ) < rM (I ) < rN (NI ) < rM (NI ).
Yet, due to the fact that the investment in skills is assumed to be unobservable to the
lender, the interest rate for either the minority or majority has to be the same. Under this
assumption incentives to become self-employed are further explored. Coate and Tennyson
(1992) observe that under specific conditions (see lemma in: Coate and Tennyson, 1992,
p. 283) one of which is that it is possible that the minority (the discriminated group) with
the same entrepreneurial abilities as the majority (the non-discriminated group) will have
less incentive to enter self-employment. This is to say that there exist such interest rates
with which not only a smaller proportion of the minority would end up skilled (relative to
the majority), but out of those who are skilled fewer would become self-employed.
Finally, Coate and Tennyson (1992) look into a case when investment decisions of
individuals are observable to the lender and thus the net gain from investing takes the
form ∆(ri(I), ri(NI), wi), i ∈ {N,M}. Yet, if a minority worker was to invest in his or her
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skills but the stimulus of a reduced interest rate would not compensate for the deterrent
effect of relatively low wages, then it would still be possible that minority members have
less incentive to enter self-employment, as compared to the majority of the population.
In this manner Coate and Tennyson (1992) show how discrimination in capital mar-
kets may have a direct effect not only on the choice between wage-employment and self-
employment, but also on the returns to entrepreneurial activity and the survival rate of
minority businesses. Not having access to bank loans or being able to borrow relatively
small amounts of money or at high interest rates may heavily impede business set-up and
development. It has been shown, though, that even here the discrimination performed
by banks does not necessarily affect all immigrant groups equally, Parker (2006). In the
case of immigrants as a minority population, one of the possible explanations of this fact
arises from the specificity and clustering of immigrant businesses mostly around only a
few industries which have above-average failure rates. This is why it may look as if banks
discriminate immigrants as such, while in fact they “discriminate” certain types (risky) of
businesses, which happen to be run mostly by immigrants. Here, juts as in the other two
types discrimination discussed heretofore the conclusion is valid as long as the assumption
that the one who provides the credit is from the “other” group than the one who applies
for the credit. This assumption may be easily violated if immigrants (knowing that their
borrowing is constrained on the receiving market) borrow from within their ethnic groups,
i.e. relay on the support of their immigrant network. This feature will underlie the rea-
soning developed in the empirical analysis of ethnic concentration ratios and their effect
on ethnic entrepreneurship.
Moderators of discrimination
Labor market discrimination of immigrants can be moderated by means of several mech-
anisms. Among them we find the duality of labor markets and the highly related notion
of relative deprivation. The former has been developed by Doeringer and Piore (1971)
and Piore (1979). Despite the fact that the concept was not tailored to fit the issue of
immigration, it has been widely used to explain immigrants’ labor market behavior. Do-
eringer and Piore (1971) recognize the duality of labor markets in industrialized economies,
namely that there are two distinct sectors, the primary and the secondary. The primary
sector is characterized by relatively stable employment opportunities and well-payed jobs
in which human capital is effectively employed. The secondary sector experiences oppo-
site features and comprises 3-D jobs, i.e. dirty (dull), dangerous and demeaning. Such a
market structure and especially demand for labor in the secondary sector is what creates a
pull-factor for migrants. The unwillingness of native workers to undertake jobs which are
connected to low social status leaves a number of positions open to potential newcomers.
Labor market duality also theoretically enabled migration in presence of unemployment,
as the segments of the markets on which there was unemployment and on which there was
demand for labor need not be the same one.
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The duality of the labor market affects discrimination in the sense that it hypothesizes
that there are markets, e.g. related to specific industries, where not one’s skills are criti-
cal, but rather the willingness to perform menial work. A highly skilled worker would not
be rewarded according to his level of productivity considered in absolute terms. On the
secondary labor market his or her chances of demonstrating and making use of this produc-
tivity are limited. Thus on top of wages being differentiated based on measures unrelated
to productivity, e.g. race or gender, they are also differentiated based on the unequal
access of some groups to certain segments of the labor market, so called occupational dis-
crimination. Labor market duality may thus inflate the difference in earnings between the
immigrants and the natives, providing an even stronger push factor for self-employment,
than wage discrimination alone.
The second mechanism which may potentially moderate the effect of discrimination
by utilizing the notion of labor market duality is relative deprivation (Stark and Bloom,
1985), considered within the framework of the New Economics of Labor Migration. Based
on a model in which utility is determined not only by one’s income but also by the relative
value of that income as compared to the incomes of others, Stark and Bloom proposed
that people may migrate in order to change their group of reference. This hypothesis
was developed upon the premise that “...people engage regularly in interpersonal income
comparisons [which] generate psychic costs or benefits...” (Stark and Bloom, 1985, p.
173). People might prefer to be the richest among the poorest abroad, than the poorest
among the rich at home. By working in the secondary sector, where all immigrants, who
are assumedly the comparison group for other migrants, are more or less equally worse off
than the natives working in the primary sector, immigrants decrease the psychic costs of
being different, thereby increasing their utility.
Given the notion of relative deprivation and the duality of labor markets, discrimina-
tion may have a deterring effect on the propensity to become self-employed. As it has been
described in the previous section, employer discrimination induces migrants’ crowding-in
into self-employment as long as
wM/wN < πM/πN
If the comparison group, following the logic of Stark and Bloom (1985) are not natives,
but other immigrants working in the secondary sector, then the wage difference between
immigrants and their comparison group might be smaller than that between migrants and
natives. In this sense the idea of relative deprivation may deflate the wage differences
considered as a decision-making factor for immigrants, weakening the incentives to choose
self-employment over wage-employment.
Summary
Summarizing, labor market discrimination is a factor which may encourage people to
undertake self-employment. Discrimination of immigrants takes the form of a wage disad-
vantage and an occupational disadvantage. The latter is related to the duality of the labor
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market and the fact that immigrants are more often than not employed in the secondary
sector. Thus, on one hand, the duality of labor markets amplifies the effects discrimination.
On the other hand, working on similar terms as other immigrants decreases one’s level
of relative deprivation what potentially increases one’s utility from migration and wage-
employment. Whether the utility from wage-employment is large enough to keep people
from switching to self-employment is a debatable issue. It seems relevant to note who
constitutes the comparison group in relation to which one evaluates his or her earnings.
2.3.2 Ethnic economies
So far we have discussed discrimination as a consequential circumstance which affects the
propensity to become self-employed among members of immigrant groups. The second
strand of literature which provides an important context for the analysis of ethnic en-
trepreneurship is related to the development of ethnic economies. This stream of thought
put more emphasis on the internal economic structures and modes of operation of minority
communities, rather than on the relations of ethnic minority entrepreneurs with the re-
ceiving society. Such a perspective gains importance as minorities become more and more
numerous, being able to become self-sufficient communities within the receiving markets
and societies.
The enclave economy hypothesis was developed by Wilson and Portes (1980) based
on an analysis of longitudinal data on Cuban immigrants in the US Wilson and Portes
(1980) tested the hypothesis that there exists a third alternative to the postulated primary
and secondary labor markets (see: Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Piore, 1979). By analyzing
the labor market incorporation of Cuban immigrants they found a significant difference
between migrants who worked in the peripheral economy (companies in sectors with rel-
atively low average wages, relatively small average employment and without internal pro-
motional ladders) and those who worked for Cuban entrepreneurs. Cubans working for
Cuban employers (what was the identification of functioning within an enclave economy)
were found to experience significant returns to their human capital, similarly to workers
within the primary labor market. In the open, secondary labor market such returns were
said to have been absent because immigrants did not have an opportunity (or need) to
take advantage of their culture-specific human capital. Wilson and Portes (1980) claimed
that, from the immigrant entrepreneurs’ point of view, hiring labor from within the same
immigrant community resulted in opportunities for expansion due to privileged access to
markets and labor, or ethnic solidarity and obligation of reciprocity (see also: Bonacich,
1973). The two conditions which were said to have been necessary for the development
of immigrant enclaves were: 1) access to sufficient start-up capital (either through immi-
grant linkages or by connections with the home country) and presence of entrepreneurial
skills among some people belonging to the immigrant population, and 2) the renewal of
the labor force within the enclave through immigration. The main benefits of operating a
business within an ethnic enclave were thus: access to labor, access to capital, and access
to a pool of consumers.
The enclave as a source of labor
As far as the role of ethnic enclaves in proving cheap and reliable labor for ethnic en-
trepreneurs is concerned, Sanders and Nee (1987) challenged the enclave economy hy-
pothesis as proposed by Wilson and Portes (1980). Based on an analysis of earnings of
Cuban and Chinese immigrants they found that, indeed, functioning within an enclave
economy may be beneficial for immigrant entrepreneurs, but that it is not necessarily
the case for their co-ethnic employees. After adapting Wilson and Portes’ methodology
Sanders and Nee (1987) re-examine the Cuban population of Miami and Hialeah, Florida
and the Chinese enclave in San Francisco, California and note that: 1) immigrants socioe-
conomic achievement is negatively related to their spatial concentration in ethnic enclaves
and that 2) immigrants’ socioeconomic achievement is positively related to their level of
assimilation. These findings lead to concluding that an enclave creates beneficial condi-
tions for newcomers’ incorporation into the labor market and for early stage entrepreneurs,
but that from a longer time perspective there is also a cost to the segregation from the
mainstream economy. Sanders and Nee (1987) find that the disadvantages related func-
tioning in an enclave, as opposed to functioning in an area with a smaller concentration of
one’s co-ethnics, apply to the wage-employed. They did not find any significant difference
between operating in and outside of the enclave for the self-employed.
Sanders and Nee’s (1987) approach has been criticized by Portes and Jensen (1989)
who suggest that operationalizing enclaves as places where people reside, rather than
where they work, as it was done by Sanders and Nee (1987), is conceptually wrong. They
reexamine the Cuban population in Miami and compare individuals’ place of work and
place where their household was enumerated. They find that indeed the two cannot be
used interchangeably, as 1) the proportion of Cubans for whom these two locations do
not overlap is sizable (40%) and 2) the populations for which the two locations overlap
significantly differ in their characteristics from those for which these two locations are
not the same. In subsequent analyses of earnings of Cubans living in ethnic enclaves in
Florida (at this time they also account for immigrants from the “Mariel Boatlift”, 1980),
Portes and Jensen (1989) look at the estimators of dummy variables indicating whether
one is self-employed or wage-employed. Comparing the estimator of the self-employment
dummy across models run on a sample of men employed in Miami (the ethnic enclave) and
men employed outside of Miami, they conclude that being an entrepreneur is positively
related to one’s earnings if he or she works in the enclave and negatively related if one
operates a business outside of the enclave. Thus, they reject the hypothesis formulated
based on Sanders and Nee’s (1987) findings, that there is no positive effect of enclave
entrepreneurship on earnings. They also find support for a rather positive role of the
ethnic enclave in providing opportunities of socioeconomic mobility for immigrant workers
and providing access to resources and capital for immigrant entrepreneurs. The issue with
the empirical strategy applied by Portes and Jensen and Sanders and Nee is that the effect
of being self-employed on earnings is captured by means of a dummy variable. Such an
approach assumes that being self-employed is related to the one’s earnings independently
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to all the other explanatory variables. From the discussion on the determinants of self-
employment it follows, though, that this must not be the case. The demographic variables
affecting ones productivity (earnings) are also those which significantly affect the process
of selection into self-employment as a form of labor market activity.
Zhou and Logan (1989) conduct further studies on the enclave economy by exploring
the case of the Chinese in New York City. In order to provide robust results, irrespective of
what we consider to be enclave, they approach three possible meanings: 1) that of a place of
living, 2) that of a place of work and 3) that of an industry. In the latter conceptualization
(not considered in the previous literature) they identify enclave industries as those, where
the Chinese immigrants are over-represented. They manage to reconcile the findings of
Wilson and Portes (1980) with those of Sanders and Nee (1987). On one hand they find
support for the positive view of the enclaves role, specifically in relation to the possibility
of upward mobility of immigrants via enhanced opportunities for self-employment. On the
other hand, they do not find advantages in terms workers earnings or the entrepreneurs
returns to self-employment when individuals within and outside of the enclave economy
were compared.
The debate (Jiobu, 1988; Portes and Jensen, 1989; Model, 1992; Sanders and Nee, 1992)
on the nature or ethnic enclaves leads Portes and Jensen (1992) to a revision of their initial
proposition. They eventually describe the role of the enclave as a local economy which
does offer employment comparable in its returns to the mainstream economy, but that
this feature holds rather for recent immigrants and to those who have limited language
proficiency. The refinements and reconceptualizations of the enclave economy hypothesis
proposed over the course of the first decade after the idea was introduced by Wilson
and Portes in 1980, suffered from similar drawbacks of the empirical analyses they were
based on. They all concerned de facto case studies of certain minorities living in specific
locations. The inquiries into the costs and benefits generated by ethnic enclaves predefined
them as localities where there are very high concentrations of given ethnic groups. The
extent to which the changes in the level of this concentration affect the role of the enclave
as limiting or boosting opportunity remained unexplored.
Referring to the various approaches to the ethnic enclave economy hypothesis Light
et al. (1994) come to a conclusion that what has developed in the literature so far is “con-
ceptual anarchy” (Light et al., 1994, p. 69). In terms of definitional issues Light et al.
(1994) assert that the interchangeable use of the terms ethnic economy and ethnic enclave
economy is conceptually wrong. Their reasoning stresses that the ethnic economy is a
concept derived from the middleman minority theory (Bonacich, 1973), while the notion
of an enclave arouse from the theory of labor market segmentation. Aside from clarifying
the semantics Light et al. (1994) emphasize that analyzing relative (within-enclave vs open
market) wages as a measure based on which the enclave economy hypothesis is tested is
misleading. The related assumption being that the people who earn wages outnumber
those whose activity is not regulated by any employment contract. As Light et al. (1994)
show, based on census data on ethnic employers and employees, in case of ethnic minori-
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ties the opposite is true - the employers outnumber their employees, as many people are
actually self-employed and those who can afford to hire workers do that on a very small
scale. Thus, as Light et al. (1994) conclude, the relative wages may be a very deceiving
measure of the welfare of the participants of the ethnic economy. Yet, as the authors
further state, even if the wages of employees in the ethnic economy were actually lower
than what they could earn in the open market, this does not indicate that an ethnic (en-
clave) economy creates a mobility trap, as it has been postulated by Portes and Wilson’s
opponents. In fact three issues should be considered: 1) that some employees in the ethnic
economy may not want or may not be able to work full time, thus earning lower wages, but
also voluntarily working fewer hours, 2) the ethnic economy could also be considered as a
school for entrepreneurs, bringing the minority long-term benefits rather than advantages
instantly visible in income data, and 3) comparing wages in the ethnic economy to those
in the open market is fair only if the open market offers suitable jobs to everyone looking
for them (in fact, in the open market one could be underemployed or even unemployed
and so compared to earning nothing even a low wage in the ethnic economy is supreme).
Thus Light at al. summarize the relative wages debate by claiming that relative earnings
in the ethnic economy determine only the extent to which it is beneficial to work there,
not whether the ethnic enclave creates a beneficial environment in general.
The enclave as a source of financial capital and consumers
The idea of how the role of enclaves in providing employment and hiring opportunities
corresponds to the fact that both the workers and employers are at the same time po-
tential consumers is a feature under-explored in the mainstream ethnic enclave debate.
The notion of co-ethnics being potential creditors has also been signaled, but not tackled
conceptually. In line with Waldinger et al.’s (1985) previous inputs to the disadvantage
theory of immigrant self-employment, in 1990 the authors suggested a conceptual frame-
work in which they combine the idea of immigrants limited opportunities (e.g. due to
discrimination) with their possibility of mobilizing ethnic resources (e.g. within ethnic en-
claves). Due to the mutual influences of its various components, the framework has been
named “interactive”. The framework is created based on an analysis of existing theoretical
concepts and statistics of ethnic entrepreneurship.
The opportunity structures the authors define include historically shaped circum-
stances which enable (and constrain) ethnic entrepreneurship - market conditions and
access to ownership possibilities. They recognize that the types of industries, where im-
migrants are most likely to be able to set up the enterprises constitute specific niches:
1) where mass production technology does not apply and where mass distribution is un-
necessary, 2) where there are low economies of scale, 3) where there is instability and
uncertainty, and 4) where ethnic goods are in demand.
Apart from the somewhat external factors creating opportunity structures Waldinger
et al. (1990) suggest that the immigrant group’s own characteristics also affect the rates of
entrepreneurship. These characteristics are divided into predisposing factors and possibil-
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ities of resource mobilization. Among the former the authors recognize blocked mobility,
selective migration and migrants aspiration levels. The latter category encompasses ties
with co-ethnics, extent of social networks and government policies.
Ways in which ethnic entrepreneurs take advantage of the opportunity structures, given
their group characteristics Waldinger et al. (1990) label ethnic strategies. These strategies
are aimed at tackling the seven most common problems: 1) obtaining information, 2) gen-
erating start-up or development capital, 3) acquiring necessary entrepreneurial skills, 4)
labor recruitment, 5) establishing and developing relationships with customers and suppli-
ers, 6) dealing with competition and 7) responding to political attacks. The possibilities
and eventual ways of addressing these issues emerge from the constraints and enabling
mechanisms embedded in the market structures and ownership possibilities as well as
from the specificity of predisposing factors and the potential of resource mobilization.
Within this framework Waldinger et al. (1990) look for explanations of why self-
employment rates may differ across ethnic groups. They define three categories by which
the immigrant communities differ, and which affect their functioning in the destination
countries: 1) pre-migration characteristics (mainly level of human capital), 2) the circum-
stances of migration and the ways they evolve (e.g. into temporary vs permanent migra-
tion) and 3) post-migration characteristics (especially the position of the ethnic group in
the host economy). Though Waldinger et al.’s (1990) framework was not formally tested,
it provides valuable guidance for empirical analysis.
Social and cultural capital as a resource
As social and cultural capital have been recognized as an ethnic resource, more and more
concepts have relied on this premise. Among the most influential we may find the idea of
mixed embeddedness or the frameworks of modes of incorporation.
Kloosterman and Rath (2001) develop the concept of mixed embeddedness with an
intent to provide a solid theoretical framework suitable for international comparisons of
immigrant self-employment. Mixed embeddedness implies that immigrants are not only
embedded in immigrant networks and their ethnicity, but also in the “socioeconomic and
politico-institutional environment of the country of settlement” (Kloosterman and Rath,
2001, p. 2). In their in-depth inquiry into what has so far been labeled generally as op-
portunity structures (see: Waldinger et al., 1990) Kloosterman and Rath firstly recognize,
that immigrant communities not only differ from the majority in “cultural” terms, but
also as far as other, more tangible, forms of capital are concerned - financial, human, so-
cial. Thus, they are initially dependent on different segments of the opportunity structure
than the native population. The second aspect of opportunity structures as understood
heretofore, which Kloosterman and Rath (2001) question, is their static character. Mi-
grants may, by their mere presence, change opportunity structures. This dynamic aspect
has been under-explored as most analyses of immigrant self-employment are case studies
of specific ethnicities in specific locations at a specific point in time.
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In their furthering of how opportunity structures should be viewed, Kloosterman and
Rath (2001) recognize two crucial dimensions - the accessibility and growth potential
of markets. In effect Kloosterman (2004) proposes a two-dimensional typology of their
interrelations. The typology allows to systematize various markets in terms of their at-
tractiveness and accessibility for immigrant businesses by classifying them as stagnant
or expansive on one hand, and low threshold or high threshold (as far as human capital
requirements are concerned) on the other hand. Ethnic markets are according to Kloost-
erman (2004) able to emerge in all but one categories of this typology and thus should be
treated as special cases of protected markets within the economy (see also: Wilson and
Portes, 1980). The only case which Kloosterman (2004) finds unattractive for immigrant
businesses is that of stagnant and human capital demanding markets. This notion is in line
with the early observation of Wilson and Martin (1982), who conducted an input-output
analysis for Cuban and black businesses in Florida. They found that in the construction,
manufacturing and “other” industries Cuban firms had greater potential to buy most of
their required inputs from other Cuban firms in the area. This was not the case for black
firms, which would have to be supplied by non-black firms. For trade, transportation and
services the structure was similar for both populations. They concluded that the Cuban
population is more integrated business-wise than the black population. This enabled ex-
plaining why some minority enclaves fare better then others. Wilson and Martin (1982)
estimated that the better integrated Cuban economy could generate an additional 50% of
spending within the community once an initial demand was injected. This last conclusion
is based on a strong assumption, though, namely that entrepreneurs would prefer intra-
community business to market exchanges with other groups. Given the theory behind
the functioning of ethnic networks this is not an unreasonable expectation, yet in case
of entrepreneurship this may be highly industry-specific (Nestorowicz, 2008). Given the
specificity of immigrants as opposed to native minorities, the comparability of the two
groups in Wilson and Martin’s (1982) study also leaves place for doubt.
The contexts and opportunity structures under which immigrant self-employment be-
comes a feasible labor market strategy have been further elaborated upon in concepts
which can be classified as frameworks of modes of immigrant incorporation. A major
contribution to this stream of thought was that by Portes and Rumbaut who developed a
typology of immigrant incorporation with ethnic entrepreneurship as one of its features.
According to them what is crucial to recognize when trying to understand the variations
in immigrants’ labor market performance are: 1) immigrants’ resource endowments in the
form of educational attainment, skills, motivations, aspirations, professional experience,
financial, social and cultural capital etc., 2) their status of entry and residence (legal, ir-
regular, undocumented), 3) the conditions under which they left their countries of origin,
and 4) the contexts of reception. The latter have been decomposed into governmental,
labor market and ethnic community aspects.
Waldinger (1987, 1996) analyzes a specific case of immigrant incorporation, namely
that which took place in the context of industrial change in the second half of the twen-
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tieth century in New York City. Waldinger conceptualizes the process of how immi-
grants manage to undertake self-employment due to succession of entrepreneurial open-
ings (Waldinger, 1987, 1996) and labels it the game of “ethnic musical chairs” (Waldinger,
1996, p. 257). In Waldinger’s view the industrial transformations taking place in the 70s
in the New York City area lead to changes in the composition of local industrial and labor
markets such that the numbers of whites declined “set[ing] in motion a vacancy chain,
allowing non-whites to move up the job hierarchy as replacements for whites” (Waldinger,
1987, p. 370). Waldinger observes that the small business segment of the market went
trough a similar succession process (Waldinger, 1996). In the above-mentioned circum-
stances self-employment became a predominantly immigrant activity, with rates exceeding
those of African-Americans and, as duration of stay increased, also exceeding those of the
white population. He postulates three main reasons for such a state of things:
• increasing immigrant populations, creating their own ethnic demand which co-
ethnics were best suited to serve (immigration being also a critical element of the
development of ethnic enclaves),
• opportunities for succession in small business industries, which could not benefit from
mass production and/or mass distribution practices and which in the new economic
environment seemed mildly profitable for communities which use to occupy them,
• lack of other opportunities for immigrants whose skills did not match the labor
demand or who could not have their skills recognized (a feature noted in the enclave
economy hypothesis, but mainly conceptualized within the disadvantage theory).
Despite Waldinger’s ability to conciliate various analytical approaches within one
framework, Rath (2000) criticizes such a way of thinking when applying it to immigrant
entrepreneurs in Amsterdam. He recognizes four aspects of Waldingers concept which do
not fit into the stories of immigrant incorporation in the Dutch case. The first is the
notion of a “labor queue” (Waldinger, 1996, p. 26). The idea implies that there is a fixed
hierarchy of preferences towards specific categories of the labor force. As Rath points out,
the Dutch society is not as race-conscious, though, as the American society. Moreover, he
recognized the socio-political dynamics of how minority statuses might change over time,
thus changing the ordering of the “queue”. Secondly, Rath comments on Waldingers as-
sumption of long-term cohesion, solidarity and support within ethnic communities. Rath
notices, that the social relationships within ethnic groups tend to change over time and,
especially under the circumstances of harsh ethnic competition within ethnic niches (see
also: Kloosterman, 2004), this may not be true. Rath’s third argument relates to the
importance of local institutional frameworks at the destination, which affect the oppor-
tunities for immigrant self-employment. He criticizes Waldinger for stressing the role of
ethnic networks in the process of immigrant incorporation, while the notions of consumer
demand, technological change and international division are put aside. Finally, Rath draws
attention to the underexposed variety of the scopes and scales of institutional frameworks
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which affect immigrants’ opportunities, a notion which was later emphasized by Klooster-
man and Rath in their 2001 paper. In a subsequent piece of critique Rath (2001) notices
also the drawbacks of Waldingers definition of niches which is said to: 1) too weakly point
to the voluntary character of their formation and 2) too strongly emphasize the absolute
size of the self-employed and wage-employed ethnic community (what in case of Amster-
dam would lead to excluding economically and culturally significant and distinct ethnic
groups). He also points to the lack of differentiation between occupations and branches of
trade and industry, which may be spread over different labor markets, making the distinc-
tion crucial to understand the immigrants’ modes of incorporation in these specific arenas
of economic exchange. Rath’s comments as to the competition and industrial specificity
are one of the first in this strand of literature. Rath based his arguments on indirect
evidence from existing statistical data and empirical analyses. In this thesis especially
industrial specificity and ethnic competition will be empirically tested as factors affecting
opportunity structures of immigrants.
Summary
Summarizing, it seems that modern day “theory” of immigrant self-employment in the
context of ethnic enclaves is not far from the “conceptual anarchy” described by Light
et al. (1994). This seems to be the price for being very conscious about both the con-
straints and the opportunities related to migrants’ and entrepreneurs’ activities. The
ethnic enclaves hypothesis considers either business expansion or cost minimization, both
of which lead to relatively higher returns, fitting well into the income maximization ob-
jective of immigrants and entrepreneurs. In the absence of an explicit income advantage
of being self-employed, the ethnic enclave hypothesis enables considering enclaves as an
engine for one’s upward mobility. Nevertheless, this may just the same be treated as the
maximization of discounted lifetime income.
The numerous aspects related to the functioning of immigrants within ethnic enclaves
may be grouped into features related to hiring opportunities, credit opportunities and
clientele opportunities. All three relay on the social and cultural capital one shares with
his or her co-ethnics. What seems to be a neglected issue, though, is that all members of
a given ethnic community may just as well take advantage of these forms of capital. Such
intuition begs the question of whether large concentrations of a given ethnic group do
not create disadvantageous conditions for the operation of subsequent ethnic businesses.
It is particularly this aspect of ethnic economies that the chapter on the role of ethnic
competition and complementarity will tackle.
2.3.3 Theoretical premises for empirical analyses
The theories and concepts presented in this chapter provide ample space for posing new
research questions and hypotheses. As this thesis focuses on labor market issues and labor
migration, the most basic premise arising from both strands of literature is that both the
self-employed and migrants are predominantly driven by relatively high returns. Testing
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of whether or not this is the case will be the subject of the first empirical analysis provided
in Chapter 4.
A potential affirmation of the idea that the earnings of self-employed immigrants are
higher than what they could earn at home or in wage-employment would open a new field
of inquiry. Immigrant entrepreneurship could be then considered as as an opportunity for
those who are constrained by labor market imperfections such as wage and occupational
discrimination. In this respect the notion of relative deprivation constitutes an argument
for considering migrants’ wage comparisons with various other groups, rather then just
the majority. In presence of discrimination profitable immigrant self-employment could
disentangle people from both the limitations imposed by international boundaries, as well
as by culture-based prejudice encountered on the host market. The relationship between
labor market discrimination and the probability of becoming self-employed will be thus
the subject of the Chapter 5.
Given that the posed hypotheses are positively verified and that indeed labor mar-
ket discrimination increases the concentration of immigrants in relatively profitable self-
employment, it remains to be determined which mechanism may drive this positive out-
come. The ethnic enclave hypothesis provides a possible answer to this question. The
fact that ethnic enclaves can be a panacea to all forms of discrimination encountered by
immigrant entrepreneurs is a solid theoretical basis for a claim that operating business
within larger clusters of co-ethnic firms is related to increased profits. Of course it would
be naive to assume that this relationship is linear. Whether immigrant enterprises actually
benefit or loose from high concentrations of co-ethnic customers and competitors will be
the subject of Chapter 6.
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Chapter 3
The case of Puerto Rico
The United States is considered as the receiving country in all studies conducted within
the framework of this thesis. The primary reason for doing so is methodological. Migrants
are minority populations. Among them the self-employed also constitute a minority. In
order to be able to analyze such a subpopulation quantitatively, i.e. have a sufficient
number of observations of interest in a sample, the general population must be sizable.
The US is the largest immigration country in the world, with 42 million residents born
abroad (United Nations Population Division, 2010). That is roughly 14% of the total
population. Among such a large number of immigrants the number of the self-employed
is large enough to enable empirical testing of quantitative hypotheses.
On top of the above condition that data had to enable estimations of returns to en-
trepreneurial activity. The US is one of the few countries which collects and provides
public access to such data.
For the purpose of analyses conducted within this Puerto Rico has been chosen as the
sending country. The reasons behind this decision are both methodological and conceptual.
Methodologically, the benefit of considering Puerto Rico is that it provides data which is
consistent with that collected in the US. This implies that just like the US, Puerto Rico
also provides information on the income from self-employment. The consistency of data
collected in the US and Puerto Rico arises from the fact that as of 1898, Puerto Rico is a
US possession1. As such Puerto Rico is subject to the same schedule, scale and scope of
censuses as the US.
The dependency of Puerto Rico from the US also results in the fact that Puerto
Ricans have unlimited access to the US labor market. Thus, considering Puerto Rico-
US migration allows to capture migratory movements which do not suffer from common
conceptual drawbacks such as the immigration policy-driven selectivity of migration. The
operation of political, i.e. non-market, forces in the process of migration is usually of great
concern to researchers. Selective migration policies more often then not are welcoming for
the “best and brightest”. Immigrants are screened against their usefulness for the host
economy. Such a process implies positive selection and an inevitable overestimation of
1In this sense US-Puerto Rico relations can be compared to those of France and Martinique, of Portugal
and the Azores, of the UK and Cayman Islands, or of the Netherlands and Aruba.
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the success rate of immigrant businesses, as the decisions to become self-employed are
partly made for the immigrants by politicians. Those who might be subject to failure are
discouraged or even precluded from starting a business venture. In this context considering
Puerto Rico-US migration allows to capture the purely economic aspects of migrants’
decision-making.
The last, but not least, similarity between Puerto Rico and the US is that Puerto Rico
uses the US dollar as its official currency. This feature enables neglecting the exchange
rate as a factor in the migration decision-making process.
On one hand, Puerto Rico is similar enough to the US to have perfectly comparable
data and no political or exchange rate interference on migration, but on the other hand it
is geographically and culturally distant enough to enable a clear identification of migration
occurrences defined as significant changes in one’s institutional setting (Eisenstadt, 1953).
Puerto Rico is an island located on the Atlantic Ocean, east of the Dominican Republic
with its capital in San Juan (see Figure 3.1). Geographically Puerto Rico is further from
the US than Haiti, Cuba, Jamaica or almost any location in Mexico. The distance between
San Juan and Miami - the capital of the nearest US state - is around 1,600 km.
Figure 3.1: Puerto Rico - geographic location.
Source: Google Maps.
The society is predominantly Spanish-speaking, embedded in a culture which is a mix of
North American and Latin, African, and Caribbean traditions (Encyclopedia Britannica,
2012). Despite the formal dependency from the US, Puerto Ricans are a self-governing
political entity with a self-elected governor and bicameral parliament. They do not have
the right to vote in the US presidential elections and have inconsequential representation
in the US Congress. With a value of USD 16,300 Puerto Rico ranks 73rd in the world in
terms of level of PPP-adjusted GDP per capita (2010 est.). The respective value for the
US is USD 49,000, what gives the 11th position in the world (2011 est.; Central Intelligence
Agency, 2012).
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The lack of mobility restrictions on one hand, and the institutional separateness in
Puerto Rican-U.S. relations on the other hand makes Puerto Rico a perfect subject to
study individual migration decisions. All that is common allows to neglect the effects
of selective immigration policies. The selectivity which remains stems from the socio-
demographic characteristics of individuals and their responsiveness to market forces. All
that contributes to a socio-economic gap between Puerto Rico and the US potentially
motivates mobility and allows to recognize it as an international movement.
Despite the conceptual and methodological benefits of analyzing migration from Puerto
Rico to the US, the conclusions derived from such analyses are limited tot he specific case
study. In order to provide external validity of the obtained results each of the three
empirical chapters devoted to testing one of the operational hypotheses will include an
extension going beyond the Puerto Rican case.
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Chapter 4
Gains to immigrant
self-employment
4.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with a dual choice - on one hand that between migration and immobility,
and on the other hand that between wage-employment and self-employment. As discussed
in the previous chapter, theorists in field of migration suggest that net income gains are
the predominant driver of mobility. In other words, ceteris paribus, one would have to
earn more abroad than at home for migration to become a noteworthy option.
As far as undertaking self-employment is concerned, theorists in the field of the eco-
nomics of entrepreneurship incline towards two complementary mechanisms of pursuing
this labor market strategy. One stresses the financial benefits of choosing self-employment,
be it opportunity-driven or necessity-driven. The difference being that in the first case
optimization is unconstrained, and in the second case the scope of choice is limited by
institutional or other impediments to employability, making the decision effectively sub-
optimal. The second mechanism is related to non-pecuniary benefits of self-employment.
Among these we can list self-determination or flexibility as the advantages, and increased
instability and insecurity as the disadvantages.
Modern migration theorists also include non-financial benefits of emigration in the
emigrants’ utility function, yet their are usually limited to such features as improved
living standards in the destination country, anonymity if undertaking 3-D (dangerous,
dull, demeaning) jobs or access to better quality social services and social safety nets.
Despite having a common subject of study (the utility maximizing homo oeconomicus)
and an actually observable overlap of the populations of migrants and self-employed, mi-
gration literature and self-employment literature have only moderate links to each other.
Migration theories explain why people migrate, but not what form of labor market ac-
tivity they choose. If they do consider the latter issue, then only in the context of the
destination country, thus disregarding the initial choice of domestic or foreign economy.
Theories of self-employment provide intuition as to why people choose self-employment on
a given market, but do not take into consideration the fact of migrants’ initial relocation.
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Covering the blind spot of the two lines of conceptual developments is the key con-
tribution of this study. The opportunity costs of immigrant self-employment considered
within the conceptual framework of this study are depicted in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Comparing income gains from migration and labor market status
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This chapter will propose an identification strategy and provide an answer to the
question of how the optimality of the migration decision corresponds to the optimality of
the form of labor market activity decision. As the subject of this research is immigrant self-
employment, the possible gains to this type of labor market activity will be contrasted with
immigrant wage-employment, and both wage-employment and self-employment among
stayers.
From the theoretical perspective of self-employment economics, we expect that if self-
employment abroad is chosen over, e.g. wage-employment at home and both options
are available then the former must create an opportunity significantly more profitable
(considering both financial and non-financial benefits) than the latter. Migration theories
follow the same logic, despite being blind as to the specificity of labor market activity.
In an attempt to empirically test for the gains from the joint choice of self-employment
and emigration, this chapter proposes the following hypotheses
Hypothesis 4.1 Income from self-employment abroad is greater than income from
self-employment at home,
Hypothesis 4.2 Income from self-employment abroad is greater than income from
wage-employment at home,
In order to complete the picture of self-employment as a labor market choice of
immigrants, a third hypothesis will also be verified, namely that
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Hypothesis 4.3 Income from self-employment abroad is significantly different from
income from wage-employment abroad.
This general formulation of Hypothesis 4.3 results from empirical evidence provided by
previous studies which showed that, depending on the context, self-employed immigrants
may earn more (Borjas, 1990; Maxim, 1992) or less than their wage-employed counterparts
(Portes and Zhou, 1996; Anderson, 2011). Relying solely on the pecuniary advantages
of immigrant self-employment over the alternatives is mainly driven by the quantitative
nature of the analysis. The concepts related to the non-monetary value of migration and
self-employment will nevertheless constitute the context for possible interpretations of the
results. Whether the expected income gain covers for the social, familial and cultural costs
of mobility is a critical question in analyzing the migrants choice mechanism.
Despite limiting the analysis to, easily measurable, financial gains to immigrant-self-
employment the verification of the hypotheses of this chapter presents several method-
ological difficulties. Once a person has emigrated who should we compare their income
abroad to? Answering the question of whether migration is profitable requires finding a
counterfactual. As in all migration studies, acknowledging the issue of non-random selec-
tion of migrants is critical. Mobility rather engages the younger, fitter, less risk-averse,
and, at the same time, those with relatively poor employment or earnings prospects, from
smaller towns, low-income families etc. The above enumeration of characteristics arises
from the theoretical prediction that the larger the potential difference in earned incomes
between the home and host countries, the more people are willing to migrate.
Migrants should thus select from those groups which are relatively poorly matched to
the domestic labor market. This does not necessarily imply that potential migrants are
the least able or the least educated. The contrary might just as well be the case (Borjas,
1987; Hatton and Williamson, 2004; Anacka and Oko´lski, 2010). At the same time poten-
tial migrants have to be employable abroad in order to generate a positive pay-off from
migration. Even if this “double-selection” process was accounted for, methodologically,
the intrinsic feature of migration remains an issue - that once people emigrate, they are
no longer observed within the domestic population, leaving the composition of character-
istics (and the correlated earnings) of the non-migrant part of the society altered by their
absence.
The case of Puerto Rican emigration to the US will be considered in order to test
the hypothesis that self-employed immigrants earn more than what would have earned
had they not migrated or had they become wage-employed abroad. The Puerto Rico-US
setting is especially well suited for this reasoning. Due to the fact that Puerto Ricans
are US citizens we can neglect the positive selection of immigrants, which otherwise could
have been owed to restrictive immigration policies and laws regulating employment of
foreigners. Nevertheless, the spatial dimension of Puerto Rican emigration to the US
remains significant, allowing to recognize Puerto Rican emigrants to the US as crossing
distinct cultural, administrative and formal institutional boundaries. The case of Puerto
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Rico has also been selected due to the fact that, being subject to the same data collection
procedures, the Puerto Rican data perfectly matches US data, and, most importantly,
similarly to US data provides information on the earnings of the self-employed. Such
information is generally unavailable in the statistics of many other countries.
The next section reviews scholarly publications which addressed similar issues with the
objective to determine the scope of possible empirical strategies. The following section
describes the methodology used in this analysis of income gains from immigrant self-
employment. Subsequently, the dataset used for the analysis is described. Next, the
results, together with accompanying robustness checks, are reported. An attempt at
providing external validity of the study follows in Section 4.5. The last section summarizes
the outcomes and provides intuition behind the subsequent chapters of this work.
4.2 Review of research strategies
The hypothesis underlying the research on income gains from migration are strongly em-
bedded in the neoclassical theory of migration. Based on the assumption that people
migrate if they expect to experience a net income gain (Hicks, 1932; Lee, 1966; Piore,
1979; Massey, 1999; Borjas, 2000; Castles and Miller, 2009), a number of studies have
made attempts at quantifying the returns to mobility. To the best of the author’s knowl-
edge all of these inquiries dealt with comparing the net income gains as measured by
income from wage-employment. Nonetheless, their relevance for this study is noteworthy.
Firstly, they suggest empirical strategies of dealing with the methodological challenges of
estimating returns to migration. Secondly, they provide quantitative thresholds to which
we will be able to compare the findings of this research.
According to Clemens (2010) the causes of international differences in wages may be
rooted in one of three mechanisms. One involves a certain degree of “isolation” between
markets and depends, among other things, on differences in market competitiveness, non-
tradability of goods, or limitations to the transfer of technologies. The second mechanism,
labeled the “growth effect” of location on human capital (Glaeser and Mare, 2001), implies
that in different locations initially equally productive workers may acquire skills on the
job at a different pace, e.g. due to knowledge spillovers. The third mechanism also
involves externalities positively affecting one’s productivity, but which augment one’s level
of human capital, rather then enable acquisition of new abilities (the “level effect” of
location of human capital, Glaeser and Mare (2001)).
All three of these arguments can be translated into explanations for the differences
in incomes of the self-employed. The first mechanism applies quite straightforward. The
“growth effect” and the “level effect” of location on productivity may come from being able
to mimic the best practices of other businesses, and gain or augment one’s entrepreneurial
performance in this manner. The self-employed are also able to gain economic advantage
in one place, when compared to another, in a much simpler way, though. When considering
business operation in one of a number of markets entrepreneurs may evaluate such factors
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as the potential consumers’ willingness to pay and the price elasticity of demand. By
catering to local consumers who represent higher income levels and who are less responsive
to changes in prices entrepreneurs may perform successful arbitrage. Of course their curse
lies in the fact that theoretically anyone can do exactly the same, creating unfavorable
competition effects.
The major methodological issue which arises when trying to compare migrants to
non-migrants in terms of their earnings is that of selectivity. Migration is known to
be a selective process, i.e. engaging only certain individuals from within a population.
This notion poses a challenge in terms of creating relevant comparison groups among the
migrants and the stayers. Whether those who leave are the “best and brightest” or the
“unfit” members of the home population is a context-specific feature, depending both on
the country of origin and the country of destination. Among the few empirical strategies
which enable dealing with this issue are: analyses carried out in experimental settings,
longitudinal studies and econometric techniques which correct the results for the extent
of selectivity.
The experimental setting has been utilized in studies by Clemens (2010) and McKenzie
et al. (2010). Clemens (2010) estimates wage differences among Indian workers in India
and the US. Clemens took advantage of data made available by a multinational firm in
the software industry which enabled workers to apply for an intra-company lottery in
which they could win the opportunity to work in the American branch of the firm. The
case study was chosen precisely because of the random process which determined whether
people became migrants (lottery winners) or not (lottery losers). The earnings of lottery
participants who won were eventually compared to the earnings of lottery participants
who dod not win. Given no systematic selection into being a migrant, i.e. good balance
of observable traits (education, position, age) among stayers and emigrants, and the ho-
mogeneity of the workers (tertiary educated, holding similar positions within company)
enabled straightforward comparisons of mean earnings.
The results obtained by Clemens (2010) point to a 600% increase in wages when a
worker moves from India to the US, despite using the same technology and producing
a highly tradable good. Such results are in line with the author’s conclusions from an
earlier paper, namely that “gaps like these can only persist from policy barriers to labor
movement. This means that those barriers create one of the largest distortions in any
global market, create the largest form of wage discrimination observed in today’s world”
(Clemens et al., 2009, p. 56). The major drawback of Clemens’ study is that it focuses
on a very specific type of undermining the external validity of the findings.
McKenzie et al. (2010) have a similar strategy and analyze the income gains of emi-
grants from Tonga to New Zealand. The choice is also dictated by methodological consid-
erations, i.e. the need to control for migrant selectivity. The authors take advantage of a
unique dataset which holds information on all applicants for a migration lottery organized
by New Zealand for the citizens of Tonga. The dataset hold information on both those
who have applied for the lottery, received visas and became migrants, as well as those who
49
applied for the lottery, but did not receive visas and stayed in Tonga. Due to the fact that
the lottery is truly random the differences in the earnings of lottery winners and lottery
losers are attributable to migration its self rather than any systematic difference between
those who decide to migrate and those who do not.
The authors’ estimates of income gains from work abroad amount to a 263% increase
in income, on average. The average weekly income of Tongans who have been successful in
the migration lottery and settled permanently in New Zealand was NZD 274. The average
weekly incomes of Tongans who applied for the lottery, but were unsuccessful and stayed
in Tonga. The average wage of stayers is estimated at NZD 104. McKenzie et al.’s (2010)
approach is methodologically very robust. Its only flaw may lay in the fact that such
a setup is clearly very unique making it impossible to apply their methodology in other
contexts.
Having reliable, “true” estimates based on a randomized process of selection McKenzie
et al. (2010) were able to also able to compare various techniques of estimating income
gains from migration. They find that single difference estimators (difference between self-
reported post- and pre-migration income) overestimate the “true” income gain by 25%.
Testing for this was also possible due to the specificity of the data which holds information
on pre-migration incomes. A linear model estimated by OLS, which pooled migrants and
non-migrants together and included a dummy for being a migrant overestimates the income
gain for migrants by 31%-35%. Statistical matching techniques are also tested. Matching
on multiple covariates led to a 28%-33% overestimation. Propensity Score Matching has
been found to overestimate the experimental results by 20%-36%, depending on specifica-
tion.
Despite potential bias, statistical and econometric techniques just as those tested by
McKenzie et al. (2010) are in most cases the only way to estimate gains from migration,
as experimental setups such as that in the case of Tonga or the multinational company are
extremely rare. Kennan and Walker (2011) take advantage of the National Longitudinal
Study of Youth and the possibility to observe exactly the same individuals over a number of
years, gathering information on their earnings and place of residence. Their work differs
significantly from the research reviewed heretofore in the fact that it concerns internal
migration within the US. The authors consider migration as a component of a lifetime
utility maximization problem, in which utility is derived from income and disutility from
(costly) migration. Given the complexity of the problem on one hand, and its recursiveness
on the other, the authors model it by means of dynamic programming. Though the main
objective of the study was to“quantify the extent to which migration is motivated by
expected income gains” (Kennan and Walker, 2011, p. 244), the model also allowed to
obtain estimates of the magnitude of these gains.
The authors approximated the average gain from interstate migration in their sample
at USD 1,357 per year (6.3%). When no home attachment was assumed (operationalized
as a restriction on a parameter capturing a home premium) the estimated gain amounted
to USD 4,424 year (20.6%), implying significant preference for staying at home. As the
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authors admit, the restrictions they impose on the wage process, namely that the indi-
vidual fixed effects and movements along the age-earnings profile do not affect migration
decisions, are a very demanding. Due to data availability their analysis is also restricted
to white, non-Hispanic, high-school graduates who did not undertake further education,
leaving the question about the ability to generalize these results open.
Clemens et al. (2009) conduct the widest of existing analyses comparing the income
gains from migration for emigrants from 42 countries to the US. They use a unique dataset
complied by the World Bank from country censuses circa 2000 and the 5% PUMS of the
2000 US census. The wage estimates are obtained from Mincerian-type wage equations,
where the dependent variable are log wages, and the set of independent variables includes
standard correlates of earnings such as age, gender or residence area, and their interactions
with being a US born US worker, a non-migrant (a foreign born foreign worker), an early
arriver (foreign-born US worker who immigrated to the US while being under 20 years of
age) or a late arriver (immigrating when older then 20). The base case model relies on
a few identifying assumptions, namely that: unobserved traits of a non-migrants do not
differ from those of migrants, and the relationship between these traits and wages on the
home market is unrelated to the relationship of these traits and wages on the US market.
Migration is also assumed to be costless.
They compare wages of observably identical migrants and non-migrants, namely 35-39
year-old, wage-employed, male workers in the urban formal sector who have 9-12 years
of education in their home countries and were born there. The median purchasing power
parity (PPP) adjusted gain they estimate in a base case model (without adjustments
for household-level gains from having an emigrant member or personal costs of mobility)
is USD 15,339. The lowest gain (37%-43%, depending on specification) is reckoned for
Dominicans. Nigerian immigrants of the given characteristics are expected to gain the
most, their earnings in the U.S are approximately 12 times higher than what they would
have been in the home country).
As far as the issue of non-random selection of migrants is concerned Clemens et al.
(2009) refute that it could be a significant source of wage-differences by comparing the
unobserved components of wage-equations. Based on an analysis of few case studies they
conclude that if selection was to explain the wage gaps between observably equivalent
workers at home and abroad, two conditions would have to be met: 1) the workers would
have to be drawn from the top few percent of the distributions of unobserved determinants
of wages in their countries of origin; and 2) the unobservables which have a positive effect
on wages in the home country would have to have a negative effect in the host country. It
seems unlikely for these conditions to be the case. Nevertheless, the authors compute the
extent of possible bias resulting from potential positive selection (on unobservable traits) of
emigrants. They provide an analytical solution a potential migrant’s optimization problem
formulated based on Roy’s (1951) model, which involves comparing foreign wages (which
are known) to expected home wages (the estimated counterfactual) given the costs of
migration. Within a reasonable range of parameters the estimated wage ratio overstates
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the true wage ratio by 6%-18%. When quality of schooling and the imperfect transferability
of formal educational attainment have been accounted for, positive selection was found to
be responsible for biasing the bilateral wage ratios upward roughly by 20%-30%.
The main drawback of Clemens et al.’s (2009) research is that it provides robust
estimates only for a specific category of the labor force. It also fails to account for migrants’
selection into specific sectors and occupations within those sectors, what may generate a
number of effects such as the domination of migrants in 3-D jobs or effective glass ceilings.
And it is precisely such issues as labor market discrimination that the authors incline to
in the interpretation of their results.
The review of most recent research, which provides estimates of returns to migration
does not tackle the issue of returns among the self-employed. To the best of the author’s
knowledge no such study exists. Given the specificity of self-employment in terms of the
potential risks and benefits it generates, the question of how much do people gain if they
not only decide to migrate, but also optimize the form of their labor market activity
seems increasingly interesting. All of the research in this area is subject to severe data
limitations, an issue which will not be solved completely in this study either. For this,
and other methodological reasons highlighted heretofore, all estimates of income gains to
migration should be treated with caution, and with regard for the specificity of the data.
4.3 Methodology
Given the results obtained by McKenzie et al. (2010) this study will exploit propensity
score matching (PSM) as a technique to generate estimates of returns to immigrant self-
employment. No other empirical approach is a feasible option due to data limitations, i.e.
unavailability of data collected in an experimental setting, no information on past wages,
nor the possibility to apply a comparable instrumental variable to control for past income.
4.3.1 Data
The analysis uses the 5-year (2005-2010) American Community Survey (ACS) and the
5-year (2005-2010) Puerto Rican Community Survey (PRCS) data from the Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA, Ruggles et al. 2010). Using samples merged
over 5-year periods implies capturing average effects over this time period1.
All the variables from the ACS and PRCS which have been used for the purpose of
estimating the relative returns to immigrant self-employment are described in Table 4.1.
The PRCS data perfectly match the ACS data as they are subject to the same data
collection procedures, including the same questionnaires. This helps to avoid mistakes
and imperfections of translating and merging completely distinct datasets, what would
normally be the case if data sources from two different countries were used.
1Using 1-year samples would potentially bias the results due to the specific economic situation at that
one point in time. The 2005-2010 time period allows to smooth the effects of the financial crisis, which
could have been visible in the data.
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Table 4.1: Description of variables used
Variable ACS/PRCS components Transformation
SE earnings INCBUS00: respondent’s net pre-income-tax self-
employment income from a (non-incorporated)
business, professional practice, or farm, for the
previous calendar year; INCWAGE: respondent’s
total pre-tax wage and salary income for the pre-
vious year, inter alia incomes of incorporated en-
trepreneurs; CLASSWKRD - see the “labor mar-
ket status” variable.
The two PUMS income variables
have been merged and considered
as self-employment income irre-
spective of the incorporation sta-
tus of the business. Negative val-
ues were excluded from the estima-
tions.
WE earnings INCWAGE: respondent’s total pre-tax wage and
salary income for the previous year.
Used as is for wage-employed work-
ers only.
hourly earnings UHRSWORK: usual hours worked by the respon-
dent per week. INCBUS00, INCWAGE - see
above, CLASSWKRD - see below.
Usual hours worked per week mul-
tiplied by 52 were considered usual
hours worked per year. Income
(yearly) divided by the usual hours
worked per year gave usual hourly
income.
labor market status CLASSWKRD: detailed class of worker, in-
cluding incorporated and non-incorporated self-
employment, and wage-employment. Workers
with multiple sources of employment are classified
according to the work relationship in which they
spent the most time during the reference day or
week.
Used as a dichotomous variable
differentiating between the wage-
employed and self-employed.
age AGE in years. As is.
gender SEX: male or female. As is.
education EDUC: respondents’ educational attainment, as
measured by the highest year of school or degree
completed.
Grouped into incomplete, primary,
secondary, and tertiary education.
family size FAMSIZE: counts the number of own family mem-
bers residing with each individual, including the
person her/himself.
Grouped in to 4 categories: indi-
vidual household, family of 2 or 3,
family of 4 or 5, and a family larger
then 5 people.
industry IND1990: consistent long-term classification of in-
dustries at three digit level.
Two digit classification into 14 ma-
jor industry groups used.
occupation OCC1990: consistent long-term classification of
occupations at three digit level.
Two digit classification into 7 ma-
jor occupational categories used.
weights PERWT: the variable indicates how many persons
in the population are represented by a given person
in an IPUMS sample.
Applied to all models.
Source: The IPUMS databases, Ruggles et al. (2010).
Capitalized variable names are the names used in the IPUMS databases. For detailed distributions of the above
characteristics within each of the identified groups (Table 4.2) see Table 2 in the Appendix.
Given the stated hypothesis four groups of subjects have been identified in the data:
1) self-employed Puerto Ricans residing in the US, 2) self-employed Puerto Ricans residing
in Puerto Rico, 3) wage-employed Puerto Ricans residing in Puerto Rico, and 4) wage-
employed Puerto Ricans residing in the US. Whenever referring to “Puerto Ricans” persons
who declared their place of birth in Puerto Rico are referred to2. Persons considered as
“residing in” the US or Puerto Rico were those captured by the ACS or the PRCS,
respectively. Self-employment and wage-employment have been identified on the basis of
2The BPL variable in IPUMS-USA.
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the self-reported class of worker. The self-employed considered in this study include both
the incorporated and unincorporated entrepreneurs. The wage-employed include all other
categories of workers, including those working in public institutions and the military. The
sample sizes of each of the groups are reported in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Size of subsample used in the study, by migration and labor market status
Frequency Percent
Self-employed
Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico 4,606 57
Puerto Ricans in the U.S. 3,466 43
Total 8,072 100
Wage-employed
Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico 46,614 51
Puerto Ricans in the U.S. 45,075 49
Total 91,689 100
4.3.2 Propensity score estimation
Propensity score matching (PSM, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)) is a statistical technique
which involves three steps: 1) estimating a propensity score for each individual, 2) match-
ing observations with similar propensity scores, and 3) comparing the outcomes of matched
individuals. The first and second component of the PSM procedure allow to create “statis-
tical twins”. Comparisons of people who differ in terms of one feature, but are otherwise
observationally identical allows to obtain more reliable estimates of the differences in an
outcome variable of interest. As matching is done on observables only, PSM makes the
comparison groups structurally more alike. As indicated in the reviewed literature such
an approach is one of the ways to minimize the effect of selection bias. Comparing mi-
grants and non-migrants with similar pre-migration characteristics, rather than migrants
and non-migrants as they are, increases the possibility of attributing income differences
to migration.
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Applying PSM results in creating a quasi-experimental setup, in which there is a
“treated group” of interest, and a “control group” to which the outcomes of the treated
group are compared. Following the hypotheses set for testing within this study, the groups
which have been treated as experimental or control are described in Table 4.3
Table 4.3: Treated and control groups
Variable Control group (0) Treated group (1)
SEPRSEUS self-employed Puerto Ricans
in Puerto Rico self-employed
WEPRSEUS wage-employed Puerto Ricans Puerto Ricans
in Puerto Rico in the U.S.
WEUSSEUS wage-employed Puerto Ricans
in the US
where SE and WE stand for self-employed and wage-employed Puerto Ricans, respec-
tively, and PR and US stand for residence in Puerto Rico (non-migrants) and the US
(migrants). An WEPRSEPR comparison (of wage-employed and self-employed stayers)
has not been considered as the fact of being a migrant in a key notion in this study. A
comparison of self-employment earnings of Puerto Ricans in the US and self-employed
Americans in the US also has not been performed. First, the reason is that changing
one’s ethnic affiliation (from Puerto Rican to American) is not a feasible choice. Second,
differences in earnings of Puerto Rican immigrants in the US and of other ethnic groups
will be discussed in the context of labor market discrimination in the Chapter 5.
The first methodological issue which arises when applying matching techniques is the
number and type of observable characteristics which should be the basis for creating the
“statistical twins”3. Following the premise that the more alike are the treated and control
groups, the better, the matching process should be performed on all variables relevant
for both the selection into the treated group, and the outcome. If one wanted to match
observations on all variables as they are it could cause a computational problem due to
the multidimensionality of the operation. Thus in the PSM technique Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983) suggested estimating a propensity score for each individual instead. The
propensity score is the “conditional probability of assignment to a particular treatment
given a vector of observed covariates” (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, p. 41). They proved
that adjusting for such a scalar measure is satisfactory as far as accounting for selection
bias is concerned.
Technically, the estimation of propensity scores can done by running any discrete choice
model. The decision which one to chose is not critical, though (Caliendo and Kopeinig,
2005). In this study a probit model is used. As a result the predicted probability of
receiving treatment is obtained for every individual, given the set of one’s characteristics,
3These do not have to be pairs of observations, as the name would indicate. Depending on the matching
procedure, the “statistical twin” for an observation from the treated group could be a counterfactual
statistically created on the basis of e.g. averaged characteristics of a number of observations from the
control group. The procedures for creating “statistical twins” will be described in the next section.
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which in this study include: age, gender, level of educational attainment, family size, one’s
industry of employment, and occupation (see Table 4.1 for details). For the purpose of
this study propensity scores were estimated based on all possible interactions between all
levels of used covariates, which included: 5 age groups, 2 genders, 2 marital statuses, 4
educational attainment levels, 4 family size groups, employment in one of 14 industries
and one of 7 occupations. The interactions have been introduced in order to deal with
highly inadequate matches on single covariates. This has been shown to improve the esti-
mates obtained by means of PSM (Huber et al., 2010) and is a significant methodological
improvement in comparison to how PSM was used by McKenzie et al. (2010).
An empirical strategy applying PSM, should fulfill two conditions (Caliendo and
Kopeinig, 2005) - the conditional independence assumption and the common support con-
dition. Fulfilling the common independence assumption is a major issue if one attempts
to make causal inferences regarding actual the effect of treatment on the treated. This is
not done in this study. The common support condition assures the comparability of the
treated and control groups, what is specifically what was the reason for employing PSM
in this study.
• The Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) stresses that, given their charac-
teristics, which are independent of treatment, the subjects’ outcomes do not depend
on whether they were treated or not. This assumption can be formally expressed as
(Y0, Y1) ⊥M | P (X) (4.1)
and can be translated into the requirement that the outcome (Y0 or Y1, e.g. income
at home and abroad) is independent of the treatment (M , e.g. being a migrant),
conditional on the propensity score P (X). In other words the results of PSM will
be valid only if we assume that if a non-migrant, who is observably identical to
a migrant, moves abroad, his or her earnings will be the same as those estimated
for the actual migrant. In terms of creating a quasi-experimental setup the CIA,
if fulfilled, assures that while controlling for the given set of independent variables,
the treatment assignment (participation in migration) is “as good as random”. This
is achieved under the condition that the probability of migration (being treated) is
solely a function of the observable characteristics. As forceful as it is, this condition
will assumedly hold in this analysis and it has been at least partly justified by the
quality and quantity of data (ref: Section 4.3.1). The selection of variables used
for the matching process was comprehensive. As for the fact that that the choice
of covariates must be such that they are not affected by the treatment (migration),
an additional clarification has to be made. Such a case is clearly true for variables
such as age, gender or family size. But the effect of migration on such variables as
occupation or industry might seem doubtful. Using them necessitates the assumption
that emigrants work in the same occupations and in the same industries as they
would at home. This is of course not necessarily true, and in many cases even highly
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unlikely. Most often migrants perform jobs which are less prestigious than the ones
they could perform at home. On the supply side this is possible due to the self-
deprivation strategy mentioned in the introduction to this thesis. It may also be
a demand-driven effect as jobs which are available for immigrants are usually from
the bottom of the prestige spectrum, 3-D. Immigrants fall into those occupational
categories because they have limited opportunities of obtaining legal employment at
a destination and their choice is more often than not formally limited to jobs which
the natives are not willing to undertake. In case of Puerto Ricans in the US this is
not the case, though. As stressed at the introduction to this research Puerto Ricans
have unrestricted access to the US labor market thus they face, at least formally, the
same opportunity structure as “continental” US citizens. Under such circumstances
it is reasonable to compare stayers and emigrants within the same occupations and
industries.
• The Common Support Condition (CSC) requires that we actually compare treatment
and control groups with the same range of propensity scores. Fulfilling this condition
ensures that for each a person with a given set of characteristics both being treated
or not treated are possible. The CSC can be formally expressed as
0 < P (M = 1|X) < 1 (4.2)
where P is the probability measure, M = 1 indicates the fact the one is treated,
and X is the set of covariates. The fact that it is assured that P (M = 1|X) is
contained in an open interval excludes cases when treatment (or not) would be
perfectly predictable, leaving no reason to speculate about a possible counterfactual
situation.
After imposing the CSC on the data used, the following overlap between the propen-
sity scores of the control and experimental groups were achieved
The following numbers of observations have been ignored/used due to the common
support restriction:
Table 4.4 shows that after applying the common support restriction not more than
three dozens of observations were lost out of the 70,000 observations used in the
analysis. In all three models there were observations from the treated (migrant)
group which had extremely high (incomparable with the non-migrant population)
probabilities of migration (ref. Figure 4.2).
4.3.3 Matching procedures
Having estimated propensity scores for all individuals, the matching procedure is the sub-
sequent step of implementing the PSM method. Matching is performed on the propensity
scores, i.e. on the estimated probability of migrating (conditional on the set of observable
characteristics) rather than on the individual characteristics themselves. This procedure
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Figure 4.2: Common support
(a) SEPR vs. SEUS
(b) WEPR vs. SEUS (c) WEUS vs. SEUS
Table 4.4: Common support restriction by model
Treatment Off support On support Total
Self-employed in Puerto Rico and Self-employed in the US
Control 0 3,768 3,768
Experimental 25 2,858 2,883
Total 25 6,626 6,651
Wage-employed in Puerto Rico and Self-employed in the US
Control 0 33,177 33,177
Experimental 1 2,892 2,893
Total 1 36,069 36,070
Wage-employed in the US and Self-employed in the US
Control 0 29,648 29,648
Experimental 5 2,888 2,893
Total 5 32,536 32,541
limits the, otherwise inevitable, multidimensionality of the matching algorithm, as men-
tioned in the previous section.
The aim of applying PSM in this study is to generate three counterfactual outcomes
for Puerto Ricans who are actually self-employed in the US. With the objective of testing
the three hypotheses posed in this chapter the following three hypothetical outcomes are
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of primary interest: 1) the earnings of self-employed Puerto Rican immigrants to the US
assuming that they stayed in Puerto Rico and were self-employed, 2) the earnings of self-
employed Puerto Rican immigrants to the US assuming that they stayed in Puerto Rico
and were wage-employed, and 3) the earnings of self-employed Puerto Rican immigrants
to the US assuming that they were wage-employed in the US It is these hypothetical
earnings that will be compared to the actual earnings from self-employment of Puerto
Rican immigrants to the US in order to obtain robust estimates of the actual difference.
In the PSM method the difference between the outcome of the treated group and their
counterfactual outcome estimated from the actual outcomes of similar individuals from
the control group is called the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT), which
can formally be expressed as
ATT = E(Y1 | M = 1)− E(Y0 | M = 1) (4.3)
where Y0 and Y1 are average earnings of the control and experimental groups, respectively;
and M is the indicator of treatment equal to 1 if one is a self-employed Puerto Rican
immigrant to the US, and 0 if he or she is self-employed in Puerto Rico, wage-employed
in Puerto Rico or wage-employed in the US. ATT can be translated into the difference
between expected actual earnings of the treated group and their expected hypothetical
earnings in the counterfactual migration-employment state.
Matching of propensity scores between the control and experimental groups may take
place by means of a few different procedures including: nearest-neighbor matching, radius
matching, stratification matching, local linear regression matching and kernel matching.
The first three match any given observation from the treated group only with a few ob-
servations from the control group. The selection of which few observations are considered
ranges from one, which is the nearest neighbor in terms of propensity score in the nearest-
neighbor matching, to e.g. as many as are captured within a specified radius, in the radius
matching procedure. The last two of the listed methods, kernel matching and local linear
regression matching, use information on all of the observations in the control group in
order to determine a statistical twin for each observation in the treated group (for a more
detailed review see Becker and Ichino, 2002; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005). In order to
test the sensitivity of the results with respect to the choice of matching procedure kernel
matching, local linear regression matching and radius matching have been used. The choice
was driven by the fact that kernel and local linear matching enable taking advantage of
all the information in the dataset. These two methods do not leave any doubt as to which
observations get matched and which do not, what is the case in the other procedures.
Radius matching was chosen for sensitivity analysis, precisely because it involves a great
amount of arbitrariness in determining which observations are considered as reasonable
matches, in what it greatly differs from kernel and local linear matching. The matching
procedures were bootstrapped with 1000 replications each in order to correct for the fact
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that the standard errors of the estimated outcomes do not take into consideration the fact
that that propensity scores were calculated beforehand4.
In kernel matching a counterfactual outcome for every person in the experimental
group is constructed as a weighted average of the outcomes of persons from the control
group. Greatest weight is given to subjects with closest propensity scores. The weighting
is done by means of a kernel function. For the purpose of this study a bi-weight kernel has
been chosen as it best rewards better matches. The bandwidth of the kernel was left at the
default value. Counterfactual outcomes (E(Y0 | M = 1), see Equation 4.3) estimated by
means of kernel matching can be obtained by running a weighted least squares regression
of Y0 on an intercept, where the weights are the kernel weights, K(
P (Xi)−P (Xj)
b ), and where
K is the kernel function, b is the bandwidth parameter, and Pi and Pj are the propensity
scores of individuals from the experimental and control groups, respectively. The estimate
of the counterfactual mean is the estimated intercept from such a regression.
Estimating the counterfactual obtained from local linear regression matching differs
from that from kernel matching in that, on top of the intercept, one adds a linear term
in P to the regression equation. Smith and Todd (2005) show that such an adjustment
helps the estimator to be robust to cases in which the observation from the control group
are distributed asymmetrically around the experimental observations
Radius matching matches observations from the experimental group with those from
the control group which are nearest neighbors and which satisfy that condition that they
fall within a given distance between Pi and Pj . This has been a significant improvement
to simple Nearest Neighbor Matching which found matches regardless of how the two
observations were actually different. Radius Matching avoids bad matches. In this sense it
is also of imposing the Common Support Condition (Smith and Todd, 2005). Nevertheless,
Smith and Todd (2005) mention that it may be difficult to deduce what interval should
be chosen as feasible for making matches. The results presented in this chapter employ a
caliper equal to 1 standard deviation (s.d.) of the propensity scores estimated for a the
given sample. The results of sensitivity analysis considering 0.5 s.d. and 2 s.d. calipers
are presented in the Appendix.
After performing the matching procedures it was tested whether the average levels
of input variables become more similar between the experimental and control group in
comparison to the unmatched samples, i.e. whether the control and treated groups are
structurally alike. The results are presented in Table 4.5.
4.3.4 Balancing properties
The results of tests for the equality of input characteristics (propensity score estimation
covariates) slightly vary across comparison groups (see Table 4.5). Self-employed Puerto
4The psmatch2 program was used for matching on the propensity scores and comparing the outcome
variables. For each of the three models computations involving every of the three matching procedures
lasted approximately 6 days each on a 4GB RAM computer with a dual core processor and Stata 12
software.
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Ricans in Puerto Rico and self-employed Puerto Ricans in the US are very well matched.
On neither level of the any of the covariates does the difference in means exceed 5%,
the level considered acceptable in the literature (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005). This is
in line with the expectation that comparing people with the same labor market status
is potentially less prone to selectivity bias. When wage-employed stayers are compared
to self-employed migrants the greatest number of imperfect matches is visible (values in
bold in Table 4.5). Five covariates maintain bias exceeding an acceptable 5% level. These
variables are age in the range 40-50 years, marital status, work in the manufacturing and
retail trade industries, and work as a technician, salesman or administrative worker. The
t-test forces us to reject the hypothesis of the equality of their means when comparing
the treated group to the matched control group. From Table 4.5 it follows that as far as
the 40-50 age group and married persons are concerned, they are overrepresented among
the migrants. For the two industries the opposite is true - workers in manufacturing and
retail are overrepresented among the stayers. Workers in the technical, sales, and admin-
istrative occupations are also overrepresented among migrants. In the last analysis, where
self-employed Puerto Rican migrants residing in the US are compared to wage-employed
migrants, only one variable remained slightly biased - employment in the manufacturing
industry was slightly more common among the wage-employed. Thus it is visible that the
greatest imperfections in the balancing of covariates occur when we consider groups which
differ in both their of labor market activity and migration status. .
Despite some bias still remaining after matching, especially between self-employed
migrants and wage-employed stayers, it is worth noting that all but one of the differences
in means which were statistically significant were smaller than 2 percentage points. The
proportion of married self-employed migrants after exceeds after matching that of married
wage-employed stayers by 3.2 percentage points. The inability to obtain perfect statistical
twins in the second analysis arises from the, rather unsurprising, differences in market
structures of Puerto Rico and the US, the selectivity of entrepreneurs with respect to
those industries in which small- and micro-entrepreneurship is feasible, and the selectivity
of migration its self. More detailed diagnostics of the balancing properties showed that
in comparison to the unmatched samples the reduction in bias on all of the significantly
different covariates was very large, around 70%. The overall mean absolute standardized
bias in the SEPR/SEUS groups was reduced to 2.17%; in the WEPR/SEUS groups to
2.82%; and in the WEUS/SEUS groups to 2.63%. These result leave us confident about
the feasibility of further comparisons of the outcome variables across these groups.
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4.4 Results: Income gains from immigrant self-employment
The considered outcome variables were hourly and yearly incomes from self-employment
or wage-employment of migrants or stayers, depending on the hypothesis being tested.
This section presents the results of comparisons of the average levels of actual earnings
of self-employed migrants with their counterfactual earnings had they been in the con-
trol group, i.e. the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT). The ATT will be
thus considered as an estimate of the returns to immigrant self-employment. Following
the the conventional way of presenting results in this study, the first part of Table 4.6
compares gains from Puerto Rican immigrant self-employment in the US in case when
self-employment in Puerto Rico is considered an alternative, the second part of Table
4.6 treats wage-employment in Puerto Rico as an employment alternative and the last
part of Table 4.6 compares income gains of Puerto Rican self-employed to Puerto Rican
wage-employed in the US.
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The results show a consistently positive and significant Average Treatment on the
Treated, implying positive gains to immigrant self-employment in comparison to all three
of the considered counterfactuals. Table 4.6 is indicative of slight differences of magni-
tude between estimates obtained by means of kernel matching or local linear regression
matching and radius matching, though. Testing for average bias reduction after all three
matching methods lead to conclude that average bias is lowest after kernel matching. Thus
estimators of income differences obtained using this method will be subject to further in-
terpretations.
The comparison of earnings of the self-employed in Puerto Rico and in the US shows
significant gains to migration. On average, a Puerto Rican entrepreneur earns nearly USD
5 per hour more in the US than he or she would earn in Puerto Rico. This is a significant
difference given that it amounts to 70% of the US federal nationwide minimum wage level
of USD 7.25 per hour, and it is more then the Puerto Rican minimum wage of USD
4.10. The difference in yearly income from self-employment between stayers (the control
group) and emigrants (the treated group) amounted to approximately USD 15,000. After
bootstrapping the ATT estimates our initial results remain unchanged. This is more then
USD 1,000 per month. In percentage terms the USD 15,000 gain amounts to 65% of the
estimated earnings from self-employment in Puerto Rico. Recall that the income gain for
Puerto Rican migrants to the US obtained by Clemens et al. (2009) was of comparable
magnitude, 50%. From the obtained results it follows that just by migrating people are
able to significantly improve their financial situation.
Having considered the simplest case when the income gain to immigrant self-
employment results purely from migration and not changing one’s labor market status,
an exercise combining both effects was considered. The second part of Table 4.6 presents
a comparison of earnings of self-employed Puerto Rican immigrants in the US and the
earnings of wage-employed non-migrants remaining in Puerto Rico. When looking at the
ATT estimate when the profitability of self-employment in the US is compared to the prof-
itability of wage-employment in Puerto Rico, the income gains from the former strategy
are also evident on the level of both hourly and yearly earnings. As far as yearly earnings
are concerned the gain is similar to that experienced by Puerto Rican who were assumed
to be self-employed prior to migration, approximately USD 15,000. When it comes to
hourly earnings the gain is even larger. Self-employed Puerto Rican emigrants to the US
earn approximately USD 7 more than if what they would earn if they were wage-employed
at home.
When the gains from transitioning from wage-employment are compared to the gains
from transitioning from self-employment we can come to a conclusion that the supply of
labor of these two potential groups of emigrants differs. Those who migrated and changed
their labor market status gain more per hour, but in yearly terms their earnings are nearly
identical to those of people who migrated but did not change their labor market status. If it
is that the self-employed devote more time to economic activity than do wage-employed,
than one possible narrative behind this result could be that the those who were wage
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employed in Puerto Rico did not change their work schedule. Earning relatively more but
working relatively fewer hours could lead to identical gains as those of people who earn
less, but work more.
From the comparison of self-employed migrants to wage-employed or self-employed
stayers we can deduce that emigration to the US and taking up self-employment is an
income-maximizing choice for Puerto Ricans. If they weigh their gains to immigrant
self-employment against the option of being self-employed in Puerto Rico they may gain
per year as much (approximately USD 15,000) as they would earn in seven and a half
months back at home (USD 23,602 per year, approximately USD 2,000 per month). The
cost for achieving this is family separation and potentially also poorer living conditions,
unaccounted for in this study. If gains to immigrant self-employment are weighed against
the option of being wage-employed in Puerto Rico the yearly gain is just as high. If one
wanted and could spend more time on the job, though, the benefit could be even higher
in this case.
When we compare gains to self-employment and gains to wage-employment among
Puerto Ricans in the US, the findings are less optimistic, yet the gain is still positive
(last part of Table 4.6). It appears that self-employed Puerto Rican immigrants earn
significantly more than their US-based wage-employed statistical twins. In terms of hourly
earnings the difference is approximately USD 1.5, while in yearly terms it amounts to
circa USD 4,000. These final outcomes reaffirm the income-maximizing objective of self-
employed Puerto Rican migrants to the US.
4.5 External validity of the study
In order to provide a benchmark for the obtained results of the case study of Puerto
Rican migration to the US a similar analysis has been carried out on a different sample
of migrants. Due to the preferential position of Puerto Ricans on the US labor market,
i.e. lack of formal restriction to labor market participation, the closest to migration from
Puerto Rico to the US was internal migration across US states.
The dataset used was the same one as that in the above Puerto Rican study, yet only
its US part, i.e. the 5-year 2010 American Community Survey (Ruggles et al., 2010).
The variable used to differentiate movers from stayers (MIGRATE1) reports whether an
individual had changed his or her residence since a reference point one year ago. The state
in which the person was enumerated (STATEFIP) was compared to the state of residence
one year ago (MIGPLAC). If the distance between the capital cities of those states was
larger than 1000 miles (the distance from San Juan, Puerto Rico to Miami, Florida),
the person was considered a mover. If one declared he or she did not change the state
of residence within the past year, they were considered a stayer. The basic descriptive
statistics for both groups are presented in the Appendix.
As the self-employed are of main interest to this study, only self-employed movers
and self-employed stayers were compared. The propensity score related to being a mover
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was computed for each individual in the final sample. The model used to estimate the
propensity score was identical to that applied in the Puerto Rican study. Due to the
fact that that migration was restricted to mobility exceeding the distance of 1000 miles
and to persons who were self-employed, the proportion of movers was very small, 0.45%.
Because of this and the fact that the distributions of propensity scores in both samples
were similar, one-to-one matching was applied rather than techniques which weighed ev-
ery observation in the control population. One-to-one matching is a version of nearest
neighbor (NN) matching. The method matches an individual from the treated group to
an individual from the comparison group that is closest in terms of the propensity score.
Only one nearest neighbor, the default, has been considered for the base case compari-
son5. The procedure can be carried out in a way that already matched individuals from
the comparison group can be used more then once (matching with replacement) or not
(matching without replacement). Replacement was allowed, what lead to increased qual-
ity of matching and smaller bias across the samples of movers and stayers. The test of
the balancing properties of the predictor variables are presented in Table 4.7. In all cases
remaining bias is negligible.
After establishing a good control group for internal migrant entrepreneurs, the earnings
of the two groups were compared. Analogously to the Puerto Rican study, both hourly
and yearly income was considered. The estimated differences in returns to self-employment
for people who are internally mobile and those who are not are presented in Table 4.8.
In order to test for the robustness of this result one additional attempt has been made
to understand the gains to self-employment in case of internal migration in the US. The
lower section of Table 4.8 also presents the results obtained by the same method as the
one applied above, but where the outcomes to be compared were normalized incomes,
rather than absolute incomes from self-employment. Every individual’s income from self-
employment has been divided by the mean earnings from self-employment in the state if
his or her residence.
Table 4.8 indicates that both in the case of hourly and yearly earnings internal migrants
(the treated group) earn significantly less, than their immobile statistical twins. In case of
hourly earnings the difference is USD 3.5, while in terms of yearly income the difference
amounts to over USD 10,000. This finding contradicts the intuition that people move to
improve their material status.
5A matching procedure taking into account 5 nearest neighbors has also been applied as a form of
sensitivity analysis. The results were similar in terms of sign and significance, but smaller in magnitude.
The balancing properties were satisfied.
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Table 4.7: Balancing properties, internal migration (after one-to-one matching)
Mean t-test
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias bias t p>t
age 20-30 Unmatched 0.27 0.17 22.5 13.84 0.00
Matched 0.27 0.27 -0.3 98.7 -0.11 0.91
age 30-40 Unmatched 0.23 0.28 -13.2 -7.20 0.00
Matched 0.23 0.23 -0.2 98.4 -0.09 0.93
age 40-50 Unmatched 0.20 0.30 -24.5 -12.99 0.00
Matched 0.20 0.20 0.1 99.4 0.06 0.95
age 50-60 Unmatched 0.11 0.17 -18.1 -9.41 0.00
Matched 0.11 0.11 0.2 99.0 0.08 0.94
gender-female Unmatched 0.40 0.36 8.3 4.72 0.00
Matched 0.40 0.40 0.1 98.4 0.05 0.96
education-primary Unmatched 0.02 0.03 -5.6 -2.93 0.00
Matched 0.02 0.02 0.2 96.4 0.09 0.93
education-secondary Unmatched 0.30 0.39 -20.7 -11.36 0.00
Matched 0.30 0.30 -0.2 99.0 -0.08 0.94
education-tertiary Unmatched 0.68 0.57 22.4 12.31 0.00
Matched 0.68 0.68 -0.1 99.7 -0.03 0.98
married-yes Unmatched 0.54 0.72 -37.5 -22.45 0.00
Matched 0.54 0.55 -0.3 99.1 -0.13 0.90
family 2-3 Unmatched 0.45 0.51 -12.9 -7.31 0.00
Matched 0.45 0.45 -0.1 99.0 -0.05 0.96
family 4-5 Unmatched 0.17 0.26 -22.7 -11.96 0.00
Matched 0.17 0.17 -0.1 99.7 -0.03 0.97
mining Unmatched 0.04 0.05 -6.0 -3.17 0.00
Matched 0.04 0.04 0.3 94.8 0.13 0.89
construction Unmatched 0.00 0.00 1.2 0.72 0.47
Matched 0.00 0.00 0.7 44.7 0.26 0.80
manufacturing Unmatched 0.15 0.18 -7.6 -4.18 0.00
Matched 0.15 0.15 0.1 98.9 0.03 0.97
transport/communications Unmatched 0.04 0.04 -2.1 -1.17 0.24
Matched 0.04 0.04 0.2 92.7 0.06 0.95
wholesale Unmatched 0.04 0.05 -0.6 -0.31 0.76
Matched 0.04 0.04 0.0 100.0 -0.00 1.00
retail Unmatched 0.02 0.03 -2.0 -1.09 0.28
Matched 0.02 0.024 0.2 90.0 0.08 0.94
finance/insurance Unmatched 0.10 0.11 -3.4 -1.90 0.06
Matched 0.10 0.10 -0.2 94.2 -0.08 0.94
business/repair services Unmatched 0.09 0.08 1.7 0.96 0.33
Matched 0.09 0.09 -0.3 80.2 -0.13 0.90
personal services Unmatched 0.13 0.11 5.5 3.20 0.00
Matched 0.13 0.13 -0.1 98.2 -0.04 0.97
entertainment Unmatched 0.08 0.09 -0.7 -0.41 0.68
Matched 0.08 0.08 -0.1 84.6 -0.05 0.96
professional services Unmatched 0.02 0.01 8.7 5.93 0.00
Matched 0.02 0.02 0.5 94.6 0.17 0.87
public administration Unmatched 0.27 0.21 13.6 8.02 0.00
Matched 0.27 0.27 -0.1 99.5 -0.03 0.98
technician, salesman, administrative worker Unmatched 0.21 0.22 -0.5 -0.30 0.76
Matched 0.21 0.21 0.3 43.1 0.12 0.90
service worker Unmatched 0.13 0.14 -2.9 -1.64 0.10
Matched 0.13 0.13 -0.2 93.7 -0.07 0.94
farmer etc. Unmatched 0.04 0.09 -18.5 -9.09 0.00
Matched 0.04 0.04 0.5 97.2 0.25 0.80
precision or repair worker, craftsman Unmatched 0.12 0.15 -9.1 -4.93 0.00
Matched 0.12 0.12 -0.1 99.0 -0.04 0.97
operator, fabricator, laborer Unmatched 0.07 0.08 -4.0 -2.20 0.03
Matched 0.07 0.07 -0.2 94.1 -0.10 0.92
Table 4.8: Average treatment effect on the treated, internal migration
Before matching After matching
Variable Treated Controls Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
Income as is
hourly income 21.29 25.13 21.29 24.75 -3.45 1.53 -2.25
yearly income 40,269 51,115 40,269 50,725 -10,456 3,163 -3.31
Normalized income
hourly income 0.85 1.03 0.85 1.00 -0.15 0.06 -2.50
yearly income 0.91 1.16 0.91 1.13 -0.22 0.07 -3.13
The above results confirm that internally mobile entrepreneurs earn significantly less
than stayers who are self-employed. Both in case of hourly and yearly earnings movers
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earn below the average, while stayers earn at (hourly income) or above (yearly income) the
average. The earnings of movers are 85% of those of the stayers in hourly terms, and 80%
in case of yearly earnings. This contradicts the findings of Kennan and Walker (2011),
who found significant gains to internal migration in the US.
Two reasons may underlie this conclusion. First, the data limits the tome horizon in
which mobility is observed to one year. This implies that the self-employment observed
among movers is very new. It is easy to imagine that in a new start-up the owners earnings
are relatively small to what all those who did not move in that past year, thus on average
have well established businesses, earn. Second, in case of internal migration we cannot
exclude motives other than financial gains.
The US Current Population Survey6 provides information on the motives of internal
mobility. In 2012, among movers of all ages, 23.23% of the 3 million long-distance intra-
U.S. mobility (exceeding 500 miles) was due to family-related reasons. 52.04% (1.5 million
persons) moved for employment-related reasons, including new job or job transfer, to look
for work or lost job, to be closer to work/easier commute or becoming retired. 22.30%
of movements were predominantly for housing-related reasons, 2.42% was mobility for
other reasons. Thus, it might be the case that for a significant proportion of the mobile
population (circa 50%) self-employment is a by-product of their move, rather than its
objective. In this sense it may be considered as a necessity rather than an opportunity.
Such businesses are likely to be less profitable. Neither of these reasonings can be tested
on the data used in this study. Nevertheless, they constitute interesting avenues for future
research and possibly could be considered on the basis of the Current Population Survey.
4.6 Summary and conclusions
Stemming from migration theory is the presumption that people migrate due to relative
wage differences between the sending and receiving markets. This postulate is predominant
in neoclassical theories, but modern concepts of migration do not refrain from acknowl-
edging it either. Among the few studies which make attempts at evaluating return to
migration neither, to the best of the author’s knowledge, deals with gains to immigrant
self-employment, as opposed to wage-employment. Due to the multilaterally beneficial
role of immigrant self-employment the economic rationality behind choosing this labor
market strategy calls for scientific attention.
This chapter aimed at testing whether immigrant self-employment is an income-
maximizing strategy when compared to either of the alternatives: wage-employment at
home, self-employment at home, or wage-employment in the host country. Given the data
limitations on one hand, and the ability to eliminate policy driven selection bias on the
other hand, migration from Puerto Rico to the United States has been the subject of the
study.
6www.census.gov/hhes/migration/data/cps/cps2012.html
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The estimates of income gains revealed the following relations of incomes from
immigrant self-employment and three possible alternatives, i.e. self-employment at home,
wage-employment at home, and wage-employment abroad
in hourly terms:
SEUS > SEPR by USD 4.70 (4.4a)
SEUS > WEPR by USD 6.74 (4.4b)
SEUS > WEUS by USD 1.53 (4.4c)
and in yearly terms:
SEUS > SEPR by USD 15, 337 (4.4d)
SEUS > WEPR by USD 15, 099 (4.4e)
SEUS > WEUS by USD 4, 074 (4.4f)
The financial gains to immigrant self-employment, researched in the context of Puerto
Rican immigration to the US, are unambiguously positive. This conclusion holds for
all three cases considered - when the alternative is wage-employment at home, self-
employment at home or wage-employment at the destination. The presented extension to
the Puerto Rican study revealed that such gains need not to be taken as granted, though.
Extending the analysis to mobility of comparable distance across US states showed that
self-employed migrants may earn less than than self-employed stayers, i.e. that migration
can be related to a decrease in earnings. The data limitations of this study could have
lead to a downward bias of these results, though. Further research in other settings still
remains to be done.
On top of the financial gains, as noted in the literature review to this thesis, non-
financial costs and benefits are imperative in the assessment of the drivers of migration.
This is to say that for migration to be a feasible option it must not only promise to enable
higher earnings per se, but also cover for the possible socio-psychological costs of mobility.
The differences in earnings would thus have to be higher if one assigns negative value
to e.g. separation with family or to the (possibly demeaning) job one is to undertake
abroad. Of course the destination country may also offer conditions which are beneficial
for the migrant and may decrease the difference in real earning necessary for migration
to occur. Such conditions include, but are not limited to, better living standards, health
care or child care, social benefits. The destination country may also offer anonymity. This
becomes valuable if one is to perform a 3-D job, which one would never undertake at home
in fear of humiliation. Matching on variables which could be considered proxies of such
features and then comparing obtained estimated of income differences could be a research
strategy for yet another extension to this study.
Given the estimated pecuniary gains and the possible non-pecuniary gains from migra-
tion the obtained results beg the question of whether they cover the socio-economic costs
of mobility. Even when considering only the financial cost related to, among other things,
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the price for the journey a migrant would have to consider spending approximately USD
500 on a 2.5hr round trip flight from San Juan, Puerto Rico to Miami, Florida7. This
decreases the yearly income gain for migrants by merely 3%, to USD 14,500, an amount
of money one most probably could and would spend on occasional visits home without
loosing the financial motivation of being a self-employed migrant.
The finding that immigrant self-employment is a unambiguously profitable option when
compared to wage-employment at home or abroad or self-employment at home is surely
not the only reason why individuals choose that labor market strategy. Actually a number
of other push and pull factors may also play a decisive role in the process. If emigrants
consider changing labor market status while being abroad, one of the underlying aspects
of the decision-making could also be the possibility to avoid discriminatory treatment on
the labor market. An inferior position in comparison to one’s group of reference might be
an incentive strong enough to push people out of wage-employment into self-employment,
where the returns depend on one’s productivity to a much greater extent. On the contrary,
when choosing immigrant self-employment as an alternative to domestic self-employment,
the decision-making process may account for factors which make migration a superior
option to staying, thus pulling entrepreneurs abroad. Among such factors we can identify
ethnic enclaves as an institution which possibly contributes to the difference in returns
to self-employment at the origin and at the destination countries. Absent at home but
present where one’s ethnic group constitutes a minority population, it is said that ethnic
enclaves may serve as business incubators in which immigrant businesses can achieve
returns unattainable otherwise. Both labor market discrimination, as a potential push
factor, and ethnic competition and complementarity in ethnic enclaves, as a potential pull
factor, will be the subject of study in the following chapters.
7Results of search for the cheapest return flight in a month’s time on expedia.com.
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Chapter 5
Discrimination
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 showed that immigrant self-employment can bring relatively high returns, even
when compared to wage-employment abroad. This feature implies that undertaking en-
trepreneurship may be a very good way for migrants to deal with labor market imperfec-
tions, such as wage discrimination. Discrimination may be very distressful for those who
are affected. On one hand it is quite straightforwardly related to a penalty in terms of
earnings. On the other hand, unfair treatment also causes psychological tension. In case
of immigrants lack of agency and empowerment, especially in the lower segments of the
labor market may conceal these detrimental effects. As it will be argued, self-employment
may be a way for immigrants to deal with the issue of discrimination.
One of the types of discrimination which underlies the choice between wage-
employment and self-employment, is employer discrimination. Employers may have a
distaste for employing immigrants, i.e. they may have an exogenous taste for discriminat-
ing against them. Employer discrimination can be manifested in two ways - when people
with similar productivity characteristics are payed differently, i.e. wage discrimination,
and/or when they are unable to obtain similar positions, i.e. occupational discrimination.
Differences between groups in observed labor market outcomes, such as earnings, may
be due to two different factors, though. On one hand, it may be the fact they are differently
endowed in productivity-related features, e.g. have different levels of school attainment or
labor market experience. On the other hand, it may be because of how differently their
endowments are evaluated by employers. The first source of differences in earnings would
not be considered discriminatory or unfair. If it happens that due to the selectivity of
migration poorly educated and poorly skilled migrants arrive at the destination, then their
lower earnings may adequately reflect their productivity. If these workers nevertheless earn
less than natives with equally poor skills and abilities, then that is what we would recognize
as discrimination. Thus what is critical in researching labor market discrimination is
distinguishing between the two factors responsible for wage differences.
From the mechanisms described above it follows that immigrants either may have
limited access to higher payed positions, or they are paid less. Whichever is in place it
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makes wage-employment relatively less attractive compared to self-employment. For some
individuals this may be an incentive strong enough to undertake the latter. The theory of
employer discrimination suggests that the push-pull factors towards self-employment are
created by the following inequality
wM/wN < πM/πN
This indicates that as long as their relative earnings from self-employment exceed their rel-
ative earnings from wage-employment, migrants might concentrate in the former. Crowd-
ing into self-employment is hypothesized to continue until the profits are pushed down to
a point where the relative earnings of immigrants in both types of labor market activity
are equal. The interdependencies between immigrant and native labor market activity
and immigrants’ intensity of self-employment is conceptually depicted in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Immigrant discrimination and self-employment intensity
As relatively low earnings of immigrants are features of both discrimination and po-
tential income gains to self-employment, these two effects may enforce each other in the
development of immigrant entrepreneurship. Thus this chapter will conceptually build
upon the work of the previous empirical analysis.
As far as empirical predictions are concerned, Figure 5.2 depicts the relation of the
right and left-hand side of the above inequality across US states. It shows that in a
vast majority of US states immigrants have a relative earnings advantage over natives
in self-employment. Thus it seems that if they are discriminated on the labor market,
self-employment should be a feasible alternative from the theoretical point of view1.
1Due to methodological constraints the analysis conducted in this chapter will comprise only a selection
of states. Neither of them are the potential outliers positioned far to the right - Kentucky, Maine, North
Dakota, West Virginia, Wyoming - or left - District of Columbia, South Dakota - of Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Immigrants employment share and earnings, by state and form of labor market
activity
Source: own calculations based on American Community Survey 5-year PUMS, 2005-2010.
Given the financial benefits of pursuing self-employment rather than wage-employment
and the detrimental effects labor market discrimination, this chapter poses the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5 Labor market discrimination is related to increased intensity of
immigrant self-employment.
In testing the above hypothesis this thesis considers two issues, which are often ne-
glected in the literature, but which seem more than important for the proper identification
and interpretation of the research. The first issue is related to the outcome variably, i.e.
immigrant self-employment. The second is related to discrimination as a notion which
implies a relative position of one group against another.
As far as the outcome variable of this study is concerned, the literature often formu-
lates hypotheses concerning the propensity to become self-employed (see e.g.: Borjas and
Bronars, 1989; Clark and Drinkwater, 2000). This chapter proposes that the intensity of
self-employment be considered instead. The reason for such a formulation is that when
using the extent of discrimination as a predictor variable in estimating the probability of
self-employment incidence we do not consider actual switchers. Thus it is impossible to
determine whether individuals affected by discrimination become more inclined toward
self-employment. All we can actually say without access to panel data is that the greater
the extent of discrimination, the greater the share of self-employed in the labor force.
As far as the second issue is concerned, the question is which group should the outcomes
of the group if interest be compared to. Previous research in the field seems to take it
for granted that the comparison group is the “majority”. In the case of the UK “whites”
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are assumed to be such a group (see e.g. Clark and Drinkwater, 1998, 2000), “second
generation Australians” in the context of Australia (see e.g. Evans and Kelley, 1991),
and in the context of the US. “Non-Hispanic whites” or ”British whites” (see e.g. Borjas
and Bronars, 1989; Fairlie and Meyer, 1996). Evans and Kelley (1991) have noticed that
discrimination can also be a measure of social distance, though.
The greater the ethno-cultural differences between the dominant and the minority
group, the bigger the extent of discrimination may be. Of course this will be the case
if employers also represent the dominant group. Yet this must not necessarily be the
true. The notion that minority employers may actually discriminate against majority
employees and favor their own have been extensively explored within the discussion on
enclave economies (Sanders and Nee, 1987; Portes and Jensen, 1989, 1992; Sanders and
Nee, 1992; Portes and Zhou, 1996). On the other hand, greater social distance may imply
that a very distinct group is not the group of reference for a given immigrant minority.
If this was the case then we could expect that even in case of large income differences,
they would not be meaningful enough to affect an individual’s labor market behavior. The
arguments on the significance of various groups of reference in the migration process have
been raised in the New Economic of Labor Migration (Stark and Bloom, 1985, see Chapter
2 for a review). This study will thus contribute to previous work by looking at various
possible reference groups, rather than just one. In this sense it will consider a number
of discrimination measures and evaluate them with respect to their association with the
probability of becoming self-employed.
The main contributions of this study will be, first, providing a refined analysis of
immigrant labor market discrimination, going beyond a simple comparison to one ethnic
group. Second, demonstrating how the extent of labor market discrimination in relation to
various groups of reference is associated with the intensity of immigrant self-employment.
Third, in pursuit of these objectives this chapter will employ techniques well known from
the field of labor economics, but which have been overlooked in some of the previous
analysis leading to possibly biased results.
The chapter is structured as follows: the next section presents a review of research
strategies related to the measurement of wage gaps concerning immigrant populations.
The following section presents the methodology. It describes the data, sets the context
and explains the choice of comparison groups for the wage gap analyses, and introduces
the econometric models used in the analyses. The latter part is divided into two parts, the
first explaining the technique used for determining the extent of discrimination, and the
second explaining the technique used for quantifying the relationship between the extent
of discrimination and the intensity of self-employment. Next, the results are presented and
discussed, followed by a concise description of a external validity study. The summary
and conclusions close the chapter.
5.2 Review of research strategies
Recent analyses on immigrant-native wage gaps prove the existence of significant differ-
ences in the earnings of non-natives and autochthons, both in the case of the US and
other countries. How these gaps affect self-employment choices of immigrants is a less
researched topic. Among the few written works on this issue Fairlie and Meyer (1996)
explore self-employment rates of different ethnic groups in the US. Relaying on the works
of Bonacich (1973), Light (1972), and Borjas (1986) they find that: the average differ-
ences between wage-employment and self-employment earnings is positively related to the
self-employment rate of a given group; the more advantaged groups in terms of earned or
unearned income have higher self-employment rates; and that higher self-employment rates
in the home countries of immigrants do not necessarily translate into high self-employment
rates at the destination.
In evaluating the discrimination hypothesis Fairlie and Meyer (1996) propose a two
step procedure. They first estimate regressions where the dependent variables are wage-
employment and self-employment earnings, and unearned income, and the independent
variables are a number of individual characteristics, including dummies for ethnicity. In
the second step they use the coefficients of the ethnicity dummies as independent variables
in selectivity corrected probit models of self-employment. By means of this method they
find that the discrimination theory does not hold, i.e. that ethnic penalty, ceteris paribus,
does not lead to higher self-employment rates, but the contrary. The weakness of Fairlie
and Meyer’s (1996) approach is that by using dummy variables as controls for ethnicity,
they provide biased estimators. Such a strategy is inadequate for measuring the extent of
discrimination as it ignores potential differences in the other explanatory variables between
the compared groups.
Clark and Drinkwater (1998) explore differences in wages between non-whites and
whites in the UK based on the theoretical model of Coate and Tennyson (1992). They
compute a non-white discrimination coefficient, which is the natural exponent of the β-
coefficient on non-whites in a log-wage equation. Their findings point to a significant
earnings disadvantage of non-whites, both in payed- and self-employment. Such a strat-
egy suffers from the same drawbacks as that of Fairlie and Meyer’s (1996), though. In
subsequent work Clark and Drinkwater (2000) take the difference in the expected earnings
from self- and wage-employment as an explanatory variable in estimating the probabil-
ity of becoming self-employed. Their findings confirm that self-employment intensity is
positively related to the disparity in one’s predicted earnings from the two forms of labor
market activity.
In 2001 Nielsen et al. took advantage of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and pro-
posed a crucial methodological refinement in decomposing wage differences between the
immigrants and natives, which took into consideration not only the discrimination hy-
pothesis, but also assimilation theory. Thy estimate the wage gaps between immigrants
and natives based on Danish data disaggregating the differences into three components
(Nielsen et al., 2001, p.10)
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∆E = yˆn − yˆi = yˆn − yˆi∗n￿ ￿￿ ￿
Q∗E
+ yˆi∗n − yˆi∗i￿ ￿￿ ￿
D∗E
+ yˆi∗i − yˆi￿ ￿￿ ￿
A∗
where Q∗E is the difference between the native (n) and immigrant (i) earnings when eval-
uated at natives’ coefficients, i.e. it indicates the part of the wage gap resulting from
differences in endowments between the two groups; D∗E is the difference between the na-
tive and immigrant earnings which is related to differences in coefficients, rather than
endowments, i.e. it indicates the extent of discrimination; and finally A∗ is the part of
the wage gap which is due to the fact that the immigrant-native wage gap may decrease
as immigrants assimilate (have longer duration of stay and longer working experience in
Denmark). The analysis considers two hypothetical states (*). “Perfect assimilation” is
after 10 years of stay and 10 years of work experience. The “unassimilated state” con-
cerns newcomers. The two states are operationalized by means of setting relevant variables
such as years since migration, experience and age to values corresponding to perfect as-
similation and being a newcomer. Nielsen et al. (2001) do not find strong evidence for
wage discrimination against immigrants, but they do find large differences in their work
experience (shorter employment spans than of the native population)2.
In a cross country study of 17 European economies van Tubergen (2005) uses the
native and immigrant employment rates, rather than wage-gaps, to measure the extent of
discrimination. The findings support his hypothesis that greater probability of becoming
self-employed is associated with lower levels of employment in a given ethnic community.
The imperfection of this measure lies in the various ethnicity-specific features unrelated
to discrimination, which affect labor market choices and are captured by the employment
rate (e.g. social roles within households, time use arrangements, fertility patterns). An
analog analysis to that of van Tubergen (2005) has been done for wage gaps between
immigrants and natives across different ethnic groups in Sweden (Hammarstedt, 2006).
Most recently Lehmer and Ludsteck (2011) described the immigrant-native wage
gaps for Germany. They specifically focused on the period 1995-2000. Oaxaca-Blinder
decompositions (ref. Nielsen et al., 2001) of earnings revealed greatest labor market
discrimination among Poles, yet this pattern was not applicable to all East European
citizens. This, similarly to studies such as that of Fairlie and Meyer (1996), points to
the fact that labor market mechanisms affecting “aggregate ethnic groups”, or a certain
selection of ethnic groups on average, may in fact work quite differently for specific
ethnicities. Interestingly Lehmer and Ludsteck (2011) propose to distinguish between
“pure wage discrimination” and discrimination resulting from pushing immigrants into
lower payed jobs, i.e. “occupational discrimination”. In order to do so they run wage
decompositions both controlling for sector of employment and not.
From the reviewed literature it follows that, first, focusing on one ethnic group rather
than an aggregate may be very meaningful. Second, it shows that who is treated as
2The authors do not conduct further analysis on how these wage-gaps affect immigrants’ intensity of
self-employment, though.
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the “dominant” comparison group is quite arbitrary and varies across studies. Third,
we can see that the Oaxaca-Blinder wage decomposition method and its variations has
been successfully applied to immigrant-native wage comparisons. Last, but for this thesis
definitely not least, it is clear that despite various attempts at measuring the extent of
discrimination it has less frequently been analytically considered as a stimulant for self-
employment.
5.3 Methodology
This analysis has two components. The first inquiry deals with estimating the extent of
labor market (wage) discrimination between Puerto Rican immigrants to the US and the
possible reference groups of natives. The second inquiry looks at how the extent of wage
discrimination affects the probability of becoming self- employed.
5.3.1 Data
In this study we use the 5-year American Community Survey data from the year 2005-2010
(Ruggles et al., 2010). It is the same dataset as has been used for the analysis in Chapter
4. In contrast to that chapter, though, for this part of the research the Puerto Rican
Community Survey data is not used, as here the focus is only on the US as a receiving
country. The descriptive statistics for selected variables used in the analyses are presented
in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Means and standard deviations of selected variables used
Variable Puerto Rican Puerto Rican Hispanic Non-Hispanic white white
immigrants natives natives natives natives
age 45.36 33.94 34.43 43.97 43.58
(14.58) (12.68) (14.49) (15.21) (15.30)
gender-male 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.49
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
gender-female 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.51
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
married-no 0.50 0.64 0.60 0.41 0.42
(0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
married-yes 0.50 0.36 0.40 0.59 0.58
(0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
education-incomplete 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.16) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
education-primary 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01
(0.31) (0.16) (0.18) (0.12) (0.12)
education-secondary 0.51 0.58 0.58 0.46 0.46
(0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
education-tertiary 0.36 0.39 0.38 0.53 0.52
(0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
agriculture 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03
(0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16)
construction 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26)
manufacturing 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.12
(0.33) (0.26) (0.28) (0.32) (0.32)
transport/communications 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06
(0.26) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
wholesale 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
retail 0.16 0.21 0.22 0.17 0.17
(0.36) (0.41) (0.41) (0.37) (0.38)
finance/insurance 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07
(0.25) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25)
business/repair services 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.26) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23)
personal services 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
entertainment 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
professional services 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.29
(0.45) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.45)
public administration 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.21) (0.21)
manager, professional 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.32 0.32
(0.42) (0.42) (0.41) (0.47) (0.47)
technician, salesman, etc. 0.27 0.36 0.35 0.30 0.30
(0.45) (0.48) (0.48) (0.46) (0.46)
service worker 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.14
(0.41) (0.40) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35)
farmer etc. 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03
(0.13) (0.11) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16)
precision or repair worker, etc. 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10
(0.29) (0.26) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30)
operator, fabricator, laborer 0.17 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11
(0.37) (0.31) (0.33) (0.31) (0.31)
Speaks English-none 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.20) (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02)
Speaks English-only 0.11 0.39 0.41 0.97 0.95
(0.31) (0.49) (0.49) (0.17) (0.23)
Speaks English-very well 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.02 0.05
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.16) (0.21)
Speaks English-well 0.21 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.01
(0.41) (0.23) (0.25) (0.06) (0.08)
Speaks English-not well 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.34) (0.12) (0.13) (0.04) (0.05)
working-yes 0.72 0.80 0.79 0.84 0.84
(0.45) (0.40) (0.41) (0.36) (0.37)
self-employed-yes 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.11
(0.24) (0.21) (0.24) (0.32) (0.31)
Observations 49,031 51,823 532,706 7,129,412 7,464,142
Source: The IPUMS databases, Ruggles et al. (2010). Standard deviations in parenthesis.
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Relatively many Puerto Rican immigrants in the US have primary education in com-
parison to the other groups. In contrast, there are relatively fewer Puerto Rican im-
migrants with tertiary education, especially when compared to white and non-Hispanic
white natives. In terms of industrial clustering there are no striking differences. Puerto
Rican immigrants are more often present in manufacturing and less present in retail when
compared to Puerto Rican natives or Hispanics in general, but their shares in these two
industries are similar to those of whites and non-Hispanic whites. As far as occupations
are concerned Puerto Rican immigrants have a visibly higher presence as operators, fabri-
cators and laborers. Differences are also visible in terms of language proficiency of Puerto
Rican immigrants, who rather rarely speak only English, and more often (than the other
groups) declare they speak English “well” or “not well”. The Puerto Rican immigrant
self-employment rate is also lower than that of whites and non-Hispanic whites. It is
comparable to that of Puerto Rican and Hispanic natives, though.
5.3.2 Empirical setting
In light of the considerations presented in the introduction to this chapter, taking the dom-
inant group as a comparison and assuming that most employers also come from that group,
thus capturing the “maximal” discrimination, seems justified from the perspective of labor
market analysis. When considering discrimination as a factor affecting individuals’ labor
market decisions, though, the choice of reference group is not as obvious. Though the
discrimination of, for example, Ugandan immigrants in the US when compared to white
US citizens may be largest in numerical terms, it may not actually push the former out of
wage-employment into self-employment. Instead numerically smaller, but “socially” more
significant discrimination may play a critical role, e.g. discrimination of Ugandans in com-
parison to the black population, to black immigrants, or specifically to black immigrants
from East African countries.
This chapter, continuing to analyze Puerto Rican immigrants to the US, will thus
consider several ethnic groups of natives for comparisons:
• Puerto Rican natives, i.e. US born persons of Puerto Rican ancestry;
• Hispanic natives, i.e. US born persons of Hispanic, including Puerto Rican, an-
cestry;
• White natives, i.e. white US born persons (note that all Hispanics, including
Puerto Ricans are classified as white);
• White non-Hispanic natives, i.e. white US born persons, excluding all Hispanics.
The rates of Puerto Rican immigrant self-employment in comparison to the selected
groups of natives are presented in Table 5.2.
The fact that the self-employment rate of Puerto Rican immigrants in the US is higher
than that of Puerto Rican and, generally, Hispanic natives, but lower than that of non-
Hispanic whites and white natives creates an interesting context for the analysis. If self-
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Table 5.2: Self-employment rates by selected groups
self-employment wage-employment
Puerto Rican immigrants 6.23% 93.77%
Puerto Rican natives 4.52% 95.48%
Hispanic natives 6.01% 93.99%
All white non-Hispanic natives 11.22% 88.78%
All white natives 11.03% 88.97%
Data: Ruggles et al. (2010).
employment is in fact driven by the extent of labor market discrimination should we
be also expecting higher discrimination of Puerto Rican immigrants when compared to
Puerto Rican and Hispanic natives, but lower discrimination when compared to non-
Hispanic white natives or white natives in general? This type of analysis will be a much
needed addition to the discrimination literature, which usually considered the diversity of
immigrant groups, rather than of natives (for an analysis of discrimination of various US
immigrant groups see: Fairlie and Meyer, 1996).
As this analysis considers discrimination and self-employment intensity of one group
only, i.e. Puerto Rican immigrants to the US, the regional diversity of labor markets
will be exploited to achieve variation in the effect of discrimination on self-employment
outcomes. The state level has been chosen as the basis for regional comparisons. On one
hand this is due to state-level specificity concerning immigrant incorporation and the labor
market in general. On the other hand only such a level of analysis allows to explore solely
Puerto Ricans as an ethnic minority, assuring large enough numbers of observations. Due
to the relatively small number of Puerto Ricans in general, and consequently of the Puerto
Rican immigrant population in the US, and because of their clustering in certain states,
only some areas have been included in final the analyses, though. Figure 5.3 presents the
density of Puerto Rican immigrants relative to the total population across US states. The
seven states eventually included in the analyses have been labeled.
The state with the highest share of Puerto Rican immigrants is Connecticut, with
over 2% of Puerto Rican immigrants in the total population. It is a relatively small state,
though, with 3.5 million inhabitants. Florida’s population, despite being comprised “only”
in 1.94% of Puerto Rico born persons, has nearly 360 thousand Puerto Ricans living there,
what makes it the state with the largest Puerto Rico born population.
The seven states which been included in the analysis of discrimination: Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania comprise 65% of the Puerto
Rican immigrant population in the US. In the remaining states computations of the extent
of discrimination were not possible for one or more of the comparison groups. Due to the
resulting incomparability of results across different samples these states were left out of
the study.
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Figure 5.3: Share of Puerto Rican immigrants across states
Source: Own elaboration based on map from Wikimedia Commons.
5.3.3 Estimating the extent discrimination
First, we measure to what extent are Puerto Rican immigrants discriminated in the labor
market against different reference groups. As it has been indicated in the introduction to
this chapter, the choice of several groups of natives for comparison was dictated by the
need to consider the extent of discrimination as a decision-making factor in subsequent
analyses.
Following the works of Nielsen et al. (2001) and Lehmer and Ludsteck (2011) the
applied measure of discrimination is derived from the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of
wage equations for specific subpopulations. The difference in expected earnings of two
groups within these subpopulations - Puerto Rican immigrants and a native comparison
group active on the US labor market - are computed from Mincerian wage equations and
are Heckman-corrected for selection into working (Heckman, 1979):
Pr(working) =β0 + β1X+ β2martial status + ￿, (5.1a)
ln(earnings) =β0 + β1X+ β2industry + β3occupation+
+ β4 Inverse Mill’s Ratio + ￿i (5.1b)
where X is a set of individual characteristics such as: age, gender, level of educational
attainment, and English language proficiency; industry is the industry of one’s activity3;
occupation is one’s occupation4; (5.1a) estimates the probability that an individual in
3Constructed based on a three-digit classification of industries coded in the IND1990 variable in the
PUMS datasets, yielding 13 sectors.
4Based on a 3-digit classification of occupations derived from the OCC1990 variable in the PUMS
datasets, 7 categories.
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productive age (16-65) is actually working, and (5.1b) is the log-wage equation which
corrects for that fact using the Inverse Mill’s Ratio as a regressor. Marital status has been
used as the selection variable which is assumed to affect the odds of working, but not the
productivity. This set of regressions is run separately for each of the five considered groups
(Puerto Rican immigrants, Puerto Rican natives, Hispanic natives, white natives and
white non-Hispanic natives) for each state. Following Jann (2008) we then compute the
differences in expected earnings, estimated from (5.1b), between Puerto Rican immigrants
(PRi) and each of the comparison groups (CG) in each state.
The difference is then decomposed into three components
R =E(YCG)− E(YPRi) =⇒ (5.2a)
=⇒ R =[E(XCG)− E(XPRi)]￿βPRi+
+ E(XPRi)
￿(βCG − βPRi)+
+ [E(XCG)− E(XPRi)]￿(βCG − βPRi) (5.2b)
We are especially interested in [E(XPRi)￿(βCG − βPRi)] which measures the contribution
of differences in the wage regression coefficients to the estimated wage inequality. The
differences in coefficients are calculated from the view point of Puerto Rican immigrants,
i.e. they are weighed by their levels of predictor variables. The measure quantifies the
difference in earnings which would prevail even if Puerto Rican immigrants had the other
group’s characteristics. Considering this component of the wage difference, rather than
the rest of (5.2b) allows us to filter out that part of the wage difference between Puerto
Rican immigrants and a reference group which is due to differences in endowments, i.e.
differences in levels of productivity-related measures. The remainder of the difference is
then attributable to discrimination.
5.3.4 Estimating the relation of discrimination to self-employment in-
tensity
As our interest lies in describing how the extent of wage discrimination affects the prob-
ability of becoming self-employed (PR(se)) among immigrants, a probit model will be
utilized in the second stage of inquiry. The regression once more takes advantage of the
Heckman-correction and the Inverse Mill’s Ratio estimated in (5.1a) and the model has
the following form
Pr(se) = β0 + β1X+ β2discrimination + β3Inverse Mill’s Ratio + ￿ (5.3)
The measure of discrimination inputted into (5.3) is the second summand of (5.2b)
divided by the value of earnings, i.e.
discrimination =
[E(XPRi)￿(βCG − βPRi)]
Y
(5.4)
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Given that earnings are always positive, this measure takes the sign of the discrimination
(− for positive discrimination, + otherwise) and is standardized by the mean earnings in a
given state (Y ). This standardization allows to assess the relative extent of discrimination.
This procedure was applied for two reasons. First, it is critical to know whether we are
talking about positive discrimination, i.e. preferential treatment in terms of remuneration,
or “regular” discrimination. And second it is crucial to know not only how many dollars
more (or less) would one earn if it was not for discrimination, but also what part of the
actual wage would that make up for. In case of USD 12,000 earnings per year a USD 1000
difference would be worth a month’s pay, but if the wage is USD 36,000, then that only
makes it worth 10 days’ pay, being relatively less discriminatory. The average state wage
was used in order to limit possible endogeneity between the probability of self-employment
and the income measure.
5.4 The role of discrimination in immigrant self-
employment
The average level of discrimination, as defined by (5.2b), of Puerto Rican immigrants when
compared to the different groups considered in this chapter yields results presented in Table
5.3. The percentage values indicate how much less (or more) do Puerto Rican immigrants
earn due to labor market discrimination. Given that the estimated wage-equations were
regressions of log-earnings, the percentage differences in earnings were calculated using
the following formula
%value = {(exp[E(XPRi)￿(βCG − βPRi)])−1 − 1}× 100% (5.5)
Taking the inverse allows to consider the earnings of natives (any of the comparison groups)
as 100% and relate the earnings of immigrants to that value. Subtracting 1 implies that
the presented results show by how many percent the value of estimated immigrant wages
is above or below the natives’ wages. Notably, these values do not indicate the actual
difference in wages, but only the difference which is attributable to discrimination. In
fact, the difference might be relatively larger (smaller) due to poorer (better) endowment
in productivity-related characteristics of Puerto Rican immigrants. Following Lehmer
and Ludsteck (2011) the wage decompositions have also been run without accounting
for occupations. Analyses of discrimination in terms of hourly earnings, both including
and excluding occupations, have also been performed. The results slightly differed in
magnitude, but never in terms of sign. Thus here the focus will be on the results presented
in terms of yearly earnings and inclusive of occupations. Tables with the results of the
other specifications are presented in the Appendix.
Though the extent of discrimination greatly differs across states and comparison groups,
from table 5.3 it follows that in case of comparisons against Hispanic and Puerto Rican
natives Puerto Rican immigrants are, on average, negatively discriminated. On the state
level this regularity is visible only in the state of New York.
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Table 5.3: Labor market discrimination of Puerto Rican immigrants across states and
comparison groups
Puerto Rican Hispanic white Non-Hispanic white
natives natives natives natives
Connecticut 5% -3% 29% 28%
Florida -22% -29% -10% -7%
Georgia -19% -24% -5% -2%
Illinois 20% 4% 42% 10%
New York -4% -1% 66% 69%
Ohio 37% -12% 12% 12%
Pennsylvania 80% 0% 53% 56%
average effect negative negative positive positive
specification of discrimination measures
occupations + + + +
earnings yearly yearly yearly yearly
Only Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition discrimination coefficients significant below
the 5% level have been considered. The discrimination measure took the value of
0 otherwise. Only states for which models achieved convergence are shown.
Only in two states Puerto Rican immigrants enjoy an earnings advantage in comparison
to all four reference groups - in Illinois and Pennsylvania. The latter state also represents
the most striking positive discrimination. Puerto Rican immigrants living in Pennsylvania
earn 80% more than Puerto Rican natives. Positive discrimination of a relatively large
magnitude has been also recognized in New York, yet there an income gain of 66% and
69% is in comparison to white and non-Hispanic white natives, respectively.
When it comes to negative discrimination the highest values were recognized in Florida.
Puerto Rican immigrants turned out to be discriminated when compared to all native
groups. In Florida Puerto Rican immigrants also experienced the highest level of discrim-
ination. Their wages are estimated to be 29% lower than those of Hispanic natives living
in the state. Negative discrimination is also consistently observed across all comparison
groups in Georgia.
The patterns represented by the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions open a new array
of research questions. It appears that the institution of labor market discrimination is
far more complex than expected. For one thing it varies across localities implying high
context-specificity. Second, it differs greatly across comparison groups. It seems that the
more general (distant) the group, the more favorable working conditions one may obtain.
This finding contradicts the intuition that the more distant the group, the greater the
discrimination would be.
These patterns are explainable under one scenario, already signaled in the introduction
to this chapter, i.e. under the circumstance that the employers are in fact from the minority
group. This would explain favoring of Puerto Rican immigrants as a form of within-group
support. The fact that in some cases, mostly when compared to Puerto Rican or Hispanic
natives, Puerto Rican immigrants are negatively discriminated might be indicative of an
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ethnic market in which labor market institutions work as expected towards insiders, but
when compared to outsiders, labor market favoring dominates.
Given the obtained measure(s) of labor market discrimination we have moved to
estimating the relation of discrimination to the probability of becoming self-employed.
Marginal effects of selected independent variables after estimating (5.3) are presented in
Table 5.4
Table 5.4: Probit model output, marginal effects
base Puerto Rican Hispanic white Non-Hispanic white
case natives natives natives natives
discrimination 0.438*** 0.672*** 0.363*** 0.354***
age 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
gender (1=female) -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018***
education incomplete - reference category
primary -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016***
secondary -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.016***
tertiary -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
N 19,582 19,582 19,582 19,582 19,582
English proficiency + + + + +
occupations + + + + +
industries + + + + +
specification of discrimination measures
occupations n/a + + + +
earnings n/a yearly yearly yearly yearly
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level
In each of the considered cases discrimination has a positive marginal effect in relation
to the probability of self-employment. Thus it seems that we can confirm the initial
hypothesis that the larger the discrimination, the higher the probability of becoming self-
employed.
From Table 5.4 it follows that labor market discrimination of Puerto Rican immi-
grants when compared to Hispanic natives has the largest relation to the probability of
Puerto Rican immigrant self-employment. If Puerto Rican immigrants compare their
wages to non-Hispanic white natives, then their intensity of self-employment is relatively
the smallest. If white or Puerto Rican natives are the reference group, the relation of
wage discrimination to the probability of becoming self-employed falls somewhere in the
middle.
These results tell the story of social distance, as proposed by Evans and Kelley (1991).
Whites and non-Hispanic whites are the two groups furtherest in social distance from
Puerto Rican immigrants. Whites are inclusive of Puerto Ricans, but comprising many
other ethnic groups. Non-Hispanic whites exclude Puerto Ricans all together. Thus the
fact that the wage comparison to these two groups exhibits the weakest relation to the
intensity of self-employment in a given state is in line with the theory.
Puerto Rican natives were considered the group which is the nearest to Puerto Rican
immigrants in terms of social distance. The relation of discrimination to the intensity of
self-employment is in this case stronger than that in the case of whites and non-Hispanic
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whites, but weaker when compared to Hispanic natives in general. What is important
to recall is that in case of comparisons with native Puerto Ricans and Hispanics average
discrimination across the seven considered states is positive. Thus the results from these
two cases actually show that the larger the favoring (the lower the discrimination) of Puerto
Rican immigrants, the smaller the intensity of self-employment. It seams reasonable to
assume that smaller favoring in comparison to a similar group would have a weaker effect
on the intensity of self-employment. In case of a very similar group equality in terms of
earnings could be very much acceptable. In such a context smaller wage advantages must
not necessarily be associated with higher probability of self-employment.
In order to gain better understanding of the obtained results we consider a specific case,
i.e. an average aged male, working in the retail sector, in a technical, sales, administrative
position, speaking English very well, with secondary education. The marginal effects of
various discrimination measures on the predicted probability of self-employment calculated
for such a person are presented in Figure 5.45.
Figure 5.4: Marginal effects of various levels of discrimination on the Probability of Puerto
Rican immigrant self-employment, by comparison group
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
From Figure 5.4 we can see that for positive discrimination (negative value of our
discrimination measure, left part of the OX axes) its relation to the probability of becoming
5The figures consider discrimination measured with respect to occupations and yearly earnings. Results
for analyses where earnings are hourly and discrimination does not account for occupations are presented
in the Appendix.
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self-employed is very small. When negative discrimination is in place in most cases it
doubtlessly increases the probability to become self-employed, as predicted by the theories
of immigrant self-employment. In case of discrimination of Puerto Rican immigrants when
compare to Puerto Rican natives (a) or Hispanics (b) the relation is not as obvious. At
very high values of discrimination the probability of immigrant self-employment seems to
fall.
Table 5.5 provides a precise numerical value of the probability of becoming self-
employed when the marginal effects of the various measures of discrimination are eval-
uated at their mean values and mean (dominant, where applicable) values (categories,
where applicable) of independent variables6.
Table 5.5: Marginal effects of various discrimination measures evaluated at their mean on
the probability of Puerto Rican immigrant self-employment, by comparison groups
dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
Puerto Rican natives 0.59 0.02 24.29 0.00 0.55 0.64
Hispanic natives 0.40 0.02 22.00 0.00 0.36 0.43
white natives 0.19 0.01 19.33 0.00 0.17 0.21
white non-Hispanic natives 0.19 0.01 18.69 0.00 0.17 0.21
Under such a scenario the relation of discrimination to the probability of elf-
employment seems linear in relation to social distance. The greater the distance, the
smaller the interdependence between wage discrimination and self-employment intensity.
5.5 External validity of the study
Similarly to what has been done in the case of the analysis of income gains to immigrant
self-employment, this chapter also provides an extension of the above study. The subject
of the following exercise are all immigrants to the US. Their earnings are compared to
the earnings of their co-ethnics who are US citizens. The immigrant and native pop-
ulations comprise seven ethnic groups delimited by approximately continental divisions:
West Europeans, North Africans and Southwest Asians, Hispanics, Central Europeans,
Sub-Saharan Africans, Asians, and North Americans7. All models were computed on
the 2005-2010 American Community Survey dataset (Ruggles et al., 2010). The Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition of wage differences is done for citizens and non-citizens within these
ethnic groups.
An attempt was also made to compute the extent of discrimination not only within
ethnic groups, but identically to the strategy applied for Puerto Ricans, also across states.
As the various ethnic groups have different concentrations across states, computing dis-
crimination for all the ethnic groups was possible only for a handful of locations, California,
Florida, and New York. The immigrant population in these three states amounts to ∼35%,
6The results of this exercise for other discrimination measures are presented in the Appendix.
7Defined based on the ANCESTR1 variable in the PUMS datasets. The variable captures the first
response to a question on one’s ethnic origin
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unlike the high concentration (∼62%) of Puerto Ricans in the seven states selected for the
main analysis (Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Ohio, New York and Pennsylvania).
These states are also not necessarily the major receiving states for immigrants from the
specific ethnic groups. Thus only the variability of average discrimination across ethnic
groups was eventually considered.
In order to determine the expected sign of the relation of discrimination to the inten-
sity of self-employment for all immigrants we have tested if self-employment is not an even
less profitable opportunity than discriminatory wage employment. This could have been
the case because, similarly to the situation on the wage-earning labor market, (ethnic)
group membership may generate a signaling effect also in the case of the self-employed,
resulting in relatively lower expected earnings and less incentive to choose self-employment
as a labor market strategy. The mechanisms behind such outcomes could be consumer or
credit market discrimination. If immigrants earned less in self-employment than in (dis-
criminatory) wage-employment, then we would not expect them to become self-employed
more often nevertheless.
In order to test for the possibility of lower earnings from self-employment an additional
analysis using Propensity Score Matching has been applied (see Chapter 4 for methodolog-
ical details). The method was identical to that used in Chapter 4, the only difference being
that the control group were all wage-employed immigrants (non-citizens) while the treated
group were all self-employed immigrants. In order to facilitate computations a random
10% sample has been selected from the 10 million observations in the 5-year ACS used for
the discrimination analysis. Immigrants constituted 7.33% of the 1,014,340 observations
eventually considered. 11% (59,665 observations) of the working immigrant population are
the self-employed. The estimation of propensity scores was done on 51,285 observations,
all of which were on common support.
Kernel matching, bootstrapped estimates of treatment effects obtained after kernel
matching, and one-to-one matching have indicated no significant difference between the
estimated average earnings (yearly and hourly) of immigrant wage-employed and self-
employed workers. All matching procedures assured acceptably similar samples after
matching (bias of variables used for propensity score estimation lower than 5% between
the treated and control group).
The fact that immigrants’ earnings from wage-employment and self-employment do
not differ does not yet imply that immigrants are on average indifferent between the two
forms of labor market activity. Recalling the theoretical models we have to note that what
maters is the difference between the relative earnings of self-employed and wage-employed
immigrants to respective groups of natives. The theory predicts that if discrimination
persists, minority members will opt for self-employment until their crowding-in pushes
profits low enough that
wM/wN = πM/πN
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where w denotes wages, π denotes profits from entrepreneurship and indices M and N
indicate minority and non-minority members, respectively (or migrants and natives, in
this case).
Knowing that the enumerators in the above equation are statistically identical (wM =
πM ), the difference between the denominators is what remains unexplored. Thus Propen-
sity Score Matching has been applied once more, this time to compare the difference in
earnings between self-employed and wage-employed natives. The methodology was iden-
tical to what has been done heretofore. The 10% random sample of the 5-year ACS
has been used, just as for the comparison between immigrant wage-employment and self-
employment earnings. 635,581 observations were eventually included in the analysis, all
on common support. The self-employed constituted 13% of the sample8. Both kernel and
one-to-one matching provided satisfactory comparability between the characteristics of
wage-employed natives (the control group) and self-employed natives (the treated group).
The comparison of outcomes (hourly and yearly earnings) conducted for samples matched
by means of both techniques yielded the same results presented in Table 5.6. Due to
obtaining results which are highly significant and robust to different matching procedures,
bootstrapping has not been performed.
Table 5.6: Income gains to self-employment among US citizens: Average Treatment Effects
on the Treated (ATT)
Variable Treated Controls Difference PSM S.E. T-stat
Kernel Matching
hourly income 25.93 21.47 4.46 0.98 4.55
yearly income 52,339 45,274 7,065 1,951 3.62
From Table 5.6 it follows that native self-employed persons earn on average signifi-
cantly more, both in hourly and yearly terms, than wage-employed natives. This would
indicate that since wM = πM and wN < πN , then wM/wN > πM/πN , what, according to
the theory, would be the reason why immigrants, in general, despite discrimination, are not
inclined to choose self-employment over wage-employment. This result leads to hypoth-
esizing that the relation between discrimination and the probability of self-employment
among US immigrants in general should not be positive.
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of wage differences between immigrants and natives
within the seven aggregated ethnic groups gave the following results:
Table 5.7 indicates varying levels of discrimination. Non-citizens of Western European
ancestry are the only group which has a negative value of the coefficient-related part of
8In this study the fraction of self-employed immigrants is 11% while self-employed natives 13% implying
a 2 percentage point difference in favor of the natives. This contradicts the data presented in Figure 1.1a,
where the US is an example of a country in which the immigrant self-employment rate exceeds that of the
natives. The differences may be due to two reasons. First, the OECD data defines immigrants and natives
based on place of birth rather than citizenship, as it is done here. Second, they consider the actual self-
employment rate, that is the number of self-employed in the total labor force, while in this study only the
wage-employed and self-employed workers are considered in the analysis, excluding e.g. the unemployed.
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Table 5.7: Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition of Wage Gaps by Ethnic Groups
Wage equation Decomposition
Coefficient Observations Endowments Coefficients Interaction
West European 2,941,563
Predicted ln(wage) for natives 10.18***
Predicted ln(wage) for immigrants 10.51***
Difference -0.33*** -0.25*** -0.09*** 0.03***
North African & Southwest Asian 44,812
Predicted ln(wage) for natives 10.21***
Predicted ln(wage) for immigrants 9.94***
Difference 0.27* 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.00
Hispanics 764,129
Predicted ln(wage) for natives 10.20***
Predicted ln(wage) for immigrants 9.69***
Difference 0.51*** 0.14*** 0.38*** -0.01**
Central Europeans 356,433
Predicted ln(wage) for natives 10.48***
Predicted ln(wage) for immigrants 9.99***
Difference 0.49*** 0.32*** 0.30*** -0.13***
Sub-Saharan African 44,933
Predicted ln(wage) for natives 10.27***
Predicted ln(wage) for immigrants 10.11***
Difference 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.05*** -0.01
Asian 316,760
Predicted ln(wage) for natives 10.51***
Predicted ln(wage) for immigrants 10.15***
Difference 0.36*** -0.01* 0.33*** 0.04***
North American 1,360,243
Predicted ln(wage) for natives 10.26***
Predicted ln(wage) for immigrants 10.25***
Difference 0.01 -0.22*** 0.14*** 0.09***
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
the decomposition. This means that they experience positive discrimination. That is
to say that if they had the same characteristics as the natives and were evaluated at
the values of β-coefficients at which they are now, they would earn less, than they do.
Non-citizens from Western Europe are, based on the observables considered in the wage
equation, also more productive, than citizens (negative value of the endowment-related
part of the decomposition). West European immigrants are also the only subpopulation
which earns significantly more than their native counterparts. The rest of the ethnic
groups do experience significant, negative labor market discrimination and as immigrants
they earn significantly less than the natives. The exception are people of North American
origin (e.g. Afro-American, African-American,Central/North American Indian, Canadian,
American, United States), who do not experience any significant difference in earnings
whether they have US citizenship or not.
Among Asians discrimination is responsible for 91% of the wage gap between citizens
and non-citizens (calculated as the quotient of the coefficient-related part of the decom-
position and the wage gap, in percentages). This is the highest value, yet both Hispanics
and Central Europeans are groups for which the wage gap its self is larger. For Hispanics
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discrimination accounts for 75% of the wage gap and for Central Europeans the respective
number is 61%. 48% of the wage gap of North Africans and Southwest Asians is due to
discrimination , while for West Europeans and Sub-Saharan Africans the values are 27%
and 30%, respectively.
As a robustness check for this part of the analysis we have explored the discrimination
hypothesis also on groups defined not by ethnicity, but by the level of development of the
country of birth. Our hypothesis was that the higher the level of development, the better
the quality of education, and the better the quality of education, the better the signaling
effect of education on the US labor market, and the higher the wage. Persons born in highly
developed countries should thus have lower propensities to become self-employed, as they
would be less discriminated. Oyelere and Belton (2012) have approached this issue and
found the level of development of one’s country of birth is in fact positively correlated with
the odds of becoming self-employed in the US. The countries of birth rather than declared
ethnicities were used in this case in order to obtain clear matches with the countries
recognized by the UNDP in their Human Development Indices9. The Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition of wage gaps between citizens and non-citizens within four groups differing
in the level of the birth countries’ HDI10 led to results which were meaningless for further
analysis - only in the “medium HDI” group did significant discrimination occur. Thus,
the discrimination measures obtained from comparisons between aggregate ethnic groups
have been used in further analyses.
Following the approach used in estimating the relation of discrimination to the intensity
of self-employment among Puerto Rican immigrants, we have run an identical probit
model, in which the extent of discrimination, i.e. the value of the coefficient-related part
of discrimination divided by the state average wage, is used as an explanatory variable.
Table 5.8: Probit model output, marginal effects
dy/dx
discrimination -0.658***
age 0.015***
gender (1=female) -0.025***
education incomplete - reference
primary 0.001*
secondary 0.017***
tertiary 0.007***
N 52,902
English proficiency +
occupations +
industries +
specification of discrimination measures
occupations +
earnings yearly
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level,
*** significant at 1% level
9http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/
10Following UNDP: very high HDI, high HDI, medium HDI, and low HDI
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The estimated model indicates a significant negative effect of discrimination on the
probability of becoming self-employed. This implies that as discrimination increases, the
intensity of self-employment decreases. Such a result contradicts the finding for Puerto
Rican immigrants. As expected, though, the explanation may be in the relatively small
earnings of immigrants in self-employment.
A specific scenario, identical to the tested for Puerto Ricans, has been also tested (male,
age 35, secondary education, very good command of English, working as a technician,
salesman or administrative worker in the retail industry). The result was not different,
i.e. the marginal effect of discrimination on the probability of becoming self-employed was
-0.67 and highly statistically significant. Probability of self-employment as a function of
a whole range of values of immigrant wage discrimination is presented in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5: Marginal effects of various levels of discrimination on the probability of immi-
grant self-employment in the US
5.6 Summary and conclusions
The objective of this study was to test whether the extent of labor market discrimination is
significantly related to the intensity of self-employment among immigrants. First, inquiring
into the migration literature we have computed a labor market discrimination measure
based on an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of wage gaps between immigrants and natives.
This measure has been computed for differences in wages between Puerto Rican immigrants
in the US and four other comparison groups of natives: Puerto Ricans, Hispanics, whites,
and non-Hispanic whites. On one hand, the disadvantage theory suggest that the greater
the greater the social distance between two groups, the greater the extent of discrimination.
On the other hand, NELM could lead us to believe that the more relevant the group
of reference, the greater effect a certain comparison would have on one’s labor market
behavior. These considerations were critical in light of the second step of the analysis,
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i.e. considering the extent of labor market discrimination as the explanatory variable in
models of the intensity of self-employment. The initial hypothesis was that the higher the
level of discrimination, the higher the intensity of self-employment.
The analysis has pointed to major differences in the discrimination measure when vari-
ous comparison groups were considered. Nevertheless, it was possible to observe a general
tendency, namely that when compared to more similar groups (Puerto Rican and His-
panic natives) Puerto Rican immigrants were rather negatively discriminated, while when
compared to more distant groups (whites and non-Hispanic whites) they were rather pos-
itively discriminated (preferentially treated). Discrimination has been considered on the
state level. Here some variability has also been recognized. In some states discrimina-
tion was consistently positive or negative across all comparison groups. In other states it
varied, usually following the pattern related to group familiarity described above.
Based on these findings it has been concluded that institution of labor market dis-
crimination is far more complex than expected. For one thing it varies across localities
implying high context-specificity. Second, it differs greatly across comparison groups. The
latter finding contradicts the intuition that the more distant the group, the greater the
discrimination would be. Nevertheless, these patterns may be explained by a scenario in
which the employers are in fact from the minority group, rather than from the major-
ity group, as often assumed. This narrative calls for further scientific inquiry, especially
as immigrant, and minority populations in general, grow and develop towards becoming
minority-majorities.
The analysis of Puerto Rican immigrant discrimination has exploited both of the mech-
anisms which potentially moderate the effect of discrimination, i.e. labor market duality
(by considering models which treat and do not treat occupations as a determinant of
earnings) and, through the notion of multiple comparison groups, relative deprivation.
When discrimination was considered as a factor related to the intensity of self-employment
the findings were in line with the theory - the higher the labor market discrimination,
the greater the probability that a Puerto Rican immigrant in the US will choose self-
employment as an alternative labor market strategy. The most notable findings thus
include the observations that:
• Puerto Rican immigrants in the US are rather positively discriminated against most
distant ethnic groups (whites and Non-Hispanic whites);
• Puerto Rican immigrants in the US are rather negatively discriminated against most
similar ethnic groups (Puerto Rican natives and Hispanics);
• Being discriminated against in comparison to more similar groups (native Puerto
Ricans or Hispanics) has a relatively small effect on the intensity of self-employment;
• In relation to more distant groups (whites or Non-Hispanic whites) the relation of
the extent of this discrimination to the intensity of Puerto Rican immigrants’ self-
employment across US states was relatively large.
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The extension to this study aimed at enabling an extrapolation of the results obtained
for Puerto Ricans to a more general setting, i.e. of immigrants in the US en masse. The
Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions have compared the earnings of citizens and non-citizens
across seven major ethnic groups, delimited more or less by continental divisions: West
Europeans, North Africans and Southwest Asians, Hispanics, Central Europeans, Sub-
Saharan Africans, Asians, and North Americans. Here the discrimination measure also
pointed to significant differences. West Europeans were most interesting, as they were the
only group within which immigrants earn significantly more than the natives and in which
immigrants are positively discriminated. Due to methodological and data limitations the
analysis was performed on the country level.
The effect of various groups’ discrimination on the average intensity of immigrant self-
employment has been found negative, contrary to the result obtained for Puerto Ricans.
This result contradicts the theory based on which we should expect discrimination to
push immigrants into self-employment. An explanation for this “odd” result can be found
in the theory of employer discrimination, though. By means of the Propensity Score
Matching technique the average earnings in wage-employment and self-employment have
been compared for the immigrants, and for the natives. The obtained results lead to
concluding that discrimination does not push immigrants into self-employment because
the immigrants’ earnings from self-employment are relatively lower than their earnings
from wage-employment.
Despite the very consciously applied methodology, this study potentially suffers from
a number of limitations. One of the most common weak points of studies of this type,
and generally of the type presented in this thesis, are self-reported earnings. This may
be a serious issue especially when comparing the wage-employed to the self-employed, as
the latter may have more possibilities of affecting their earnings by, e.g. avoiding taxes or
performing additional, unreported activity. Also when comparing natives to immigrants,
the latter may be unwilling to declare their income from unregistered economic activity.
Given the inability to correct for this potential bias, the earnings used are assumed to
be proxies of actual earnings nevertheless. An other issue is that of comparison groups
used in the analysis. Whether Puerto Rican immigrants actually compare their earnings
to those of the suggested ethnic groups and whether immigrants and natives within the
proposed ethnic clusters actually care for the differences in each others wages is unknown.
The proposed empirical approach has been developed based on general theories related
to inter-group relations rather than actual inquiries into how people make their decisions.
Notwithstanding this approximation of reality, the obtained results are in line with intu-
ition and allow for a rather coherent narrative. The third possible limitation arises from
the applied measure of discrimination. It is as valid, as are the wage regressions. Unfortu-
nately it is rather impossible to account for all possible productivity-related explanatory
variables. Nevertheless, the fact that the dataset used is very rich most certainly improves
the estimates to the greatest extent possible.
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The diversity of results obtained from this study, visible on regional level as well as in
relation to various ethnic groups, is surely one of the possible fields of further academic
inquiry. It also touches upon a wider problem of the usefulness, on one hand, of case
studies, which may be very specific and not alike any other example, and, on the other
hand, the usefulness of aggregate inquiries, which clearly conceal the actual complexity of
social phenomena.
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Chapter 6
Competition and complementarity
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we have explored how profitable is choosing self-employment as a
market strategy for migrants by comparing the earnings of observably similar individuals.
Given the results of that exercise we have further inquired into the institutional factors
which may push individuals into self-employment. Having concluded that in the case
of Puerto Rican immigrants in the US discrimination does in fact positively relate
to their propensity to become self-employed, we now move to exploring yet another
factor affecting the profitability of immigrant entrepreneurship, namely competition and
complementarity generated by the local pool of one’s co-ethnics. The objective of this
chapter will be to test the following hypothesis
Hypothesis 6 Ethnic competition decreases, while ethnic complementarity increases
returns to local entrepreneurial activity.
The presumption that local pools of co-ethnics may affect local ethnic business prof-
itability arises from interrelating the postulations of two strands of literature. One is the
discourse on ethnic entrepreneurship in which the main contributions are works by Wilson
and Portes (1980), Wilson and Martin (1982), Sanders and Nee (1987), Portes and Jensen
(1992), or Sanders and Nee (1992). These authors proposed that relatively high concen-
trations of co-ethnics in given localities (labeled as ethnic enclaves, niches, or economies)
allow entrepreneurs to gain access to labor and financing, which are prerequisites for a suc-
cessful startup. People of common cultural heritage may also be the source of increased
demand for traditional products and services. Auster and Aldrich (1984) have relaxed
the spatial concentration requirement. On one hand they do mention the advantages of
operating a business in an enclave, where the entrepreneurs can, better than mainstream
businessmen, respond to the local customers’ ethnic tastes. On the other hand, though,
they mention that enclaves actually do not have to denote a place, but rather “networks
of communal solidarity” (Auster and Aldrich, 1984, p. 53), which can be spread across
distant areas. This communal solidarity, as it is claimed, could increase survival rates of
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immigrant businesses by providing support and stability in the form of preferential loans,
business sites, supplies etc.
In the context of favorable, business enabling, and stimulating interconnections be-
tween enterprises, the theory of industrial organization provides counterarguments to those
posed by theorists of ethnic entrepreneurship. Models of competitive markets imply that
the more competition a firm faces, the smaller is its market power, i.e. the ability to set
the price above marginal costs and gain substantial profits (Carlton and Perloff, 2005).
Under the assumptions of perfect competition, a homogenous, perfectly divisible product,
perfect information, no transaction costs, no externalities and firms being price-takers the
following figures show possible profits from business operation.
Figure 6.1: Short-run competitive equilibrium: representative firm (left), market (right).
Source: Carlton and Perlof (2005), p. 62.
In the short run (Figure 6.1) all firms produce as long as the market price is above
the shut down price (ps), at which it is not profitable for any firm to generate output
given the related costs. Taking the market price as given, and above ps, firms generate
profits of magnitude equal to the difference between the price and the average costs (AC).
Had the price exceeded AC but not the average variable costs (AV C) firms would stay in
business despite generating loss. The loss would then still be smaller than if the company
was to shut down and face the loss of average fixed costs, which are assumed to be sunk.
The representative firm’s profits are thus equal to: π = (MC(q0) − AV C(q0)) × q0. The
opportunity of making a profit creates an incentive for other companies to enter the market.
This has its consequences in the long-run (Figure 6.2).
Assuming that all the incumbents and entrants are identical in terms of their marginal
and average cost of production, and they employ only a small fraction of the total amount
of factors of production, the long-run supply curve becomes a horizontal line at the point
where the average costs are minimal, what also indicates the equilibrium price, implying
zero profits. Thus the theorization that the more firms compete over the market, the
smaller (infinitesimal) the profit of a typical firm.
The assumption that we are dealing with a number of identical firms is quite far-fetched
of course. Let us assume that there are two types of firms which exhibit the same marginal
cost functions, but different average cost functions (for simplicity let us label them ’high’
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Figure 6.2: Long-run competitive equilibrium: representative firm (left), market (right).
Source: Carlton and Perlof (2005), p. 62.
and ’low’). When the low cost firms reach their production capacity (they produce at
minimum AC and generate no profits) and demand is not yet satisfied, producing extra
units of a good implies higher average costs. The price increases to cover those costs. At
that point, though, the high cost firms for which the minimum of their cost function is
at the level of the new, higher market price may enter the market as production becomes
feasible for them.
This logic, still being an oversimplification of reality, has lead to thinking that it is
possible that due to the different cost functions and unsatisfied demand a variety of com-
panies may actually exist on the market optimizing their profits by producing different
amounts of output. In such a scenario the low-cost companies should be able to gen-
erate extra rent, as compared to their high-cost counterparts. Thus the more unequal
the distribution of market shares, the higher the profits can relatively be (Tirole, 1988).
Research in the field of industrial organization has found empirical evidence of this re-
lationship. It has been shown that indeed higher market concentration (more unequal
distribution of market shares, the extreme of which is a monopoly facing no competition)
leads to higher industry profitability (Bain, 1956; Demsetz, 1973; Cowling and Waterson,
1976; Tirole, 1988). The link holds also when the market power of industries is accounted
for (hypothesizing the possibility of charging higher prices in more concentrated settings,
Peltzman, 1977). Whether the concentration-profitability principle applies also to ethnic
business operation, as described by migration theorists, and how ethnic businesses fare
among within-industry competitors are inquiries not yet tackled, though.
By adding the ethnic to the business we will be able to capture, otherwise unrec-
ognized, advantages which arise from the complementarity of business owners and their
clientele and workers. Recognizing the preferences of ethnic clients and enabling relational
contracting with ethnic employees may significantly decrease the costs of business opera-
tion and increase the profits. The greater the number of firms which recognize this source
profitability, though, the grater the competition and the smaller the profits. A theoretical
framework encompassing the effects described above is presented in Figure 6.3.
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Figure 6.3: Effects of market competition and complementarity on immigrant self-
employment.
Market
A: Competition
↑ number of co-ethnic businesses:
- in the same sector (j)
- on the local labor market (i)
B1 :
↑ number of co-ethnics
-on the local market (i)
B: Complementarity
B2 :
↑ number of immigrants:
- in the same sector (j)
- on the local market (i)
Returns to
Immigrant
Self-employment
↓ $(SE)
=⇒ ↑ product/service supply
=⇒ ↓ price
↑ $(SE)
=⇒ ↑ labor supply
=⇒ ↓ wage
↑ $(SE)
=⇒ ↑ product/service demand
=⇒ ↑ price
In applying the concepts of market competition/concentration to ethnic entrepreneur-
ship we will be continually considering the case of Puerto Ricans in the US. This leads
to a definitional issue, which was not as critical in the previous two sections. Hitherto
we have analyzed either individual features of immigrants and how they relate to individ-
ual outcomes (in the study on income gains to self-employment), or, when considering a
contextual factor such as discrimination, we did not require that ethnic origin play any
other role than that which we actually capture, i.e. that an individual was born in Puerto
Rico and considers himself or herself of Puerto Rican decent. In this chapter we have to
make stronger assumption concerning the role of ethnicity in business operation. Based on
three facts - that an individual is of Puerto Rican ancestry, was born in Puerto Rico and
is self-employed in the US in a given industry - we take it for granted that an individual
would compete with his or her co-ethnics, as if they operated in an ethnic economy. This
of course must not be true, as even a Puerto Rican operating a grocery store must not
necessarily supply Puerto Rican food and compete with other Puerto Rican owners of
“Puerto Rican” stores. Instead it is possible that they run a store with Indian food and
supply local Indian (or any other as a matter of fact) customers and compete with Indian
(or any other) owners of similar stores. Waldinger et al. (1990) in their seminal work on
ethnic entrepreneurs state that
what is “ethnic” about “ethnic business” may be no more than a set of con-
nections and regular patterns of interaction among people sharing common
national background or migration experiences (Waldinger et al., 1990, p.33).
Though we do actually consider people “sharing common national background or mi-
gration experiences”, the first part of the above-mentioned quote is what we assume to
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be the case, rather than what we can actually observe. Unfortunately, the data does not
allow for the recognition of such interactions. Instead we rationalize this assumption by
claiming that if a Puerto Rican runs a business (what we observe) which is a grocery
store with Indian food products, serving the Indian community in an Indian neighbor-
hood (what could be the actual story behind our data) he or she could just as well run a
store oriented towards Puerto Ricans, as this is what is his or her inherent and inalienable
advantage. Nevertheless, all conclusions derived from this chapter should be interpreted
with this inference in mind.
6.2 Methodology
The methods used to answer the questions posed above include computing the Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index (HHI) of industrial concentration, and estimating Mincerian wage equa-
tions, which account for the non-random selection of Puerto Ricans into self-employment,
and using the HHI as a contextual explanatory variable. Both procedures are described in
detail in the following sections. A description of data transformations conducted for the
purpose of this study follows.
6.2.1 Measures of industry concentration
Measures of industry concentration are measures used to determine the distribution of
the market shares of specific firms. These measures can be most basically divided into
those that account for all companies on the market, and into those which consider only
few (Ginevicius and Cirba, 2007). Their overview is presented in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Market concentration measures
Measure Functional form
Concentration Ratio CRm =
￿m
i=1 si
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index HHI=
￿n
i=1 si
2
Horwath Index HI= s1 +
￿n
i=2 si
2(2− si)
Entropy Index EI=-
￿n
i=1 silnsi
Exponential Concentration Index ECI=Πni=1s
si
i
Rosenbluth Index RI=1/[(2
￿n
i=1 isi)− 1]
GIN Index GI=
￿n
s=1 si/[1 + n(1− si)]
m - number of largest firms, i - index of i-th largest firm, si - market share of firm i, n
- total number of firms,
Among measures which capture only part of the distribution of market shares we can
find the concentration ratios (CRs), which indicate the share of industry market sales of,
most commonly, 4 (CR4) or 8 (CR8) largest firms. The ratios fall in the range (0%, 100%],
where 100% means the given number of largest companies are the only suppliers on the
market. This of course indicates the biggest drawback of concentration ratios, namely
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that they are not applicable if the number of companies is smaller than n, and that they
are informative as far as the competition within the top n firms is concerned.
The other measures summarized in Table 6.1 are functions of market shares of all the
companies within certain industries. This is preferential in comparison to the CRs, but as
can be seen the weights attached to particular sizes of firms significantly vary and affect
the value of the indices. One of the most frequently used alternative measures is the
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI). The square of the companies’ shares results in grater
weights given to larger firms. Thus, it can capture not only the dispersion related to the
number of firms, but also the inequality of their market shares. HHI makes it possible to
distinguish between three companies claiming 50%, 25% and 25% of the total sales, and
three companies which all have equal market shares (∼33%). In the first case the larger
company (50% share) receives a higher weight than the other two, thus the value of the
index increases relatively to the case where the three companies have identical sales. The
index takes values in the range (0, 1], where 1 indicates that a company is the only firm in
a given industry, a monopolist. The notion that the HHI uses square terms, i.e. weights
which are proportional to the market share of a company, has been contested and thus
the other measures have been proposed.
The Horwath Index (HI) considers the share of the largest company as it is and for the
smaller firms it weighs them proportionally to their size (square term), and additionally
applies a weight which inversely proportional to the size (2− si). These operations result
in the fact that, contrary to HHI, HI tends to take values in the middle and top of the
value range (0,1]. Why the largest firm has been singled out (rather than e.g. two or three
largest firms) seems quite arbitrary, though. As a matter of fact the division into the
discrete and cumulative parts is itself controversial (Curry and George, 1983; Ginevicius
and Cirba, 2007).
Two alternative measures of industrial concentration which, similarly to the HHI,
are more concise in their form are the Entropy Index, and the Exponential Concentration
Index. The former relates the concept of (information) uncertainty to market outcomes. It
assumes that as competition grows, the probability that a customer will provide business
to a given company decreases. A monopoly would have lowest entropy, as the firm is
perfectly informed, i.e. able to predict customer’s actual choices, and does not face any
uncertainty. The intuition laying behind applying this measure seems quite controversial,
however, as it originates in a very different field. Its properties also imply that, as opposed
to all the other concentration measures, it decreases as the market structure approaches
a monopoly. The ECI has been found quite similar to the HHI (Ginevicius and Cirba,
2007), the only difference being the weight assigned to small and large firms. While the
HHI was found by Ginevicius and Cirba more sensitive to large firms, the ECI is more
sensitive to small firms. Thus, as the authors claim, in order to estimate the ECI the
whole distribution of market shares has to be known, while in order to obtain a decent
approximation of HHI knowing the low end of the share distribution is not critical.
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The final two measures considered in Table 6.1 are the Rosenbluth Index, and the GIN
Index. Due to the product of if the i-th firm’s share and i itself in the denominator of
the former, it gives different weights to companies which have identical shares. This, even
intuitively, seems like a disadvantageous property. The latter measure captures both the
number of firms (n), and the relative size of every firm (si) in evaluating their relative
sizes (used in the summation). As Ginevicius and Cirba (2009) claim in a later text of
theirs, it underreports competition in case of e.g. a market comprising two companies,
one of which has 90% of the market shares, and the other one 10%. The value of the GIN
index is then 0.786 - much smaller than an expected 0.9. The HHI in this case would give
the value of 0.82.
What stems from the above discussion is a conclusion, that neither measure of indus-
trial concentration can be considered to perform best based on objective criteria. The
discourse does not provide a recommendation for which index to use. While some of them
are more suitable for very dispersed markets, others better capture competition among few
large firms. Given the incomplete coverage of the concentration ratios we have rejected
their applicability in the first place. The debatable features of other measures be it their
theoretical grounding (in case of the Entropy Index), a large degree of arbitrariness in
choosing the functional form (Horwath Index, Rosenbluth Index), or strong assumptions
concerning complete market information (Exponential Concentration Index) have discour-
aged us from employing them in this study. Out of the reviewed measure only the HHI
and the GIN Index have been eventually considered. Since they perform in a relatively
similar manner, both nevertheless facing some drawbacks, following Ockham’s Razor, HHI
as the simpler (and more commonly used) one has been eventually applied.
Bearing in mind the disadvantages resulting from the functional form of the HHI,
another debatable aspect of this (and any other concentration measure) should be noted,
namely the attribute of a company which is to be used to compute its market share.
Carlton and Perloff (2005) consider the value of sales as a default. Ginevicius and Cirba
(2007) refer to “attributes” in general, without providing tests of the sensitivity of reviewed
measures with respect to different characteristics. Curry and George (1983) mention that
among the proxies for a firm’s size we could consider value-added, sales, employment or
assets. The choice for this study was limited by data availability. As it will be described
in the data section, one’s self-employment, pre-tax income has been used as the company
performance measure.
6.2.2 Mincerian wage equations
A standard approach in the literature on the returns to self-employment (Li, 2000; Lof-
strom, 2002; Portes and Shafer, 2006) consists of estimating a Mincerian-type equation
Income of self-employedi,r,k = β0 + βX+ βrr+ βkk+ ￿i, (6.1)
where income is measured on comparable basis (e.g. per hour or per year) across individu-
als i, sectors k, and across r localities. Matrix X typically comprises standard explanatory
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variables such as age, gender or education. The identification strategy proposed in this
study extends the standard specification by additional control variables, which capture
the effects of general competition, ethnic competition, and ethnic complementarity across
markets (sectors and geographic localities). These include:
• industrial competition measured by the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index across in-
dustries k and local areas r.;
• ethnic competition measured by the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index encompassing
only Puerto Rican businesses within each sector k and locality r;
• ethnic complementarity measured by the density of Puerto Ricans relative to
non-Puerto Ricans, as well as the relative wealth of Puerto Ricans relative to non-
Puerto Ricans in area r.
Technical reasons which prevent the use of OLS in estimating returns to self-
employment are twofold. First, there may be systematic selection into self-employment.
Second, there may be also systematic success factors, whereas typically large (positive and
negative) incomes of the self-employed are censored. These two problems necessitate the
use of the correction for usually latent components of returns to self-employment (Simpson
and Sproule, 1998; Le, 1999; A˚stebro and Chen, 2012).
Following (Berglann et al., 2011; Hamilton, 2000) a two-stage procedure is formulated.
We use
Pr(working) = Γ0 + ΓX+ ε (6.2)
to obtain estimates of the Inverse Mill’s Ratio (IMR) in order to correct the bias in the
estimates of (6.1). The variable used to identify the selection equation, identically to
the approach applied in the previous chapter, is one’s marital status (see (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2009) for a discussion of using or not using an identification variable). We then
move to estimating
SE income = β0 + βX+ βrr+ βkk+ δIMR+
γ1General Competition+ γ2Ethnic Competition+
ηComplementarity + ￿Income, (6.3)
for all positive incomes from self-employment1.
6.2.3 Data
The models for this section have been estimated on the same data as the estimations in the
previous chapter, the 5-year 1% Public Use Micro Samples of the American Community
Survey, what is a dataset encompassing ACS data from the years 2005-2010 (Ruggles et al.,
2010). Additional data transformations include computing the HHI on different levels of
1We do not take into account negative values of income. The primary reason for doing so relies in how
HHI is computed - negative values would lower the overall shares of income.
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geographic aggregation, and computing ratios of co-ethnics and of co-ethnic wealth on
different levels of geographic aggregation.
The HHI has been computed for 113 industries2. The ethnic, Puerto Rican HHI
(HHIPR) is computed for persons of Puerto Rican ancestry operating businesses in those
113 industries. Controls for either 533 Super Public Use Microdata Areas3, or, in the
alternative specification, 52 states4 have been considered.
In order to capture the complementarity effects depicted in Figure 6.3, ratios of per-
sons of Puerto Rican origin to the total population of a given Super-PUMA or state have
been calculated and used as contextual, explanatory variables in the models. The relative
wealth, approximated by average total household income, of the local Puerto Rican com-
munity in relation to the average wealth of the total population has also been accounted
for in the models. As far as immigrant specificity is concerned, an immigrant dummy
variable equal to 0 if one is of Puerto Rican ancestry5 and US born, and 1 if one is of
Puerto Rican ancestry and was born in Puerto Rico6.
Employed measures of income are identical to those used in previous chapters. Basic
descriptive statistics for the total sample and two Puerto Rican subgroups - persons of
Puerto Rican ancestry born and residing in the US, and persons of Puerto Rican ancestry
born in Puerto Rico and residing in the US are presented in Table 6.2. The last column of
Table 6.2 presents the differences in explanatory variables between Puerto Rican “natives”
(2) and Puerto Rican “immigrants” (3)7.
2Three-digit level of the classification yielding 196 categories - the IND1990 variable in the USA-
PUMS database. All estimations have been run without supplied weights - multiplying observations lead
to possibly “fake” concentration indices. The unweighted sample did not present significant distributional
differences. We have also excluded the Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting and the Mining industry,
as well as the Public Administration and the Military as there were negligible numbers of self-employed in
those sectors, what eventually biased the concentration index estimate.
3Geographic areas with min. 400,000 residents - the PUMASUPR variable in the USA-PUMS database.
4The STATEFIP variable in the USA-PUMS database.
5Based on the first response to the question about one’s self-reported ancestry or ethnic origin, the
ANCESTR1 variable in the PUMS database.
6Differentiation made based on the declared birth place of every respondent, the BPL variable in the
PUMS databases.
7Recall that Puerto Ricans are technically US citizens and thus they are not recognized as immigrants
in the American Community Survey questionnaire.
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Table 6.2: Summary statistics - means or proportions
(1) (2) (3)
All US born Puerto Rico born Difference
Puerto Ricans Puerto Ricans (2)-(3)
Income per hour 18.088 18.572 17.401
(22.308) (22.774) (21.620)
age 43.575 40.431 47.667 **
16-75 (12.743) (11.639) (12.957)
men 58% 58% 58%
women 42% 42% 42%
education-incomplete 1% 1% 2% **
education-primary 5% 2% 9% **
education-secondary 48% 49% 46%
education-tertiary 46% 48% 43% **
English-does not speak 2% 0% 3% **
English-speaks not well 6% 1% 11% **
English-speaks well 12% 6% 21% **
English-speaks very well 52% 50% 55% **
English-speaks only English 28% 43% 10% **
HHI by Super-PUMA 0.125 0.125 0.124
(0.185) (0.183) (0.187)
HHI by state 0.013 0.014 0.012
(0.044) (0.049) (0.035)
HHIPR by Super-PUMA 0.770 0.383 0.738 **
(0.306) (0.357) (0.322)
HHIPR by state 0.362 0.794 0.334 **
(0.3512) (0.292) (0.342)
Relative number of co-ethnics 0.043 0.039 0.048 **
by Super-PUMA (0.057) (0.055) (0.058)
Relative number of co-ethnics 0.022 0.021 0.023 **
by state (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Relative wealth of co-ethnics 0.818 0.835 0.796 **
by Super-PUMA (0.212) (0.212) (0.210)
Relative wealth of co-ethnics 0.777 0.787 0.766 **
by state (0.178) (0.173) (0.183)
non Puerto Rico born 57% n/a n/a
Puerto Rico born 43% n/a n/a
No. of observations 3298 1865 1433
Data: IPUMS database - ACS 5 year sample 2005-2010. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
(**) implies difference in means or difference in percentage points, where applicable,
significant at 5% level.
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For the purpose of modeling and meaningful interpretation of the results, all variables
(but dummies) have been standardized. Otherwise a unit increase in the competition
measures would have been incomprehensible.
6.3 Self-employment returns and ethnic congestion
Obtained results are OLS estimates and are corrected for non-random selection of indi-
viduals into working by means of the Heckman correction. To facilitate interpretation,
all continuous variables have been standardized. Consequently, point estimators may be
interpreted in terms of relative importance.
Table 6.3: Regression output. Super-PUMA level of analysis.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Competition effects:
HHI -0.030 -0.030 -0.029 -0.067**
HHIPuerto Rican 0.073***
Complementarity effects:
relative number of co-ethnics -0.077*** -0.066*** -0.032
relative wealth of co-ethnics 0.041** 0.036*
Standard covariates:
age 0.978*** 1.313*** 1.346*** 1.368***
age2 -0.666** -0.970*** -1.003*** -1.021***
gender (1-female) -0.147 -0.115 -0.111 -0.128
age x gender -0.072 -0.095* -0.097* -0.092
education - incomplete reference level
education - primary -0.007 -0.020 -0.027 -0.010
education - secondary 0.075 0.156 0.155 0.152
education - tertiary 0.483*** 0.574*** 0.569*** 0.550***
English - does not speak reference level
English - speaks not well -0.156 -0.132 -0.132 -0.119
English - speaks well -0.168 -0.149 -0.142 -0.138
English - speaks very well 0.047 0.073 0.075 0.076
English - speaks only English 0.072 0.071 0.068 0.063
Inv. Mill’s Ratio 0.022 0.192 0.213 0.206
constant -0.540 -0.792** -0.813** -0.816**
No. of observations 2853 2853 2853 2853
R2 0.092 0.096 0.097 0.101
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
We have been concerned that the results were driven by the Super-PUMA level of
analysis. In order to explore this issue we have run an identical set of models, only that all
spatial measures were calculated on the state level. The results did not present statistically
significant effects in terms of the variables of primary interest. This most probably resulted
from insufficient variation on such a high level of aggregation.
Results obtained for Super-PUMAs present several interesting patterns. Firstly, it can
be observed the estimator of the Inverse Mill’s Ratio is insignificant, implying no relevant
selection bias of Puerto Ricans into working. This result is somewhat puzzling given results
obtained from models with identical selection restrictions. Selection equations estimated
with marital status as a selection variable have given ultimately significant Inverse Mill’s
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Ratios in other studies of self-employment (see e.g. Tyrowicz and Nestorowicz, 2011),
including the extension to this analysis presented in the latter chapter of this thesis.
Secondly, thanks to modeling standardized variables we can see that age is the variable
which explains most in terms of the variation in returns to self-employment in the analyzed
sample. A one standard deviation increase in age is related to approximately one standard
deviation increase in returns to self-employment. As age2 is also significant, and negative
across all models we may conclude that there exists a non-linear relationship between
age and returns to self-employment such that they are increasing with a decreasing rate.
All but one of the other control variables are insignificant. It appears that in the case
of entrepreneurs of Puerto Rican ancestry working in the US not gender, nor proficiency
in English are significantly related to returns to self-employment. Only having tertiary
education, as compared to not completing even the level of schooling, is associated with
higher earnings from entrepreneurial activity.
The estimators of greatest interest are those measuring the competition and comple-
mentarity effects. Overall competition within industries showed no significant relation
to returns to business operation for Puerto Ricans. This may be on hand due to the
relatively small number of Puerto Rican entrepreneurs, and on the other hand to the in-
cubating effect of ethnic enclaves which, according to theorists of ethnic entrepreneurship,
may protect the ethnic economy from the outer market. HHI becomes significant, though,
in the last model, where we also account for Puerto Rican HHI, that is within sectoral
competition, but only among Puerto Rican businesses. It shows that as the general level
of competition in an industry increases (HHI falls), returns to business operation increase
for the Puerto Ricans, under the condition that competition among them remains the
same. This result is indicative of an ethnic niche or some kind of enclave economy being
in place. Businesses run by Puerto Ricans are on one hand isolated (independent) from
the industrial environment in the local area (Models (1)-(3)), but once competition among
Puerto Ricans themselves is accounted for (Model (4)), the local industrial relations have
a beneficial effect on their profits - the more competition there is outside of the, hypoth-
esized, “enclave”, the more money the “enclave” makes. A 1 s.d. increase in general
competition (fall of HHI by 0.18, equivalent to a change of the market structure from 3
equally sized companies to 10 equally sized companies) is related to a USD 1.5 per hour
(0.067 ∗ 22.03 = 1.48) increase in returns to self-employment among the Puerto Ricans
(∼USD 2,800 per year).
As far as the Puerto Rican HHI is concerned, we find that within-group business
competition, ceteris paribus, i.e. assuming that industrial competition in general does not
change, is detrimental to profits, as expected from the theory (the higher the HHI, the
closer the market is to a monopoly, thus the higher should be the expected profits). An
increase in the Index by one standard deviation (0.3) is related to an increase in profits
by 0.073 standard deviations (0.073 × 22.03 = 1.6). Such changes account e.g. for the
following situation: if initially we have two equally sized companies (each with a 50%
share of the market) and one company expands to cover 90% of the market, and the other
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one is left with 10% (change of HHI by 1 s.d., 0.3, from HHI=0.5 to HHI=0.82), then the
average return to business operation will increase by approximately by USD 1.6 per hour
(USD 3,300 per year). Expectedly, the influence of the structure of the ethnic businesses
has a stronger relation to business income then the overall structure of businesses in an
industry.
When it comes to variables capturing circumstances which are presumably comple-
mentary to business operation, i.e. the number of co-ethnics in a given locality, and their
wealth, their estimators turn out significant in all of the considered models. Based on
the literature reviewed for the purpose of this thesis, we expected that the number of co-
ethnics will be positively related to returns to one’s business operation. The data indicates
the contrary. One possible reason could be in the somewhat expected effect that the more
co-ethnics there are, the more of them may also take advantage of their ancestry and start
their own enterprise. The other explanation could lie in the fact that the larger the ethnic
concentrations in a given area, the more likely it is we are dealing with ethnic ghettoiza-
tion, possibly also related to relatively low economic status of the residents, what in turn
results in low purchasing power. Thus in Model (3) not only the proportion of co-ethnics
in the local population was accounted for, but also their relative wealth. It turns out that
the richer the local pool of co-ethnics, the more income co-ethnic entrepreneurs generate.
The relation is weaker, though, than that between profits and the other complementarity
and competition effects. In Model (4) both competition and complementarity conditions
are accounted for. Adding ethnic HHI to the model turned the estimator of the number
of co-ethnics insignificant. To some extent this strengthens our supposition, that more
co-ethnics may in fact relate to more co-ethnic competition in business. The relation of
business returns to co-ethnic wealth remains similar in terms of both directionality and
scale.
As the obtained results may be sensitive due to definitional, conceptual and method-
ological assumptions, two robustness checks have been carried out on the final model.
Firstly, we were interested whether “ethnic monopolists”, i.e. persons who are the only
local Puerto Rican entrepreneur operating business in a given industry, significantly alter
the results. Secondly, the notion of being an immigrant, central to this thesis, and its rela-
tion to business returns was examined. The results are presented in Table 6.4. Model (4a)
excludes observations, which were characterized by either HHI = 1 or HHIethnic = 1.
In Model (4b) we include a dummy variable indicating whether one is a Puerto Rican
immigrant or not. As indicated in the previous studies, Puerto Ricans are US citizens.
Thus the Immigrant dummy took the value of 1 if one was of Puerto Rican ancestry,
but born in Puerto Rico (recall that the American Community Survey data are employed,
what implies that the respondents are in the US at the time of the survey), and the value
of 0 if one was of Puerto Rican ancestry and born in the US8.
Model (4a) reports the results of the first robustness check, namely limiting the
sample to observations for which the market concentration measures are not equal to
8Based on the BPL and ANCESTR1 variables in the IPUMS databases.
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Table 6.4: Robustness checks. Super-PUMA level of analysis
(4) (4a) (4b)
Competition effects:
HHI -0.067** -0.106 -0.068**
HHIPuerto Rican 0.073*** 0.124*** 0.061***
Complementarity effects:
relative number of co-ethnics -0.032 -0.015 -0.031
relative wealth of co-ethnics 0.036* -0.013 0.036*
Robustness check variables:
HHI< 1 and HHIPuerto Rican < 1 no yes no
immigrant (0-no, 1-yes) -0.018
immigrant x HHIPuerto Rican 0.027
Standard Covariates:
age 1.368*** 0.876* 1.358***
age2 -1.021*** -0.618 -1.009***
gender (0-male, 1-female) -0.128 -0.168 -0.131
age x gender -0.092 -0.069 -0.090
education - incomplete reference level
education - primary -0.010 -0.210 -0.001
education - secondary 0.152 0.017 0.152
education - tertiary 0.550*** 0.400** 0.549***
English - does not speak reference level
English - speaks not well -0.119 0.133 -0.122
English - speaks well -0.138 -0.003 -0.148
English - speaks very well 0.076 0.148 0.061
English - speaks only English 0.063 0.151 0.045
Inv. Mill’s Ratio 0.206 0.100 0.202
constant -0.816** -0.554 -0.789**
No. of observations 2853 1211 2853
R2 0.101 0.110 0.101
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at
10% level
1 (monopoly). This cuts the number of observations by more than 50%. This is not
surprising due to the fact that in the base-case models (1-4) we measure market concen-
tration within industries and Super-PUMAs, what given the initial sample size of nearly
3,000 observations must result in many cases where someone is the only Puerto Rican in
a given industry and locality (please recall, though, that observations are not weighed for
methodological reasons). Compared to Model (4), in Model (4a) we can not conclude that
the estimator of HHI is significantly different from 0. Competition among Puerto Ricans
remains significant, though, and the correlation is nearly twice as strong - an increase in
HHIPuerto Rican by 0.3 (recall this implies moving towards a monopoly) is related to a a
2.75 USD increase in hourly earnings (5,600 USD per year). This relation is still weaker,
though, than that of income and age, or tertiary education.
Model (4b) includes a dummy variable capturing whether one came to the US from
Puerto Rico during his or her lifetime, or was born there. This robustness check does
not meaningfully alter any of the estimators obtained in Model (4). The immigrant
dummy variable, and its interaction with Puerto Rican HHI are not statistically significant,
implying that ’immigrant’ status is not relevant for the size of business income of Puerto
Ricans living in the United States.
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6.4 External validity of the study
In order not to limit the analysis to Puerto Rican immigrants only, the analysis of ethnic
competition and complementarity and their effect on returns to self-employment are also
considered across other ethnic groups, similarly to the study of labor market discrimination
The data used for this analysis is from the the American Community Survey for 2010
(1% sample of the population) and the 5% sample of the Census for 2000. The reason
why these samples were used rather than the 5-year sample used heretofore is purely
organizational and not expected to affect the results significantly. Just as the 5-year
samples, the use of the 2010 sample, as the most recent one, and the 2000 sample as one
from before the recent financial crisis assure that the results are not distinctively driven
by crisis-related anomalies. In the dataset used for this study we consider 113 industries9,
controls for 533 Super Public Use Microdata Areas10, and 8 ethnicities. Categories for
ethnicity recognize the ethnic groups clustered into approximately continental divisions11.
The measure of income is identical to the one used in the Puerto Rican study, i.e. self-
reported earnings adjusted for the number of hours worked12. Incomes are inflation-
adjusted to 2010 US dollars. The sample is restricted to adult and economically active
individuals aged 16-75, but the the ratio of co-ethnics and their wealth are calculated for
the whole population. Table 6.5 presents the basic descriptive statistics of the variables
used in the analysis.
Similarly to the Puerto Rican study, in order to facilitate interpretation, all continuous
variables have been standardized. Consequently, point estimators may be interpreted in
terms of relative importance.
In almost all specifications more concentration is associated with higher profits, which
is a standard finding, expected based on theory. However, ethnic HHI in Model 5 turns
the overall HHI insignificant and has a negative and statistically significant sign. A large
number of co-ethnics is detrimental to profitability (Model 3), but if co-ethnics are rela-
tively wealthy, there are seizable positive effects on self-employed revenues. The results
are robust across the specifications.
9Three-digit level of the classification yielding 196 categories - the IND1990 variable in the USA-
PUMS database. All estimations have been run without supplied weights - multiplying observations lead
to possibly fake concentration indices. The unweighted sample did not present significant distributional
differences. We have also excluded the Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting and the Mining industry,
as well as the Public Administration and the Military as there were negligible numbers of self-employed in
those sectors, what eventually biased the concentration index estimate
10Geographic areas with min. 400,000 residents - the PUMASUPR variable in the USA-PUMS database
11Considered ethnic groups include: Others, West Europeans, North Africans and Southwest Asians,
Hispanics, Central Europeans, Sub-Saharan Africans, Asians, and North Americans - based on the AN-
CESTR1G variable in the USA-PUMS database.
12Reported values are censored. In the 2000 sample incomes at or above 126,000 USD are expressed
as the state means of values above 126,000 USD. In the 2010 sample censuring is made at the 99.5th
percentile within each state (higher values are the state means of all cases above these cutoff values). The
lower boundary is imposed on 0 USD.
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Table 6.5: Summary statistics - means or proportions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Natives Immigrants Difference (2) - (3)
Income per hour 22.86 23.26 17.04 6.22**
(29.03) (29.38) (22.65)
Age 46.35 46.71 41.16 5.55**
(only 16+75 population) (12.38) (12.37) (11.24)
Gender 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.03**
(1-female) (0.48) (0.48) (.49)
Marital status 0.72 0.72 0.68 0.04**
(1-married) (0.45) (0.45) (0.47)
Education-primary 3.14% 2.25% 15.88% -13.63 pp**
Education-secondary 41.22% 41.17% 37.73% 3.44 pp**
Education-tertiary 55.63% 56.19% 41.69% 14.50 pp**
English-does not speak 0.68% 0.10% 9.15% -9.04 pp**
English-speaks only English 83.71% 88.35% 15.99% 72.36 pp**
HHI 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
(0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0073)
HHIethnic .0008 .0005 .0045 -0.040**
(0.0115) (0.0065) (0.0374)
Relative number of co-ethnics 0.007 0.006 0.019 -0.012**
(0.0076) (0.0064) (0.013)
Relative wealth of co-ethnics 1.09 1.10 0.99 0.11**
(0.22) (0.21) (.24)
Dominance 0.14 0.13 0.24 -0.11**
(0-minor group, 1-major group) (0.34) (0.34) (0.4)
No. of observations 755,888 707,484 48,404
Data: IPUMS database - ACS 2010, US Census 2000. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
(**) implies difference in means or difference in percentage points, where applicable, significant at 5% level.
A one standard deviation increase in the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index is related to a
relatively small (0.009 s.d.) increase in returns to self-employment. The effect of competi-
tion is smaller than any of the individual level determinants included in the specification.
However, HHI is much less dispersed than incomes, what implies that an increase in the
value of the HHI by ten standard deviations (0.06), what corresponds e.g. to the market
being shared equally between 12 rather then 40 identical firms, is related to an increase
in the owners’ weekly earnings by $2.6 (βHHI × s.d.y × 10 = 2.6). Comparatively, having
tertiary rather than primary education relates to returns which are higher by $13.5.
On the other hand a one standard deviation increase in co-ethnic concentration is
associated with a 0.011 s.d. decrease in income from self-employment. Potentially, the
relatively bigger ratio of co-ethnics to non co-ethnics could be associated with smaller
purchasing power of members of ethnic groups clustered in enclaves. If combined with the
wealth of the co-ethnics, the coefficient on the size of ethnic group turns insignificant. We
can thus say that it is not the number of co-ethnics per se, what generates a complemen-
tarity effect with respect to entrepreneurial returns, but rather the purchasing power of
one’s own ethnic group.
A significant coefficient on ethnic HHI turns the estimator of HHI insignificant. Ap-
parently, an increase in ethnic concentration fosters returns to self-employment. En-
trepreneurs representing the same ethnic group, who operate businesses in a given in-
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Table 6.6: Regression output.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Competition effects:
HHI 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** -0.002
HHIethnic -0.013***
Complementarity effects:
relative number of co-ethnics -0.011*** 0.000
relative wealth of co-ethnics 0.027***
Standard covariates:
Age 1.349*** 1.342*** 1.346*** 1.341*** 1.356***
Age2 -1.257*** -1.254*** -1.255*** -1.253*** -1.265***
Gender (1-female) -0.118*** -0.146*** -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.121***
Age x gender -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.148*** -0.149***
Education - primary reference level
Education - secondary 0.118*** 0.105*** 0.113*** 0.108*** 0.118***
Education - tertiary 0.465*** 0.445*** 0.460*** 0.448*** 0.466***
English - does not speak reference level
English - speaks not well 0.035*** 0.024** 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.035***
English - speaks well 0.097*** 0.079*** 0.088*** 0.085*** 0.096***
English - speaks very well 0.286*** 0.273*** 0.274*** 0.274*** 0.286***
English - speaks only English 0.327*** 0.315*** 0.306*** 0.311*** 0.327***
Inv. Mill’s Ratio 0.461*** 0.462*** 0.559*** 0.461*** 0.464***
Constant -0.909*** -0.872*** -0.887*** -0.872*** -0.911***
Ethnic group dummies no yes no no no
Super-PUMA dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
No. of observations 750,795 750,795 750,795 750,795 734,655
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
dustry attract clientele and may also create a support system based on ancestral linkages,
e.g. enables access to informal credit lines or exchange of best business practices (e.g.
Marshall-Arrow-Romer type of knowledge spillovers). Such areas as ‘China Towns’ or
‘Little Italys’, despite comprising multiple, very similar businesses enhance profitability.
The results may be susceptible to few dominant ethnicities (e.g. operating in specific
industries) or some other special cases. Thus, we tried a number of robustness checks to
test the vulnerability of the main estimators to the inclusion of additional controls. These
include domination, knowledge of the market and separating ethnicity from immigration.
Model 5a excluded those individuals who were ethnic and industrial ‘monopolists’ (HHI =
1 and HHIethnic = 1). In Model 5b we include a dummy variable indicating whether one’s
duration of stay in the US is above (duration = 1) or below (duration = 0) the median
(47 years)13. Model 5c controls whether one’s ethnic group is dominant (largest) within
an industry. Model 5d considers differences in returns between immigrants and natives.
Table 6.7 presents the results.
13The duration of stay for non-immigrants was equal to their age, for immigrants it was the length of
their stay in the US as reported in the Y RSINUS variable in the PUMS database.
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Table 6.7: Robustness checks.
Model 5 Model 5a Model 5b Model 5c Model 5d
Competition effects:
HHI -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 0.006
HHIethnic -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.009*** -0.016*** -0.050***
Robustness check variables:
HHI< 1 and HHIethnic < 1 no yes no no no
Duration above median 0.025***
Duration x HHIethnic -0.030***
Dominant (0-no, 1-yes) 0.024***
Dominant x HHIethnic 0.013**
Immigrant (0-no, 1-yes) -0.091***
Immigrant x HHIethnic 0.057***
Standard Covariates:
Age 1.350*** 1.356*** 1.371*** 1.355*** 1.347***
Age2 -1.265*** -1.265*** -1.298*** -1.264*** -1.258***
Gender (0-male, 1-female) -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.118*** -0.122*** -0.122***
Age x gender -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.153*** -0.149*** -0.148***
Education - primary reference level
Education - secondary 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.123*** 0.118*** 0.112***
Education - tertiary 0.466*** 0.466*** 0.475*** 0.466*** 0.459***
English - does not speak reference level
English - speaks not well 0.035*** .035*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.011
English - speaks well 0.096*** 0.095*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.054***
English - speaks very well 0.286*** 0.285*** 0.286*** 0.291*** 0.228***
English - speaks only English 0.327*** 0.326*** 0.321*** 0.332*** 0.253***
Inv. Mill’s Ratio 0.464*** 0.464*** 0.499*** 0.463*** 0.458***
Constant -0.911*** -0.911*** -0.939*** -0.922*** -0.831***
Ethnic group dummies no no no no no
Super-PUMA dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
No of observations 734,655 734,618 734,655 734,655 734,655
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
In Models 5-5c the overall effect of ethnic competition on business income is posi-
tive (lower value of HHIethnic) implies stronger competition). In general the length of
stay is positively related to higher returns to self-employment. When interacted with
the measure of ethnic competition, though, the duration appears to be negatively linked
to profits. Among long-stayers HHIethnic has an increased negative relation to profits
(−0.009+(−0.030) = −0.039, compared to −0.009 among short-stayers). This leads us to
hypothesize that ethnic enclaves may serve as business incubators. Members of dominant
groups generally have higher profits. When we consider the way dominance interacts with
ethnic competition, though, it turns out that being a member of a dominant ethnic group
within an industry reduces the detrimental effect of ethnic competition on one’s profits, but
nevertheless the value of the estimator remains negative (0.013+(−0.016) = −0.003). For
immigrants (non-citizens) ethnic competition decreases profits (−0.050 + 0.057 = 0.007).
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6.5 Summary and conclusions
The objective of this analysis was to test the relation between returns to business oper-
ation and co-ethnic complementarity and competition among Puerto Ricans in the US.
Based on the findings of previous chapters of this thesis it was hypothesized that it is
particularly the complementarity effects that provide an ultimately favorable environment
for the development of ethnic and immigrant self-employment. Competition was expected
to have adverse effects on the returns to immigrant self-employment.
Complementarity was operationalized as the relative number and wealth of Puerto Ri-
cans living in an area. Competition was measured by means of the Hirschman-Herfindahl
Index of market concentration calculated for a given industry and locality (general com-
petition), and for Puerto Rican businesses operating in that industry and locality (ethnic
competition). Mincerian wage equations were adapted to suit the research question and
the Heckman Correction was employed to correct for selection bias.
The obtained results indicate that:
• overall market competition itself has no significant impact the profitability of Puerto
Rican business;
• when ethnic competition is controlled for, though, we find that as the general level
of competition in an industry increases (HHI falls), returns to business operation
also increase, what implies that the general level of competition in an industry has
a rather benign relation with Puerto Rican business profitability;
• nevertheless ethnic competition is negatively correlated with self-employment in-
comes of Puerto Ricans, as standard industrial organization theory would predict;
• the number of Puerto Ricans living in a given locality is generally also negatively
associated with self-employment incomes of co-ethnics; this relation becomes in-
significant, though, when ethnic competition is accounted for;
• the average wealth of the Puerto Rican community residing in a given area is unam-
biguously positively related to Puerto Rican business profitability;
• among standard covariates which supposedly affect one’s productivity only age (non-
linearly) and tertiary education (as compared to incomplete education) have been
found to have a significant relation to business returns among the Puerto Ricans
residing in the US;
• interestingly no selection bias has been found among the Puerto Ricans in terms
their propensity to work rather than be (officially) inactive on the labor market;
• whether one is a Puerto Rican “immigrant” or “native” operating a business in the
US is not significantly related to his/her business income.
From the first three results reported above we derive a conclusion that businesses run
by Puerto Ricans are on one hand isolated (independent) from the industrial environment
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in the local area (Models (1)-(3)), but once competition among Puerto Ricans themselves
is accounted for (Model (4)), the local industrial relations have a beneficial effect on their
profits - the more competition there is outside of the “enclave”, the more money the
enclave makes. What is more, competition among Puerto Ricans themselves follows a
quite standard pattern in terms of its relation with business profitability. The fact that
the greater the number of co-ethnics the lower the average business incomes (Model 2)
could also be related to the ethnic competition. Yet another explanation can be found in
relatively lower purchasing parity in large clusters of ethnic minorities. In order to control
for this scenario we have have accounted for the relative wealth of co-ethnics (Model
3). This lead to concluding that indeed the richer the local Puerto Rican community,
the higher the returns to business operation. This is an effect attributed to increased
purchasing power parity, though it could indicate easier access to startup capital for larger
(an possibly more profitable) businesses as well. We are unable to single out this feature,
though.
From Model 4 we have concluded that when both competition and complementarity
affects are accounted for, competition is the dominant force, having a twice as strong
relation to business income. ’Monopolists’, i.e. individuals who were the only Puerto
Ricans running a business in a given industry and locality were partly responsible for this
effect. After excluding observations for which the value of HHI or HHIPR was 1 (Model
5) the estimator of general competition turned insignificant, but ethnic competition gained
on value. The latter feature implies that the ’monopolists’ had relatively low incomes, as
they weakened the profit-concentration relationship. The reasons for such a situation may
be sought after in the nature of those businesses which could have been a poor decision
in the first place, what resulted in only one entrepreneur undertaking a given activity.
Whether one is a Puerto Rican “immigrant” or was born in the US was not related to
significantly different incomes.
The results obtained for Puerto Rican immigrants in the US are indicative of them
functioning on integrated internal markets. The level of general competition is preferable
in terms of higher returns to entrepreneurship. The level of intra-group competition had
a, theoretically expectable, adverse relation to business profits. This led to thinking that
these effects are in line with Puerto Ricans operating within ethnic enclaves. Moreover,
rather saturated enclaves, at least market-wise. Ethnic enclaves, as described in detail in
the introductory literature review to this thesis, are a form of protected markets. It has
not been speculated what this isolation may indicate. The fact that increasing external
(out-of-enclave) competition is beneficial to within-enclave business profits seems to be
one of the mechanisms resulting from this isolation.
External validity for the Puerto Rican case study was provided through an identical
analysis but run on eight aggregate ethnic groups living in the US. The results are in-
dicative of them also being independent of the mainstream economy. Yet, they point to a
quite different mechanism of how this isolation may affect returns to business activity.
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Contrary to the result obtained for Puerto Ricans, the level of general competition
has no significant effect on business profitability of the studied ethnic groups’ businesses.
When it comes to ethnic competition the result also differed from that obtained for Puerto
Ricans. The analysis revealed that the higher the level of ethnic competition, the more
favorable it is to ethnic entrepreneurs.
The insignificant relation of general competition to profits leads to concluding that
ethnic groups (at an aggregate level, on average) also function in protected, or isolated
markets, just as it was the case for Puerto Ricans. Given the fact that internal competition,
rather than being detrimental, induces profits, we are also inclined to think that these
ethnic markets are not saturated. This may be the second mechanism related to the
isolable nature of ethnic markets.
Further inquiry into the mechanisms of how ethnic niches interact the wider economy,
two of which have been recognized in this study, provide a fertile ground for future research.
Among the obvious data limitations related to aggregating the ethnic groups by ap-
proximately continental lines or using self-reported incomes as explanatory variables, one
major assumption should be specifically stressed. In this study it has been assumed that
people of a given ancestry actually operate “ethnic” businesses, i.e. that they capitalize
their cultural capital in the course of their entrepreneurial activities. This, of course, is a
very strong assumption. With the available data it is impossible, however, to determine
the service or product profile of considered business owners. Nevertheless, it would be an
equally strong assumption to neglect the common ethnic background of entrepreneurs as
a form of monetizable cultural capital. This especially contradicts the assumptions under-
lying available theoretical concepts related to the economics of entrepreneurship, which
heavily relay on the fact that we do not live in ethnicity-blind societies, but that rather
the contrary is true.
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Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusions
We live in a divided world. International borders separate the developed from the devel-
oping, the abundant from the scarce, the high earners from the low earners. Being on the
disadvantageous side of the world’s political, but also economic and social, frontiers may
be limiting. The possibility to cross those frontiers, though, may be related to opportu-
nities inexistent otherwise. This thesis explored whether immigrant self-employment can
be a way of taking advantage of such opportunities.
The current state of the art in research on either migration, entrepreneurship or,
specifically, immigrant entrepreneurship does not provide an answer to very basic questions
concerning the choice of self-employment among international migrants. First, do self-
employed migrants actually earn more than what they would have earned had they not
migrated? Second, in light of the answer to the previous question, can self-employment
be a way for migrants to deal with internal labor market imperfections at the destination
country, like wage- and occupational-discrimination? Third, do increasing concentrations
of immigrants hamper or help immigrant entrepreneurship?
To the best of the author’s knowledge an answer to the first question has not been
provided in existing literature. Thus we simply do not know whether, in general terms,
immigrant self-employment should be treated as a story of economic success or a story
of subsistence. Discrimination, in spite of having been examined among immigrants in
general, has been rarely looked into as a feature affecting immigrant self-employment
rates. Market competition and complementarity are studied in relation to the mainstream
economy, but are under-researched notions, especially when considered jointly, in the con-
text of ethnic entrepreneurship. Ethnic concentrations are known for boosting immigrant
entrepreneurship by enabling employment of co-ethnic workers, increasing the pool of con-
sumers, and providing access to startup capital. It has not been analyzed, though, to what
extent one’s co-ethnics could also be the source of inferior market competition.
Finding answers to the above questions is important for at least two reasons. On the
academic level it significantly contributes to existing literature, filling in knowledge gaps
which limit our understanding of the surrounding world. This is especially important
in the age of dynamic inter-regional mobility, when majorities become minorities, when
the crisis of multiculturalism is becoming a more and more recognizable issue, and when,
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despite rising levels of human development, societies experience increasing inequalities in
income, unsustainable patterns of consumption, and low social cohesion (United Nations
Development Programme, 2013). Under the above circumstances finding answers to the
questions posed by this thesis is also of practical importance. It provides insights into the
nature of immigrant self-employment as labor market choice of individuals. Depending on
whether immigrant entrepreneurship is rather that of “opportunity” or that of “necessity”
makes it either an idea worth spreading or just a negative by-product of labor market
imperfections existing across and within countries.
On the basis of existing evidence this thesis hypothesized that immigrant self-
employment is a rather beneficial undertaking. The general hypothesis stated that
General hypothesis Self-employment, on top of international labor migration, facilitates
reducing the inefficiency of the international division of labor.
Given the positive verification of the operational hypotheses formulated for the purpose
of this thesis, the studies conducted within the scope this doctoral research affirm the
general hypothesis stated above. From this perspective the main conclusions of this thesis
are the following:
• by reallocating to markets where one’s skills, abilities or knowledge are relatively
scarce, or add to the diversity of supplied products or services, individuals may ex-
perience significant income gains. Though migration as such is a profitable strategy,
by pursuing self-employment immigrants may obtain even higher returns. Notably,
this result has been obtained in a context free from legal barriers to mobility;
• the profitability of immigrant self-employment may not only allow to overcome the
labor market inefficiencies related to the international division of labor, but also to
the internal market divide, especially affecting groups with limited capacity of action
and intervention. In this sense it appears that, at least for some immigrant groups
self-employment can actually be the first-best option in terms of returns to produc-
tivity. What is more, if small social distance between employees and employers is
related to smaller discrimination, then the development of ethnic enterprises may
not only be beneficial for the entrepreneurs themselves, but also for the co-ethnic
workers they might potentially hire;
• the multilateral benefits of immigrant self-employment can be obtained by juts let-
ting it happen. By clustering and taking advantage of their cultural and social
capital migrants may develop internal markets which could serve as natural incu-
bators for businesses. Extreme expansion of these markets need not to be a worry
for native/majority firms, though, as it appears that ethnic economies are internally
subject to general market rules determining the relation of competition to profits.
The above-mentioned conclusions can be put in the perspective of actual US immi-
gration policies as evaluated by MIPEX, the Migrant Integration Policy Index. MIPEX
119
comprises 148 policy indicators on migrant integration. They are designed to benchmark
current laws and policies against the highest standards formulated by European Union’s
or international organizations’ directives, conventions, etc. MIPEX covers seven policy
areas of integration: labor market mobility, family reunion, access to education, political
participation, long-term residence, access to citizenship, and anti-discrimination laws and
protections. “Anti-discrimination laws and protections”, “labor market mobility”, and
“long-term residence” are especially important for labor market analyses.
As far as anti-discrimination policies are concerned, the US scored highest among 31
countries considered (89/100), Figure 7.1. Its efforts in terms of enabling immigrant labor
market mobility (including recognition of qualifications) or long term residence, are much
weaker, though (68/100 and 50/100 respectively). It is the latter two aspects, however,
that in light of the conducted studies reveal greatest potential in terms of facilitating
immigrant incorporation into the receiving markets. Needless to say at this point, this
can be done very effectively by enabling immigrant self-employment.
Figure 7.1: Migrant Integration Policy Index scores for the US, by policy areas
Source: www.mipex.eu/usa.
Chapter 5 of this thesis concluded that immigrant labor market discrimination in the
US exists and fares well. Across all considered groups of immigrants we found signif-
icant and sizable bias in terms of their pay. Of course, the applied measure could be
imperfect, but the results are fairly consistent. Thus it seems that in practice combating
discrimination works rather poorly.
One might think that investing in anti-discrimination measures and in their application
can not be a bad idea, as without these measures the immigrants’ situation could have
been even worse. But since, under certain circumstances, discrimination induces immi-
grant self-employment then maybe it is worthwhile to consider creating these preferential
circumstances rather than taking action against discrimination as such? A circumstance
which emerged as critical for increasing the intensity of immigrant entrepreneurship under
discrimination was the relative profitability of self-employment over wage-employment (as
demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5). Thus creating and nurturing environments which
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support business creation and development might be a very efficient way of enabling im-
migrant labor market integration.
When exploring the returns to immigrant entrepreneurship in Chapter 6 we found that
among factors which are positively related to the profitability of immigrant businesses
there is ethnic congestion (especially associated with long stay), tertiary education, and
possibly also the level of English language command. These issues are addressed by two
policy areas in which, according to MIPEX, the US performs relatively poorly: labor
market mobility and long-term residence.
The “labor market mobility” policy area comprises four composite indicators: access,
access to general support, targeted support, and workers’ rights. The US scores at the top
in terms of ensuring that resident immigrants and their families have similar chances in
the labour market as native-born Americans. It is emphasized, though, that because some
states and professional organizations are not co-operating to recognize foreign diplomas,
the jobs immigrants find may be far below their qualifications. As troubling as the latter
may seem, on one hand, Chapter 5 showed that even if immigrants’ skills were rewarded
like those of natives, they would still earn relatively less. On the other hand, Chapter 6
revealed that higher education is related to higher returns to self-employment, but recall
that in case of the self-employed their formal education does not need formal recognition.
Thus immigrant entrepreneurship, by employing immigrants’ skills as they are rather than
as how they are formally recognized, overcomes the imperfections of how foreign education
is (not) recognized.
An aspect of “labor market mobility” policies which should be more troubling, though,
is that the US score 25/100 on “targeted support”, placing it at the lower half of the
MIPEX ranking, Figure 7.2.
Figure 7.2: MIPEX “Targeted support” policy scores
Source: www.mipex.eu/usa.
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Throughout this thesis it has been emphasized and proven that immigrants are a very
specific type of labor force, one which is able to develop its fullest potential once it can
preserve its uniqueness. This is most visible in the operation of ethnic economies where
entrepreneurs can benefit from the presence of other ethnic entrepreneurs and of co-ethnic
pools of consumers and workers, as demonstrated in Chapter 6. The same chapter also
pointed to the fact that in some cases (visible in the extension but not in the Puerto Rican
case), improved knowledge of English may also be very important for higher business re-
turns. The one thing ethnic economies and space for language proficiency have in common
is that they are both inherently related to immigrants, as opposed to natives. Thus inte-
gration strategies which support newcomers in establishing businesses by targeting their
specific needs, such as language training could be most favorable. Nevertheless, even here,
the policy does not have to be general, as for some groups the mere ability to become
self-employed is as much as they need to succeed.
Last but not least, the conducted research pointed to duration of stay as a policy-
dependent factor which is related to higher returns to business operation (Chapter 6).
This connection may arise from the possibilities and perspectives for investment, as well as
from the timely acquisition of local cultural and social capital at the destination. MIPEX
gave the US one of the lowest scores (50/100) on the “long-term residence” measure
due to the country’s complex immigration laws, limited visa availability, high fees, and
long processing queues, which make immigrants’ socio-economic integration challenging.
The possibly detrimental effects of migration under the circumstance of short business
operation have also been signaled in Chapter 4. The same chapter also provided an
insight as to the possibly high returns obtained under no legal barriers to entry. Further
studies on this issue will have to be performed, though, in order to enable more conclusive
statements.
Summarizing, it seems that as far as economic outcomes of immigrants are concerned
self-employment and its facilitation at the destination countries may be a remedy not
only for existing labor market imperfections, but also for the deficiencies of immigration
policies. Rather than politically creating an ethnicity-blind market in which everyone is
granted equal opportunities, it might more efficient to enable the market to recognize
existing differences and allow people to take advantage of them.
The conclusions and policy recommendations presented above have been developed based
on empirical tests of three operational hypotheses. Respective analyses have been or-
ganized into three subsequent chapters of the thesis, preceded by a review of existing
theoretical frameworks useful for the analyses.
Chapter 4 was an analysis of the income gains to immigrant self-employment. There
are two main contributions this chapter made to the existing state of the art. First, the
conducted research took advantage of Propensity Score Matching (PSM) as a method
for establishing a counterfactual for the group of self-employed migrants. This technique
has been rarely used in studies on the economics of migration while it provides a neat
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solution to the problem of immigrant selectivity present in all empirical analyses. On
one hand, the conducted research thus widens the array of possible applications of PSM
and, on the other hand, provides migration analysts with guidance as to the applicability
of PSM in their studies. Second, the analysis found that immigrant self-employment
may indeed be an income-maximizing strategy. The study reached this conclusion based
on a number of comparisons concerning varying labor market states and both the home
and host labor markets. The study assessed wage-employment and self-employment at
home as well as wage-employment abroad as possible alternatives. Having established
that immigrant self-employment is a profitable choice in comparison to the alternatives,
the next chapter searched for the answer to the question of whether the incidence of
immigrant self-employment is related to labor market discrimination at the destination.
Thereby it aimed at determining if immigrant self-employment is an answer to labor
market imperfections at the destination.
Chapter 5 involved a two-stage procedure. First, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of
wages was carried out for immigrants and natives. This allowed to determine the extent
of labor market discrimination of immigrants across US states. Second, this measure was
used in models estimating the probability of immigrant self-employment. Given the fact
that this chapter did not aim at measuring discrimination per se, but rather discrimination
as a factor considered in a further decision-making process, two moderating circumstances
have been considered: labor market duality and relative deprivation. The former was in-
corporated into the analysis by performing comparisons of estimates obtained from models
which included or excluded occupation as a determinant of wages. The latter was con-
sidered in that labor market discrimination was computed by comparing the earnings of
immigrants to the US with the earnings of several possible reference groups of natives.
The notion of employing several comparison groups, rather than just one, was a pio-
neering approach in the study of immigrant wage discrimination. Usually only one com-
parison group is considered and no distinction is made between the social and economic
significance of discriminatory practices. As this study showed, such a differentiation might
yield quite new insights into the nature of discrimination. The primary finding and con-
tribution to existing literature made by this chapter was that indeed the extent of dis-
crimination differs depending on comparison group. Significant regional differences in the
extent of labor market discrimination of immigrants have also been identified.
As far the relation of discrimination to the intensity of immigrant self-employment
is concerned the obtained results proved that if self-employment is a more profitable al-
ternative to wage-employment higher levels of wage-discrimination are related to greater
concentrations of immigrant self-employment. This result was quite unambiguous in terms
of which group of natives was considered as the reference. This outcome points to the
rather gainful role of immigrant self-employment in reducing the adverse effects of labor
market imperfections, be it across or within markets. At this stage it remained a question,
though, what are the limits of these gains.
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In search for an answer to the question of how limited are the benefits of immigrant
self-employment, Chapter 6 looked into the notion of ethnic competition. The intuition
behind this study was that since self-employment can be such a beneficial strategy it may
generate a crowding-in effect which would eventually become detrimental to profits. In
order to measure the extent of competition the Hirshman-Herfindahl Index of industrial
concentration (HHI) has been computed for ethnic groups across local areas in the US.
This, so called, ethnic HHI, together with a measure of the local concentrations of these
ethnic communities (ratio of the number of co-ethnics to the number of non co-ethnics)
was used in estimating the returns to ethnic entrepreneurship. In this manner the study
dealt not only with the competition effects, but also with ethnic complementaries.
Though the notion that ethnic concentrations can be beneficial for business has been
already recognized in the literature, ethnic competition, especially that related to the
functioning of ethnic businesses has not been studied. On that account the research refined
the understanding of how ethnic businesses operate what is a significant contribution to
the existing state of the art. The results indicate that ethnic communities indeed operate
within sheltered markets, which can play the role of business incubators. In this way
immigrants can capitalize on their ethnicity.
All three aspects of self-employment studied in this thesis are very clearly attributable
to being an immigrant. The specificity of the gain experienced due to crossing an in-
ternational border is quite straightforward. The notion of discrimination arises from the
fact of being a minority population - a feature inexistent in the immigrants’ country of
origin. Ethnic competition and complementarity, despite not being analytically limited to
immigrants per se, are also identifiable only in a multicultural context. And despite the
fact that not all ethnic businesses must be immigrant businesses, all immigrant businesses
are to at least some extent ethnic in nature.
The geographic scope of empirical inquiries included in this thesis has been initially
limited to Puerto Rican immigration to the US. This was a choice driven both method-
ologically and conceptually. The US is the largest immigration country in the world, with
42 million residents born abroad (United Nations Population Division, 2010). That is
roughly 14% of the total population. Having even a small sample of such a population
enables quantitative analyses of the very small and specific subpopulation of self-employed
immigrants. On top of the above condition the data had to enable estimations of returns
to entrepreneurial activity. The US is one of the few countries which collects and provides
public access to such data.
The primary reason for choosing Puerto Rico as the source country for the analysis was
that it provides data which is consistent with that collected in the US, i.e. it also includes
a variable reporting one’s returns to self-employment. Moreover, Puerto Ricans do not
experience any formal labor market restrictions in the US. This latter fact was critical
for being able to neglect the issue of administratively-driven selectivity of migration. The
former issue, i.e. having data on earnings for self-employment for both the sending and
receiving country was vital for the estimations of the gains to immigrant entrepreneurship.
124
Being aware of the interpretational limitations of studies carried out in one specific
context each chapter also comprised an extension, the aim of which was to provide external
validity for the results obtained for Puerto Rican immigrants. The extension to Chapter
4 estimated the returns to self-employment among inter-state migrants in the US. The
extension to Chapter 5 dealt with labor market discrimination and the intensity of self-
employment among eight aggregate ethnic groups in the US, delimited approximately by
continental boundaries. The same ethnic groups were also considered for the purpose of
providing external validity for the study in Chapter 6.
The empirical studies conducted within the framework of this thesis are summarized
in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: Summary of conducted empirical research
Chapter 4: Chapter 5: Chapter 6:
Gains to immigrant self-
employment
Discrimination Competition and comple-
mentarity
theoretical foundation neoclassical migration the-
ory; New Economics of La-
bor Migration
discrimination/disadvantage
theory; employer, con-
sumer and credit market
discrimination
ethnic enclave hypothesis,
theory of industrial organi-
zation
identified research gap no study on the gains to
both migration and self-
employment considered
jointly; no study con-
cerning opportunity costs
related to various forms
of labor market activity;
only one application of the
proposed method
lack of research considering
various reference groups
in the analysis of wage
discrimination; few stud-
ies exploiting discrimina-
tion as a decision-making
factor in the pursuit of self-
employment among immi-
grants; no study analyz-
ing both wage and occu-
pational discrimination in
both hourly and yearly
terms
lack of research on the ef-
fects of business competi-
tion among co-ethnic en-
trepreneurs; no studies no
the joint effect of ethnic
competition and comple-
mentarity on local markets
research question do self-employed immi-
grants earn more than
what they would if they
had not migrated?
how is labor market dis-
crimination related to the
incidence of immigrant
self-employment?
how do ethnic competition
and ethnic complementar-
ity relate to returns to eth-
nic entrepreneurship?
research hypothesis Income from self-
employment abroad is
greater than expected
income earned at home
Labor market discrimina-
tion is related to increased
intensity of immigrant self-
employment
Ethnic competition is re-
lated to lower, while ethnic
complementarity is related
to higher returns to local
entrepreneurial activity
methods/measures Propensity Score Matching Oaxaca-Blinder wage de-
composition, probit model,
Propensity Score Matching
Ordinary Least Squares,
Hirschman-Herfindahl In-
dex
external validity US inter-state migration all aggregate US immi-
grant ethnic groups
all aggregate US ethnic
groups
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Chapter 4: Chapter 5: Chapter 6:
Gains to immigrant self-
employment
Discrimination Competition and comple-
mentarity
contribution finding that immigrant
self-employment may be
a more profitable choice
than that of employ-
ment at home or even
wage-employment abroad;
Propensity Score Matching
is an applicable method to
the study of income gains
from migration
discovering that the extent
of discrimination varies
across local markets and
comparison groups; if self-
employment is a relatively
more profitable form of
labor market activity than
wage-employment, then
greater wage discrimina-
tion will be related to
increased intensity of im-
migrant self-employment
proving that migrants op-
erate in sheltered markets
which are subject to inter-
nal competition, but which
operate independently of
external competition
further inquiry considering the possible
self-deprivation of immi-
grants abroad, i.e. de-
creased standards of liv-
ing; accounting for imper-
fect transferability of skills;
conducting the study in
other geographic contexts;
determining what features
of local markets at the des-
tination are responsible for
the extent of the gains
analysis of discrimination
in majority-minority con-
texts; studies on social dis-
tance and relevant com-
parisons as labor mar-
ket decision-making fac-
tors; research on inter-
nal mobility related to
avoiding wage discrimina-
tion as an alternative to
self-employment
analysis of ethnic compe-
tition in majority-minority
contexts; considering the
possibility of ethnic mar-
ket saturation and its re-
lation to ethnic business
profitability
The results reported above are valid only under the assumptions underlaying each of the
conducted studies. First, they have been developed on the basis of analyses of declarative
data including one’s earnings, labor market status or ethnic origin. Nevertheless, it has
been assumed to be the best available approximation of the actual state of things. A more
reliable and at least equally rich data source has not been identified. Second, the considered
research methods are applicable only under specific assumptions. It has been reasoned that
these assumptions have been met in each case and that the interpretation of the results is
valid as long as they are fulfilled. Third, among the interpretational limitations it should
also be stressed that the research considered a very specific context of immigration to
the US. The external validity of the conducted studies suggested that certain aspects of
immigrant self-employment are rather general (discrimination, ethnic market isolation),
while others are highly context specific (income gains, relation of discrimination to self-
employment intensity). Any generalizations of the findings should thus account for the
recognized similarities and differences.
In light of these limitations there is a great potential for future research, though. As
already indicated in Table 7.1, the possible areas of further inquiry comprise, but are not
limited to:
• researching how self-deprivation and self-exploitation may increase the gains to mi-
gration and to immigrant self-employment and whether these are viable strategies
e.g. in terms of immigrants health in the long run;
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• accounting for the imperfect transferability of skills between the countries of origin
and destination and whether self-employment, contrary to wage-employment, can
reduce the adverse effects of these imperfections;
• exploring how wage discrimination and ethnic competition and complementarity are
related to labor market outcomes of immigrants in majority-minority areas; and
how such a context affects the natives - their labor market choices and returns to
economics activity;
• studying on a more in-depth level how immigrants construct their reference groups
and how their interrelations affect immigrants’ choices;
• mapping international migrants’ internal migration at the destination in search for
the optimal location for their businesses;
• analyzing ethnic market saturation and its effect on the profitability and organization
of businesses within ethnic enclaves.
It seems that, despite the forces of globalization and market organization there is
and, at least for some time, still will be “structural viability” of small-businesses in gen-
eral (Kloosterman and Rath, 2001) and, thus, also potential for immigrant ownership
of these small businesses. Demand exerted by consumers employed in large-scale enter-
prises for group-specific, nearly tailor-made products and services in which it is hard to
achieve economies of scale (child-care, house-cleaning etc.) is precisely where immigrant
entrepreneurs often find their niche. As migration is a process which can not be stopped,
but at most managed, this thesis provided guidance as to whether and how migrants can
benefit for self-employment as a labor market strategy, leaving many more fascinating
avenues open to further academic inquiry.
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Appendix to Chapter 4.
Independent variables used for propensity score estimation
Variable SEPR SEUS WEPR WEUS
age <20 0.13 0.24 0.15 0.09
(0.33) (0.43) (0.36) (0.29)
age 20-30 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.22
(0.40) (0.43) (0.42) (0.41)
age 30-40 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.27
(0.43) (0.42) (0.43) (0.44)
age 40-50 0.25 0.20 0.24 0.26
(0.44) (0.40) (0.43) (0.44)
age 50-60 0.17 0.09 0.13 0.16
(0.38) (0.28) (0.34) (0.37)
gender-male 0.75 0.51 0.48 0.68
(0.43) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47)
gender-female 0.25 0.49 0.52 0.32
(0.43) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47)
education-incomplete 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12)
education-primary 0.18 0.07 0.06 0.10
(0.38) (0.25) (0.24) (0.29)
education-secondary 0.43 0.36 0.41 0.39
(0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49)
education-tertiary 0.38 0.56 0.52 0.50
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
married-no 0.45 0.53 0.47 0.37
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48)
married-yes 0.55 0.47 0.53 0.63
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48)
family size 1 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.20
(0.41) (0.37) (0.41) (0.40)
family size 2-3 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.45
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
family size 4-5 0.28 0.33 0.29 0.29
(0.45) (0.47) (0.45) (0.46)
family size 5< 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05
(0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22)
industries
agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.05
(0.30) (0.13) (0.10) (0.22)
mining 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
construction 0.21 0.07 0.04 0.16
(0.41) (0.26) (0.19) (0.37)
manufacturing 0.03 0.11 0.08 0.03
(0.16) (0.31) (0.27) (0.18)
transport/communications 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06
(0.21) (0.23) (0.26) (0.23)
wholesale 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
(0.12) (0.17) (0.13) (0.17)
retail 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.16
(0.38) (0.39) (0.29) (0.37)
finance/insurance 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.05
(0.16) (0.22) (0.20) (0.23)
business/repair services 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.12
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Independent variables used for propensity score estimation
Variable SEPR SEUS WEPR WEUS
(0.34) (0.23) (0.20) (0.33)
personal services 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.08
(0.30) (0.17) (0.16) (0.26)
entertainment 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11)
professional services 0.15 0.28 0.39 0.25
(0.36) (0.45) (0.49) (0.43)
public administration 0.00 0.11 0.17 0.00
0.00 (0.31) (0.38) 0.00
military 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
0.00 (0.04) (0.12) 0.00
occupations
manager, professional 0.20 0.24 0.30 0.32
(0.40) (0.43) (0.46) (0.47)
technician, salesman, administrative worker 0.19 0.31 0.26 0.21
(0.39) (0.46) (0.44) (0.41)
service worker 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.16
(0.36) (0.39) (0.42) (0.37)
farmer etc. 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.05
(0.30) (0.15) (0.13) (0.21)
precision or repair worker, craftsman 0.20 0.09 0.07 0.14
(0.40) (0.28) (0.25) (0.35)
operator, fabricator, laborer 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.11
(0.36) (0.35) (0.33) (0.32)
military 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
0.00 (0.04) (0.11) 0.00
Observations 4,606 46,614 45,075 3,466
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Independent variables, internal migration
Variable SEstayers SEmovers Variable SEstayers SEmovers
age < 20 0.07 0.19 industries
(0.25) (0.39) agriculture, forestry, etc. 0.09 0.05
age 20-30 0.17 0.26 (0.29) (0.22)
(0.37) (0.44) mining 0.00 0.00
age 30-40 0.27 0.21 (0.05) (0.04)
(0.45) (0.41) construction 0.17 0.15
age 40-50 0.30 0.20 (0.38) (0.35)
(0.46) (0.40) manufacturing 0.05 0.04
age 50-60 0.19 0.14 (0.21) (0.20)
(0.40) (0.35) transport/communcations 0.04 0.04
gender-male 0.64 0.59 (0.21) (0.20)
(0.48) (0.49) wholesale 0.03 0.02
gender-female 0.36 0.41 (0.16) (0.15)
(0.48) (0.49) retail 0.12 0.11
education-incomplete 0.01 0.00 (0.32) (0.31)
(0.08) (0.06) finance/insurance 0.08 0.08
education-primary 0.03 0.02 (0.28) (0.28)
(0.17) (0.15) business/repair services 0.11 0.12
education-secondary 0.41 0.33 (0.31) (0.32)
(0.49) (0.47) personal services 0.09 0.09
education-tertiary 0.55 0.65 (0.28) (0.29)
(0.50) (0.48) entertainment 0.01 0.02
married-no 0.29 0.46 (0.11) (0.14)
(0.45) (0.50) public administration 0.21 0.26
married-yes 0.71 0.54 (0.41) (0.44)
(0.45) (0.50) military 0.00 0.00
family size 1 0.19 0.35 (0.00) 0.00
(0.39) (0.48) occupations
family size 2-3 0.52 0.44 manager, professional 0.33 0.42
(0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.49)
family size 4-5 0.24 0.16 technician, salesman, etc. 0.22 0.21
(0.43) (0.37) (0.41) (0.41)
family size 5 < 0.05 0.04 service worker 0.14 0.14
(0.21) (0.19) (0.35) (0.34)
farmer etc. 0.09 0.05
(0.29) (0.21)
precision worker, craftsman 0.14 0.11
(0.35) (0.31)
operator, fabricator, laborer 0.08 0.07
(0.27) (0.26)
military 0.00 0.00
(0.00) 0.00
Observations 916,646 4,110
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Appendix to Chapter 5
Labor market discrimination of Puerto Rican immigrants across states and comparison
groups
Puerto Rican Hispanic white Non-Hispanic white
natives natives natives natives
Connecticut 0% -7% 19% 17%
Florida -24% -31% -14% -13%
Georgia -21% -25% -7% -5%
Illinois 18% 5% 36% 4%
New York -7% -3% 54% 54%
Ohio 39% -11% 7% 6%
Pennsylvania 79% 0% 43% 46%
average effect negative negative positive positive
specification of discrimination measures
occupations - - - -
earnings yearly yearly yearly yearly
Only Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition discrimination coefficients significant below
the 5% level have been considered. The discrimination measure took the value of
0 otherwise. Only states for which models achieved convergence are shown.
Labor market discrimination of Puerto Rican immigrants across states and comparison
groups
Puerto Rican Hispanic white Non-Hispanic white
natives natives natives natives
Connecticut 0% -2% 19% 15%
Florida -18% -24% -10% -8%
Georgia -11% -16% 0% 2%
Illinois 13% 4% 29% 30%
New York -6% -4% 40% 40%
Ohio -6% -30% -33% -34%
Pennsylvania 61% 4% 38% 39%
average effect negative negative positive positive
specification of discrimination measures
occupations + + + +
earnings hourly hourly hourly hourly
Only Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition discrimination coefficients significant below
the 5% level have been considered. The discrimination measure took the value of
0 otherwise. Only states for which models achieved convergence are shown.
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Labor market discrimination of Puerto Rican immigrants across states and comparison
groups
Puerto Rican Hispanic white Non-Hispanic white
natives natives natives natives
Connecticut 0% -6% 12% 7%
Florida -20% -27% -14% -13%
Georgia -10% 0% -2% 0%
Illinois 12% 4% 25% 25%
New York -8% -5% 33% 31%
Ohio 24% -8% -16% -17%
Pennsylvania 60% 2% 32% 31%
average effect negative negative positive positive
specification of discrimination measures
occupations - - - -
earnings hourly hourly hourly hourly
Only Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition discrimination coefficients significant below
the 5% level have been considered. The discrimination measure took the value of
0 otherwise. Only states for which models achieved convergence are shown.
Marginal effects of various discrimination measures evaluated at value of 10% on the proba-
bility of Puerto Rican immigrant self-employment in major receiving states, by comparison
groups.
dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] earnings occupations
Puerto Rican natives 0.59 0.024 24.29 0.00 0.55 0.64 yearly yes
Puerto Rican natives 0.24 0.010 23.91 0.00 0.22 0.26 yearly no
Puerto Rican natives 0.08 0.003 23.85 0.00 0.07 0.09 hourly yes
Puerto Rican natives 0.07 0.003 23.70 0.00 0.07 0.08 hourly no
Hispanic natives 0.40 0.018 22.00 0.00 0.36 0.43 yearly yes
Hispanic natives 0.33 0.013 25.02 0.00 0.31 0.36 yearly no
Hispanic natives 0.11 0.004 24.55 0.00 0.10 0.12 hourly yes
Hispanic natives 0.10 0.004 24.19 0.00 0.10 0.11 hourly no
white natives 0.19 0.010 19.33 0.00 0.17 0.21 yearly yes
white natives 0.20 0.009 22.75 0.00 0.18 0.22 yearly no
white natives 0.06 0.003 21.87 0.00 0.05 0.06 hourly yes
white natives 0.07 0.003 22.94 0.00 0.06 0.07 hourly no
white non-Hispanic natives 0.19 0.010 18.69 0.00 0.17 0.21 yearly yes
white non-Hispanic natives 0.20 0.009 21.96 0.00 0.19 0.22 yearly no
white non-Hispanic natives 0.06 0.003 21.06 0.00 0.05 0.06 hourly yes
white non-Hispanic natives 0.07 0.003 22.43 0.00 0.06 0.07 hourly no
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Marginal effects of various levels of discrimination on the Probability of Puerto Rican
immigrant self-employment, by comparison group.
(a) yearly earnings, no occupations (b) hourly earnings (c) hourly earnings, no occupations
(d) yearly earnings, no occupations (e) hourly earnings (f) hourly earnings, no occupations
(g) yearly earnings, no occupations (h) hourly earnings (i) hourly earnings, no occupations
(j) yearly earnings, no occupations (k) hourly earnings (l) hourly earnings, no occupations
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